

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED


UNITED STATES NAVY

WAR DIARY  
OF  
ADMIRAL, BLACK SEA



1 AUGUST, 1943 - 31 AUGUST, 1943  
PG NUMBERS 31537 - 31538

DECLASSIFIED BY JMW FOR INFO OF 5 MAY 1978, SEC  
DECLASSIFICATION OF NAVAL RECORDS



UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNCLASSIFIED

WAR DIARY

3

ADMIRAL, BLACK SEA

1 - 31 August 1943

PG Numbers 31537 - 31538

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY INFORMATION

Editorial Note:

The translation of this German War Diary was made in London, England, under the guidance of Commander S. A. Sanders, USNR. When his London Office was closed and the translation project was discontinued, much unfinished material was sent to Naval History Division, (GP-29).

Because the dissemination of the data contained in these documents is important, the translations and stencils have not been checked for accuracy of interpretation, phraseology, and spelling of officers' names or geographical names. Distribution under these conditions seems justified because of the excellent reputation of the London personnel and because translators are available in Naval History Division. Research to correct possible inconsistencies did not warrant the time involved.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Naval History Division  
Washington 25, D. C.



CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY  
of  
ADMIRAL, BLACK SEA

Commanding Admiral: Vice-Admiral Kieseritzky.

1 - 15 AUGUST 1943

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Naval History Division  
Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

1 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 0705 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 1 freighter of about 900 tons, 1 tug with 2 lighters of medium tonnage and 1 minesweeper entering Ghelenjik.

At 1845 and 1910 1 minesweeper and 5 vessels leaving Ghelenjik heading southwest for the usual assembly area. Owing to a radar breakdown, reconnaissance on the night of 31 July/- August had to be broken off.

At 2135 on 31 July a small vessel was located 10 miles south of Cape Chauda, course presumed to be north. The Air Force carried out daylight reconnaissance of the Caucasus coast as far as Batum and of the ports as far as Sukhum.

At 0435 5 miles south of Ghelenjik, a towing formation totaling 600 tons and 2 small armed vessels, course northwest.

At 0500 15 miles northwest of Tuapse 1 tug, 1 lighter of 400 tons and 2 patrol vessels, course southeast. 2 small armed vessels, course southeast, were sighted 5 miles west of Tuapse.

At 0508 1 patrol boat, stopped, 12 miles southwest of Tuapse.

At 0522 1 coastal vessel of 500 tons and 1 small armed vessel 5 miles southeast of Cape Adler, course southeast.

At 0530 1 coastal vessel of 500 tons entering Sukhum.

Enemy Shipping in Port:

Ghelenjik (oblique view, partially covered by clouds): 7 coastal vessels totaling 2,000 tons, 8 motor minesweepers, 9 M.T.B.s and some 60 boats.

Tuapse 0705: 14 coastal vessels totaling 4,500 tons, 6 motor minesweepers and 8 M.T.B.s, two of which were beached. 5 small armed vessels, 1 floating crane and 30 boats.

Sochi 0645: - oblique view - 2 coastal vessels totaling 400 tons and 6 motor minesweepers.

Sukhum 0550: 1 freighter of 1,500 tons with steam up, 1 freighter of 1,000 tons, 1 coastal vessel of 500 tons, 1 gunboat, 3 motor minesweepers, 25 boats, some beached.

According to radio inference, there were no large surface vessels at sea. No submarines appeared in the radio traffic. Small vessels more active off the east coast and in the Sea of Azov than during the last few days. Minor enemy attacks were repulsed at the Kuban bridgehead.

Own Situation:

2214 Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla  
on was informed of the results of our reconnaissance  
31 July which identified 7 enemy gunboats in Primorsko  
Akhtari.

Temriuk:

At 0150 naval ferry large R 418 reported an engagement with enemy gunboats, lasting until 0310. No hits observed. No damage or casualties.

At 0409 Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, who is executing the operation ordered against Primorsko Akhtari with 1 naval landing craft (guns), motor minesweeper R 30 and 3 E-boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla, was informed by radio of the presence of these enemy gunboats which had appeared in the Temriuk patrol lane.

The information from Temriuk was considerably delayed, as the communication line between Temriuk and Admiral, Black Sea via Kerch was not worked with the necessary speed. The lesson has been learned.

At 0437 Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla reported that bombs were dropped approximately 10 miles west of Primorsko Akhtari.

At 0540, Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla reported by radio that the formation of naval landing craft (guns) was engaged with enemy gunboats.

In answer to our inquiry, Naval Liaison Officer, 1st Air Corps reported at 0550 that, according to a report from the fighter cover flown as planned, a wildfowling group of 11 vessels was sighted 10 miles west of Primorsko Akhtari at 0530. One ship was on fire, drifting with



CONFIDENTIAL

engines stopped. Further details could not be observed.

Survey of the situation:

The purpose of the operation - to force the enemy motor gunboats to give battle - has been achieved. Despite their slight training, I consider the 4 naval landing craft (guns), each carrying two 8.8 cm. guns, the 3 L-boats with 4 cm. guns and our 1 minesweeper with one 3.7 cm. gun to be superior to the enemy formation. Moreover, they have a fighter escort with them.

At 0610 Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla reported an engagement with 6 enemy gunboats and asked for bomber support as ammunition was running out.

This report was received here at 0652. The news of lack of ammunition came as a surprise. After immediate discussion with 1st Air Corps, 2 further Me 109 took off with orders to make a low-level attack on the enemy with machine-guns. This measure was reported to Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla at 0729. 1st Air Corps also agreed to the commitment of dive-bombers, which according to a radiogram from Naval Liaison Officer, 1st Air Corps, took off at 0739.

In his report Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla did not mention any German losses, so the earlier report from 1st Air Corps of a ship on fire cannot refer to one of our vessels. The report of scarcity of ammunition and the fact that today, contrary to earlier behavior, the enemy seems to be particularly persistent induced me to adopt precautionary measures to meet the returning formation and give support to any damaged vessels. Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was therefore instructed by phone at 0735 to despatch at least 4 of the 5 naval ferry barges assembled off Temriuk immediately. They are to proceed north at a distance of 10 miles from the coast to support the 3rd Naval Landing Craft Flotilla (Guns). If radio communication should break down and no further orders be received, the naval ferry barges are to turn about at 1200. German dive-bombers and fighters are in the air. 1st Air Corps has been informed, but no word has yet been sent to Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, as I do not want to overburden the radio operators in the minesweeper. (I am hoping for another report from the Commander at any moment.)

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

According to the report from 1st Air Corps, 11 vessels were sighted taking part in the engagement. Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla reported 6 enemy motor gunboats. The 11 vessels are accounted for by motor minesweeper R 30 and the 4 naval landing craft (guns) plus the 6 enemy vessels, so the 1st E-Boat Flotilla cannot be there. The only report from this flotilla was transmitted at 0437 and dealt only with air attacks. It is not out of the question that the commander of the formation (Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla) dismissed the 1st E-Boat Flotilla after the air raid before encountering the enemy naval forces. On the other hand, the Air Force sighting report may not be reliable. To be on the safe side, Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla was instructed by radio at 0753 to support the formation of naval landing craft (guns).

At 0755 a short report was transmitted to Naval Group Command, South:

Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla is approximately 15 miles west of Primorsko Akhtari engaging 6 enemy gunboats; he has fighter protection, and dive-bombers have been sent out.

At 0800 1st Air Corps reported by phone that according to a report from the fighters, our formation had evaded the enemy.

At 0837 the Air Force approved the assignment of 4 further Me 110 which should contact our formation at 0910. They have orders to attack the enemy with machine-guns. Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla has been informed by radio.

At 0920 1st Air Corps telephoned the position of our formation as 33 miles westnorthwest of Primorsko Akhtari. Since 0640, when the Russians began to make smoke, no Russian gunboats have been seen. The next 2 fighters which took off at 0640 did not see anything of the enemy. At present (0920), there are 4 Me 110 and 2 Me 109 with the formation. 9 Ju 87 escorted by fighters took off from Temniuk at 0915 and should be with the formation at 0945.

I suggested to 1st Air Corps that the 9 Ju 87, which will make contact with the formation at 0945 and will therefore probably not sight the enemy, should advance to the northeast into the Bay of Primorsko Akhtari where they would still be able to attack the fleeing enemy gunboats.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

1st Air Corps agreed to this measure.

The situation now seems quite clear: our formation can no longer be in danger or the commander would certainly have reported. The naval ferry barges from Temriuk were therefore ordered via Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus to put in again. Unless there is an emergency, I do not wish this formation to proceed northwards longer than necessary because there is no fighter escort available for it. Moreover, there are 3 naval ferry barges in this formation which had just arrived with cargo from Kerch and their unloading must not be postponed longer than necessary. As there are far too few naval ferry barges to meet requirements, this delay cannot be accepted.

At 1014 F 418, the leading vessel of the naval ferry barges which left Temriuk, reported that the order to turn about had been understood. At 1200 the E-boats put in to Kerch, followed at 1700 by the formation of naval landing craft (guns) and motor minesweeper R 30.

At 1900 the action report was submitted:

At 1200 on 31 July Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla on board R 30 left Kerch with naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 8 - 11. The weather was as forecast. No special incidents on passage to the approach buoy off Primorsko Akhtari. At 0240 1 patrol vessel was sighted withdrawing in the direction of the harbor entrance which was marked with buoys. The formation took up position in the north off the blue buoy (46° 2.2' N, 37° 16' E). At 0302, as ordered, we made a surprise attack on the patrol vessel, radio station and harbor. At 0320 we altered target to 5 vessels leaving port. Our formation forced them to withdraw to the west between the naval landing craft (guns) and Kosma Achuevskaya.

V.H.F. contact was established with the 1st E-Boat Flotilla. Proceeding independently, the 3 boats of the flotilla were in position northwest of our formation of naval landing craft (guns) by 0300 as ordered. The E-boats were drawn up as a blocking force ahead and west of the enemy's line of advance. They opened fire on the enemy vessels which were steering northwest and there was a running engagement in which the naval landing craft (guns) also took part.

At 0335 the heavy enemy coastal guns found our range accurately. The formation of naval landing craft (guns) then turned off to westnorthwest.

CONFIDENTIAL

-5-

SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

At 0340 we had running engagement with 3 motor gunboats, while the other 5 boats went in to Primorsko Arhtari. The enemy made out to the northeast. From 0400 onwards attacked us in waves with 20-minute intervals between each attack: 10 bombs and machine-gun fire. Our own fighter escort was not sighted in the formation. Against the enemy and with the naval landing craft (guns) could only make 5.5 knots, bearing course 240°.

At 0520 3 enemy vessels came in sight from the south. (See 0100.) We opened fire from a favorable position in a passing action. The enemy vessels had joined forces in the start, forming a partial arc from northeast to southeast. The naval landing craft (guns) did not have much ammunition left and the formation was surrounded by smoke made by motor mine-sweeper R 30 and the E-boats. As three of the guns of the naval landing craft (guns) had failed, an E-boat put out a smoke container and a light buoy as decoys. At 0720 the enemy withdrew to the east. At 0945 the E-boats were dismissed because from 0915 the formation had been protected by heavy fighters and dive bombers.

No casualties aboard naval landing craft (guns) or E-boats, minor hits on 1 E-boat.

According to a report from 1st Air Corps, the fighter escort was in position from about 0500 although the fighting formation below did not see the planes. The fighters repulsed an enemy formation of bombers and fighters and shot down 2 Boston bombers.

#### Experiences:

1. This daylight action lasted several hours. It showed that the firing practice of the naval landing craft (guns) had been inadequate for effective attacks on ships from the range of some 3,000 meters dictated by the enemy. The penalty is now being paid for the failure to allocate longer training periods and an attempt will be made to repair this omission.
2. Even by day the enemy remains tactically superior, since his greater speed allows him to choose his position. (Requests for improved naval landing craft (guns) are forwarded separately.)
3. The E-boats provided vital support. Without them the operation might have resulted in major losses.

CONFIDENTIAL  
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

From the radio and Air Force sighting reports received during the action, I formed quite a different impression of the situation from that given in the action report of the flotilla commander. First of all, there was no initial enemy report: the flotilla commander believed that it was unnecessary as everything was proceeding according to plan. Even the final report at the end of the action was only sent in on request. All the radio messages did not come through: this failure is being investigated. The commanders of the attacking flotillas have been informed. These remarks are not intended to refute the fact that Lt. (s.g.) Klossmann, Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, again showed tactical understanding, exceptional prudence and keenness in the execution of this operation. Lt. (s.g.) Büchting, deputy Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla, also gave excellent support.

It has now been confirmed that the enemy has Russian motor gunboats in the Sea of Azov:

Speed: approximately 25 knots.

Armament: two 7.5 cm. guns and a useful machine-gun of about 2.7 cm. (long range),  
or one 7.5 cm. gun and two 4 cm. guns.

The 7.5 cm. guns seem to have been very efficient even at a range of 10,000 meters. In rough sea or at high speed, water jams the forward gun, but the boats are really seaworthy. In general their endurance is superior to our naval landing craft (guns) and they already exceed them in number in the Sea of Azov, where there are about twelve.

At 0440 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put in to Theodosia after unsuccessful anti-submarine operations south of Theodosia.

At 0925 one of our convoys was attacked by 2 torpedo planes approximately 5 miles west of Eupatoria. 2 torpedoes were fired at the Rumanian gunboat "Maresti" which was acting as escort, while submarine chaser "Xanten" was machine-gunned. No damage: one man seriously wounded aboard "Xanten". Our anti-aircraft guns scored no successes. The Rumanian fighters with the convoy reported both fighters shot down.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: Light, variable winds, in the afternoon sea wind, local thunder clouds with prospect of storm, visibility 15 miles.



CONFIDENTIAL

Group South asked for a report on experiences with meteorological buoys and Russian reactions to their transmissions. They were informed that, on the few days when the buoy functioned, it had given useful and valuable reports. It has not yet been discovered how the buoy was damaged, as there has been no ship available to search for it; but on 23 July radio intercept service D/F stations located a submarine transmitting a message near the buoy. Possibly the enemy had taken bearings on the meteorological transmissions and this submarine may have destroyed the buoy. It is planned to lay another as soon as an E-boat is available for the task, and then at a later date to lay 3 more.

U-boat Situation:

There are no reports from U-boats at sea.

To-day I have issued basic directions for the employment of the Italian midget submarines of the 1st CB-Boat Flotilla. These deal with the general organization of the flotilla, communications, use of charts, reporting system, etc. The main points are as follows:

1. As the boats are very liable to have engine trouble, they are always to operate in pairs in separate but adjacent areas.
2. The Italian flotilla commander must always be where the Italian operational radio station is - at present in Yalta, later in Sevastopol.
3. Operations will be offensive, boats acting on radio intercept and sighting reports. They will, however, operate outside the normal convoy routes so that their defenses will not be restricted by convoy escorts.

The operational order for 2 to 4 August allocates adjacent areas for midget submarines CB 1 and 6. They will proceed together to air grid squares 3420 and 4570. Operations will be directed primarily against enemy submarines because the Italian midget submarines carried out similar operations successfully last year and, indeed, their limited radius of action makes any other type of operation almost impossible.

In reply to a query, Group South reported that the Bulgarian naval forces had been instructed to escort convoys only within Bulgarian territorial waters. On the other hand, however, the Bulgarian naval forces had also been

CONFIDENTIAL

verbally instructed to attack any submarines outside the territorial waters if they were attacking a convoy proceeding inside under escort of Bulgarian naval forces. (This was the answer to my inquiry made at the beginning of July.)

At 1110, 2 Italian midget submarines (CB-boats) put in to Sevastopol.

At 1930 naval ferry barges F 418 and F 467, 4 minesweepers and 4 assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duty. Barges F 545 and F 546 will remain ready for operations in the roads.

At 2030 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put out from Theodosia as ordered for anti-submarine operations south of Theodosia.

At 2340 2 enemy M.T.B.s were discovered 3,000 meters from the mole trying to sneak into Anapa harbor, but gunfire forced them to make off to the southwest.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

Apart from the above-mentioned aerial torpedo attack on the convoy off Eupatoria, none of our convoys was attacked from the air. At 0605 22 fishing boats off Kossa Belosaratskaya were bombed and machine-gunned by 4 enemy planes, altitude 30 to 40 meters. No damage, no casualties.

Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported an attack by 15 bombers on the southern sector and the usual shelling of the site at the east harbor and the southern sector. Taganrog reported that the enemy battery at Pavlo-Ochakov had shelled the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy from 0510 to 0530. 42 rounds were fired, no damage or breakdowns reported. The harbor was again shelled from 0620 until 0700 by the battery at Morskaya. No damage or casualties.

Minesweeping Activity:

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 52 and 54 escorted the Anapa convoy, no mines swept. The group with skid gear swept for ground mines in the winter harbor without result. 3 motor minesweepers (FR) escorted the Temriuk convoys. No mines swept. Minesweeping planes swept route Red six times from point X to point Z. No mines swept. Motor minesweeper R 164 was ordered to check route Brown as far as point 17 en route for Kerch.



CONFIDENTIAL

In view of the increased enemy minelaying off the northern Taman coast, Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus proposed to time the Temriuk convoys so that they would reach Temriuk shortly before dawn. The tasks of the night escort will be:

1. to defend the coast,
2. to prevent minelaying,
3. to rouse the coast in the event of imminent landings.

The convoys cannot proceed by night unless at least 2 motor minesweepers (RA) are made available. Unless further minesweepers are allocated, this will entail the return of the motor minesweepers (RA) from Mariupol. They were due to return in any case when they had been repaired.

I stated that fundamentally I agreed with the proposal of Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus, but the temporary operational commitment of 1 or 2 motor minesweepers (RA) after preliminary announcement must be expected.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: Drop in tonnage caused by lack of goods wagons in Taman and Senaya, otherwise according to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 158 ran with 7 naval ferry barges. At 1305 convoy No. 159 put out from Kerch with 6 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1645 convoy No. 56 put out from Temriuk for Kerch with 1 naval ferry barge and an anti-mine escort. 2 more barges belonging to this convoy had not finished unloading. They had taken part in the operation with Commander, 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1740 convoy No. 49 put out from Genichesk with 5 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 2100 convoy No. 6 (Berdyansk-Kerch) put out from Berdyansk escorted by 1 tug, 1 lighter, "Grafenau" and motor minesweeper RA 51. Convoy No. 26 (Mariupol-Taganrog) ran with 1 tug and 1 lighter. At 2000 convoy No. 27 put out from Taganrog for Mariupol with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 2 transport barges.

CONFIDENTIAL

- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea per according to plan.  
(For air raid on the Constantza-Sevastopol convoy, see above.)

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

2 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 0420 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 1 freighter of 1,000 tons, 1 motor lighter of 5 - 700 tons, 4 minesweepers and 2 patrol vessels entering Ghelenjik. From 2200 until 2400 14 vessels mooring and casting off in landing area B.

Daylight reconnaissance by the Air Force over the central and eastern Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. No enemy shipping in the reconnaissance area in the Sea of Azov. According to radio traffic, no large ships at sea.

The Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria intercepted 4 submarines: 1 in the southwestern Black Sea, 1 south of the Crimean coast and the other 2 in the southeastern Black Sea. Presumably they were on exercises. M.T.B.s and patrol vessels very active.

Own Situation:

At 0410 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put in to Theodosia from anti-submarine operations south of Cape Meganom. Enemy not sighted.

At 0445 the coastal defense boats put in to Temriuk from the patrol line. They reported no particular incidents at sea, except gunfire observed on the Army front.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): The depression which settled some time ago over southern Russia is slowly moving east. More stable weather conditions are therefore to be expected in the Black Sea area. Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: north to northeast winds, force 2 to 4, fair, visibility 20 miles.

U-boat Situation:

At 0600 GB 1 and 6 (Italian midget submarines) put out from Sevastopol for their first operation against enemy submarines off the south Crimean coast. Air operations against submarines are suspended in the operational area.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

On 1 August photographic reconnaissance was flown for information on the tanker destroyed on 30 July in Sukhum roads. The photographs revealed that the tanker had sunk in water approximately 7 meters deep. She was lit on the forward part of the bridge, approximately 20 meters aft of the bow, on the port side and the ship's side.

Sections of the framing, 9 meters wide and approximately 4.5 meters deep, were destroyed. Another hit was observed forward of the after superstructure, some 30 meters from the stern on the port side. A gap, 12.5 meters wide, was seen between midships and the after part of the ship. Stern apparently broken off and listing to starboard. Even 2 days after the sinking, there was an oil patch 12 miles long across Sukhum Bay. The tanker can be regarded as totally destroyed.

5 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla were ordered to operate against enemy supply traffic off the Caucasus coast north and south of Olginskaya Bay on the night of 2/3 August. Sailing from the base had to be arranged so that, proceeding by direct route, the boats should not reach the operational area before 2200. They should withdraw from the coast for return passage by the same route by 0030 at the latest. The flotilla was informed that one of our U-boats would be operating south of 44° N. Anti-submarine operations are allowed in the area north of that parallel. 5 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out on this operation at 1400.

At 1745 the lighter "Pierre" sank some 8 miles west of Ochakov; presumably she struck a mine. No casualties. The case is being investigated by Naval Harbor Master, Ochakov.

At 1930 the naval ferry barges F 418, F 467, 4 minesweepers and 4 assault boats put out from Temriuk on patrol duty. 2 naval ferry barges are lying off the harbor entrance as reserves, also 5 more belonging to the Genichesk-Temriuk convoy.

At 2100 Ship 19 put out from Ik Mechet for anti-submarine operations in the area north of Cape Tarkhen.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no air attacks were reported on our convoys or naval forces. Naval Port Commander, Novorossiisk reported 37 bombs dropped

CONFIDENTIAL

on the town and the southern sector and the sites at the west harbor. From 0045 to 0117 an enemy plane was observed flying low over route Brown between point 19a and point 20. Minesweeping suspected. Throughout the day, Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported heavy shelling of the site at the east harbor, the southern sector and the southern part of the town. At 0147 5 - 5 rounds were fired at Berdyansk, presumably from a salvo mortar of 8.5 cm. caliber. No casualties. Taganrog was shelled from Pavlo-Ochakov from 2125 to 2145 (1 August). 18 rounds were fired at the port, no damage, 2 soldiers wounded.

Minesweeping Activity:

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 52 and 54 and motor minesweeper FR 7 escorted the Anapa convoy, no mines swept. 3 motor minesweepers (FR) and 2 groups with towed loop gear escorted convoys on route Red from point X as far as Temriuk. No mines swept. Minesweeping planes swept the area from point X to Red 15 nine times to a breadth of 400 meters. No mines swept. Motor minesweepers RM 1, 2, 3 and 5 searched the area around the wreck "Immanuel" on route Red between Mariupol and Taganrog. 1 mine swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 159 ran with 6 naval ferry barges. At 1810 convoy No. 160 put out from Kerch with 6 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1700 convoy No. 57 put out from Kerch with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 49 ran with 5 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Mariupol-Taganrog convoy ran with 1 tug, 2 lighters and 6 transport barges.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

3 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1900 the observation post at Novorossisk sighted 1 vessel putting out from Chelengkik at high speed on a southwesterly course.

Night reconnaissance in the western Black Sea reported no enemy sightings. No reconnaissance flown over the eastern Black Sea or over the Caucasus coast.

In the Sea of Azov at 0430 a small coastal vessel was sighted 3 miles north of Yeisk, course east; at 0445 a coastal vessel of 300 tons was sighted putting out from Irinorsko Akhteri on a northwesterly course. At 0703 in Yeisk, photographic reconnaissance identified 6 motor gunboats, 2 small coastal vessels and approximately 35 boats, some beached; at 0720 in Irinorsko Akhteri 7 motor gunboats and approximately 80 boats, some tied up.

No movements of large ships revealed by radio traffic. Slight activity of small vessels off the east coast and in the Sea of Azov. Submarines detected: 3 in the western Black Sea, 1 in the central Black Sea and 2 more in unidentified positions.

At the Kuban bridgehead attacking enemy battalions were repulsed.

Own Situation:

At 0059 naval ferry barge F 135 reported a submarine attack 5 miles northwest of Alushka, no damage mentioned.

At 0400 patrol boats put in to Terriuk from coastal defense duties.

Nothing to report.

I am proceeding to Kerch and the Kuban bridgehead for operational discussions with Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus, inspection of the naval troops operating there and discussions at 17th Army H.Q.

At 0650 the 1st E-boat Flotilla put in to Ivan Baba after execution of the operation ordered against the Caucasus coast near Olginskaya Bay. The coast and bay were

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

thoroughly examined in good visibility, no supply traffic observed. No special incidents on return passage.

On passage to the operational area, the 1st E-Boat Flotilla searched for the lost meteorological buoy. They discovered that the mooring buoy was still anchored, but the meteorological buoy had been disconnected and apparently removed.

It is planned to lay another meteorological buoy and, as directed by Naval Group Command South, to have it watched by Italian midget submarines which may attract submarines. Moreover, investigations are being carried out with a view to fitting the buoy with a mine which would explode in the event of unauthorized removal.

U-boat Situation:

At 0315 a report was received from CB-3 stating that she would enter Malta at 0900 as two of the crew were ill, i.e. half the complement. The coast was informed. Commander CB-East Flotilla arranged for the replacement of the two men in Malta at 0800 and at 1020 the boat put out again for the operational area.

The midget submarines were informed that during the night there was Russian submarine in grid square 4541.

No reports from our own U-boats at sea. They were informed that coastal reconnaissance was canceled as the aircraft were needed at the bridgehead.

At 2025 2 boats of the 11th E-boat Flotilla put out from Theodosia for the operation in the Cape Strach area. Because of engine trouble in one boat, both commenced return passage at 2103 and put in to Theodosia at 2205.

At 2100 Temriuk reported that owing to bad weather conditions the patrol boats could not leave port. The boats remained ready to sail if the weather improved. (Wind northwest, force 3; sea 3.)

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no enemy aircraft attacked our convoys.

Mirnapol and Gordyansk reported no enemy penetrations, but no boats damaged.

CONFIDENTIAL

Slight artillery and mortar fire was reported from Novorossisk.

Minesweeping Activity:

Ochakov: Owing to suspected minelaying (lighter "Pierre" striking a mine on 2 August), route Yellow has been closed from Odessa to Ochakov.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 52 and 54 and FR 7 escorted the Anapa convoy. No mines swept. Motor minesweeper RA 51 and 3 motor minesweepers (FR) acted as anti-mine escort on route Red from point 15 as far as Temriuk. No mines swept. Motor minesweeper R 30 twice swept route Red for moored mines from point 15 to point X without result. Minesweeping planes swept an area 400 meters wide from point 15 to point X for ground mines: the area was covered 9 times. No mines were swept.

Mariupol: Motor minesweepers RM 2, 3 and 5 searched route Red from Mariupol to Taganrog. No results were reported. Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine announced the Krivaya Kossa area as a declared area after 2 suspicious vessels had been observed at 1200 sailing on various courses at high speed. They were suspected to be enemy vessels which might have laid mines there.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: Supply traffic was held up by the weather.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 160 ran with 6 naval ferry barges. At 1740 convoy No. 161 put out from Kerch with 6 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1100 convoy No. 57 put in to Temriuk with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges. Convoy No. 56 ran with 2 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 49 ran with 1 motor sailing vessel and 5 naval ferry barges. At 1600 convoy No. 50 put out from Genichesk with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 4 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1945 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Taganrog with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 10 transport barges.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

4 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 0415 the observation post at Novorossisk sighted 2 vessels putting out from Ghelenjik as far as the exit from the Bay, then putting in again.

No reports on the enemy from the western or southwestern Black Sea.

1 Turkish passenger ship of 5,000 tons off the Turkish coast 5 miles northwest of Rizeh with course set for Rizeh. No shipping off the Caucasus coast from Ghelenjik to Tsupse. Owing to weather conditions only the ports of Ghelenjik and Tsupse could be surveyed: they showed no important changes since 1 August, except an additional freighter of 1,500 tons in Tsupse.

No movements of heavy surface forces revealed by radio traffic.

The Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria took a bearing on a submarine presumed to be some 50 miles east of Constantza. No submarines were detected off the east coast during the day. Activity of small vessels continued off the east coast and in the Sea of Azov.

Own Situation:

At 0730 I returned to Simferopol. The Commanding General of the 17th Army asked me to operate as frequently and effectively as possible against the supplies to the Mysheko beachhead. Apart from actual successes, he expects such action to have a favorable psychological effect on his troops, who are always seeing forces brought up against them, apparently without any steps being taken to oppose such transports. The difficulties were explained and understood.

After a detailed examination of enemy supply traffic to the beachhead, I estimated that the probable assembly point of the enemy convoys was some 4 to 5 miles southwest of Ghelenjik. The convoys then proceed directly (approximately on course 310°) through the enemy declared area which extends

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

to about 3 miles southwest of landing point B. They then make for an assembly point some 1.5 miles south of landing point B and land simultaneously. As long-term observations have revealed, the traffic disregards the declared areas off the coast and seems to use only landing point B.

I intend to send out the 1st E-Boat Flotilla against this supply traffic; they also will disregard the enemy declared areas which our naval forces have been avoiding up to now. The operation has been ordered for some time within the next few days.

Owing to bad weather conditions, the Temriuk patrol line was not occupied.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): North-easterly winds up to force 5 may be expected. Eupatoria to Yalta: Northeasterly winds, force 4 - 5, squally, fair, visibility 20 miles. Yalta to Novorossisk and southern Sea of Azov: Northeasterly winds, force 5, in squalls up to force 7, fair, visibility 20 miles. Northern Sea of Azov: Northeasterly winds force 4 - 5, squally, fair, visibility 20 miles.

The E-boat Flotilla did not operate owing to the weather.

U-boat Situation:

At 0000 U 20 reported that, owing to lack of fuel she was commencing return passage after 19 days in the operational area. The boat was instructed to proceed to Theodosia.

At 0012 U 19 reported that she had been driven off by the escorts of a 1,500-ton tanker before she could attack her. The boat also reported a mysterious oil trace, adding that it was very urgent that she should put the warrant quartermaster ashore as he was ill.

U 19 and U 20 were ordered to meet at 1100 in air grid square 94373 to transfer the warrant quartermaster. U 19 was also ordered to provide U 20 with details of the mysterious oil trace and her unsuccessful attempt to attack the tanker. U 20 would inform Command.

At 1651 U 20 reported that she had been off Theodosia for 12 hours, meeting U 19 according to plan.

At 1934 U 19 reported a surprise air attack in grid square 0344, followed by a 3-hours'



CONFIDENTIAL

pursuit. The boat proceeded to the north-western corner of the operational area and was ordered to return to the coast after a 24-hours' rest.

The Italian midget submarines CB 3 and 4 received their operational orders for anti-submarine operations in the area south of the Crimean coast at 0600 on 5 August.

At 1845 midget submarines CB 1 and 6 put in to Sevastopol after their first operation. No successes.

Temriuk      Owing to the weather, patrol boats could  
at            not put out: wind northeast, force 5,  
2039          sea 4. The boats remained ready to sail.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no convoys were attacked.

At 1817 the town and harbor area of Yalta were raided by 5 planes which dropped approximately 30 bombs. 6 naval personnel were killed in a cellar of a destroyed building by a bomb which landed near the Naval Administration Office. The Sea Transport Office was badly damaged. Berdyansk reported enemy penetration without bombing. From 0000 to 0030 Taganrog was shelled from Pavlo-Ochakov. Harbor not damaged.

Novorossisk reported mortar and heavy artillery fire on the site at the east harbor and the southern part of the town.

Minesweeping Activity:

Kerch: No mines were swept by the anti-mine escorts on passage to Anapa and Temriuk. Minesweeping planes checked route Red three times for ground mines from point Z to point 220 without result. Further operations by the minesweeping planes were canceled owing to the weather.

Mariupol: The area off Krivoya Kossa which was announced as declared area yesterday was re-opened as no mines had been detected.

Supply Traffic:

a. Kerch Strait: Ferry traffic seriously impeded by bad weather.

b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 161 ran with

CONFIDENTIAL

6 naval ferry barges. In this convoy the "Grafenau" towed part of a net barrage to Anapa. At 1655 convoy No. 162 put out from Kerch with 4 naval ferry barges.

- c. Convoy No. 57 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges. At 1830 convoy No. 59 put out from Kerch with 1 train ferry and 2 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1600 on 3 August convoy No. 50 put out from Genichesk with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 4 naval ferry barges. Owing to the weather, the convoy was diverted to Senaya where it arrived at 1900.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 10 transport barges.
- f. Certain of the Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea were delayed by the weather.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

Reconnaissance in the central and western Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy.

At 1358 3 merchant ships of up to 3,000 tons were sighted off the Turkish coast in the roads 10 miles southwest of Zonguldak. At 1430 1 merchant ship of approximately 1,000 tons 20 miles east of Zile, course east. Also several freight and smaller sailing ships.

In good visibility the Caucasus coast was reconnoitered as far as Cape Pitsunda. A convoy with 5 coastal vessels and 3 motor minesweepers, course southeast, was sighted north of Cape Pizunda and 1 M.T.B. was observed in the Sochi area, course southeast.

4 motor gunboats, course northeast, were sighted in the Sea of Azov 10 miles north of Achuev.

Enemy Shipping in Port, Caucasus Coast:

Sochi 0724: 6 motor minesweepers, three of which were beached, and approximately 20 boats, some beached.

Tuapse 0744: 1 minesweeper, 3 motor minesweepers, 1 small armed vessel, 1 freighter of about 1,500 tons, 4 coastal vessels and barges totaling 1,400 tons and 15 boats.

Chelenjik 0803: 5 M.T.B.s, 6 motor minesweepers, 1 coastal vessel of about 250 tons, 30 boats.

Ports on the Sea of Azov (visual reconnaissance):

Primorsko-Akhtari 0707: 2 motor gunboats, 2 coastal vessels, some 40 boats.

Yeisk 0755: 4 motor gunboats, 1 coastal vessel, about 10 boats.

Fishery at Kamishevatka 0758: 20 boats, some beached.

According to radio traffic there were no large ships at sea. Submarines detected: 2 in the northwestern Black Sea - Crimea operational area, 1 in the southwestern Black

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

Sea and other in an unidentified position.

Slight activity of small vessels in the Sea of Azov and in the east coast area.

Own Situation:

At 0000 Naval Harbor Master, Berdyansk reported that from 2140 to 2202 on 4 August an engagement took place 5 miles southwest of Berdyansk between 2 armed enemy boats and one of our own small boats. The enemy boats were attacked with 2 cm. naval guns and turned off to the coast, steering a northerly course. The German boat, motor minesweeper RB 01, also set a northerly course and attempted to force the enemy boats to turn off by blocking their advance with anti-aircraft guns and machine-guns. They turned off to the west at a high speed of about 15 knots and disappeared at 2202. RB 01 probably scored some hits. After turning off, one of the enemy boats answered her fire with a few rounds, caliber approximately 3.5 cm. No casualties or damage. Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine was again directed to forward enemy reports at once.

At 0530 naval ferry barges F 418 and F 467 and 4 assault boats put out from Temriuk because a Russian Army attack on our coastal base had been reported and it was expected that enemy boats would also attack from the sea. No enemy naval forces were observed, but around 0700 the boats were shelled from the shore although the enemy range was approximately 100 to 150 meters out. At 0900 all the boats put in to Temriuk again without any damage or casualties.

I ordered that in future the small, weakly armed RK and RT-boats should no longer act as patrols, but should confine their activities to minesweeping. Since the enemy vessels appearing in the Sea of Azov are fairly strongly armed, these boats with their weak armament would be quite useless in patrol service. Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus has been instructed to send 2 naval landing craft (guns) to Temriuk as soon as possible. They will then be employed on coastal defense duties there.

Furthermore, I authorized Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus to act on his own initiative in the employment of patrol forces lying in Temriuk, particularly for cooperation with the Army, if enemy reports seem to make such operations necessary.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Yalta sea area: easterly winds, force 4-5, cloudy, visibility 20 miles. Kerch - Novorossisk sea area and southern Sea of Azov: northeast to east winds, force 5 - 6, cloudy, visibility 20 miles. Northern Sea of Azov: easterly winds, force 4 - 5, cloudy, visibility 20 miles. Wind abating generally to force 4 during the night, locally to 3.

The 1st E-Boat Flotilla did not operate today owing to the weather. The boats have been ordered to attack enemy supply traffic between Ghelenjik and the beachhead at Novorossisk during the night of 7/8 August. Long-term observation has revealed that this traffic runs regularly from an assembly point some 5 miles southwest of Ghelenjik to landing point B. (See appended operational order.)

The weather prevented the 11th E-Boat Flotilla from operating.

I requested the Naval Liaison Staff, Rumania, to which the Naval Liaison Officer to the Rumanian Port Commander, Odessa is subordinate, to examine the defenses of Odessa harbor and to report the results to me.

I am directly interested in this port as the base of the 30th Escort Flotilla and the most important harbor for convoys in the north-western Black Sea, while I should also have an indirect interest if the enemy were to land in the neighboring coastal area.

U-boat Situation:

At 0615 U 20 put in to Theodosia after the operation. In 18 days she had met only patrol vessels close to the coast in the operational area. At 1900, when her commander had reported to Admiral, Black Sea, U 20 put out from Theodosia for Constantza.

At 0620 midget submarines CB 3 and 4 put out from Sevastopol for anti-submarine operations in the area south of Sarich.

Around 1500 CB 4 reported one pump out of order and commenced return passage to Sevastopol, where she arrived at 1625. The pump had been exchanged by 1730 and at 1830 the boat again put out for the operation.



CONFIDENTIAL

The midget submarines were informed that U 20 would be passing, while U 20 was directed to proceed to the south around the operational area of the midget submarines.

Otherwise no reports from our own boats at sea.

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was instructed to carry out training exercises with 2 boats of 3rd Naval Landing Craft Flotilla (Guns) from Kerch. The other 2 boats were transferred to Temriuk. At a given time the boats are to exchange tasks. Naval Shore Commander has been authorized to employ the training group for operations if necessary.

At 1600 "Ship 19" put out from Ak Mechet for anti-submarine operations in the Cape Tarkhan-Eupatoria area and at 0330 on 6 August should reinforce the escort for a Constantza-Sevastopol convoy.

At 1930 naval ferry barges F 418, F 467, 4 boats and 4 assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties.

At 2225 a noise bearing seemed to indicate enemy M.T.B.s passing Anapa at a distance of 5 miles on course 300° (approx.). The Anapa convoy No. 163, anchored close to Shelesny Rog, has been informed.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no aircraft attacks on convoys or naval forces. The Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria reported air activity over the western Black Sea in the morning and afternoon.

During the night several bombs were dropped on Novorossisk.

Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported the usual mortar and artillery fire on the site at the east harbor and the southern sector.

Minesweeping Activity:

Sevastopol: The FZ-group searched route Green six times from the approach buoy northwards as far as the 40-meter line and eastwards as far as the minefield. No mines swept.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 52, 54 and FR 7 escorted Anapa convoy No. 162, no mines swept. Owing to the weather, motor minesweepers R 30, R 164, RA 51 and 3 motor minesweepers (FR) broke off their minesweeping operations on route Red and put in to Temriuk.

CONFIDENTIAL

Minesweeping planes searching for ground mines swept route Red nine times and the northern entrance to Kerch Strait twelve times. No mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

Supply traffic to the Kuban bridgehead was badly impeded by the weather (wind: east to northeast, force 5 - 6).

- a. Kerch Strait: Schedule was not fulfilled owing to the weather.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 162 ran with 4 naval ferry barges. At 1805 convoy No. 163 put out from Kerch with 4 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 58 put in to Kerch again at 1000 owing to the weather.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1920 convoy No. 51 put out from Genichesk with 1 motor sailing vessel and 5 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: No Mariupol-Taganrog convoys.
- f. Crimea convoy and convoys in the western Black Sea were held up by bad weather and some of them were late in arriving at their ports of destination.



CONFIDENTIAL

6 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1220 and again at 1820 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk heard an explosion off Ghelenjik, presumably mines.

It is to be hoped that the explosions came from our minefield between Ghelenjik and Cape Doob.

Furthermore, at 1915 Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk observed 3 vessels leaving Ghelenjik at slight speed, course southwest.

Reconnaissance over the central and western Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. Normal traffic off the Turkish coast only. Owing to the weather, the Caucasus coast could not be surveyed.

No enemy shipping in the Sea of Azov.

Enemy Shipping in Port:

Yeisk 0704: 5 motor gunboats, 1 coastal vessel, approximately 20 boats, some beached.

No movements of large surface vessels were perceptible from the radio traffic. Submarines detected: 1 in the northwestern Black Sea, 1 in the southwestern Black Sea, 2 in the Bosphorus area and 3 in unidentified positions. In the afternoon planes were active over the western Black Sea. Activity of small vessels off the east coast and in the Sea of Azov still slight.

From the Army front only reconnaissance and assault activities were reported.

Own Situation:

At 0415 the vessels employed on coastal defense put in to Temriuk and reported no special incidents, except several parachute flares over the sea in a northwesterly direction.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Yalta: west to northwest winds, force 3 - 5, in the evening force 3, cloudy, visibility 20 miles. Yalta - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: winds southwest to south, force 3 - 5, in the night force 3, cloudy, light thunderstorms locally, visibility 20 miles.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

German Naval Command, Constantza and the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla were ordered to reinforce the Crimea group of 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla by sending motor minesweeper R 209 to Sevastopol, at the latest with the next convoy. Commander, Convoys and Escorts would then still have 8 motor minesweepers at his disposal.

The 11th E-Boat Flotilla was ordered to repeat the operation off Cape Utrich with all available operational boats during the night of 6/7 August. Sailing is to be organized so that the boats do not reach the operational area before 2200. They are to approach by direct route, commencing return passage to Anapa half an hour before dawn. Anti-submarine operations not restricted. Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus and Naval Port Commander, Anapa will inform the coastal authorities and enemy sightings will be transmitted to the boats on the E-boat frequency by Naval Port Commander, Anapa.

U-boat Situation:

As our E-boats were to operate during the night of 6/7 August, U 19 was instructed not to proceed north of 44° N. At 1200 midget submarines CB 1 and 6 reported ready for operations.

At 2023 U 19 reported: At 1830, 1 tanker of 1,500 tons and 3 escort boats in grid square 9433, course 140°, speed 8 knots. Am pursuing them.

A night reconnaissance plane was detailed to help to regain contact. It took off at 2100.

U 19 was instructed to report contact at once and to transmit homing signals for U 24, which has been detailed to operate against this target.

The night reconnaissance plane reported 2 or 3 vessels off Sochi and Cape Adler at approximately 2359. This report was immediately transmitted to the boats.

At the suggestion of Group South, five of the EMS mines (periscope mines) stored in Kerch were transferred to Constantza to be laid by our U-boats in the southeastern Black Sea as they left the operational area. The aim was to use them as decoys to make the enemy believe that our U-boats were still operating. Enemy anti-submarine forces would

CONFIDENTIAL

be split up and their search for real periscopes would relax after discovering the mines.

For a survey of U-boat pack tactics in the Black Sea, see Appendix.

At 1330 it was reported that a submarine had attacked the tanker "Firuz" off the northern exit of the Bosphorus in 41° 21' N, 28° 05' E. "Firuz" was hit by a torpedo on her port bow, but she remained afloat and at 1410 entered the territorial waters of the Bosphorus at 4 - 5 knots. The escorting motor minesweepers and submarine chaser "Xanten" are pursuing the enemy submarine with depth charges, so far without success. The chase continues.

At 1400 3 E-boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out from Ivan Baba for the diversionary operation ordered against enemy supply traffic between Chugovko passage and Vulcan Tal. They formed the southern group. At 1600 3 more boats followed on the same operation, making up the northern group. At 2030 the latter group turned about because of the weather (wind west-southwest, force 4 - 5, sea 4 with long, high swell, long thunderstorms locally with violent squalls). Weapons could not be used on courses against or across the seaway and only restricted use was possible with the seaway. Moreover, it was impossible to lie stopped.

The southern group met somewhat better weather conditions and was able to carry out the operation according to plan.

At 1818 S 26 of the southern group reported a breakdown in the port engine and at 1920 was dismissed to Ivan Baba as the engine could not be repaired on board during the operation. The remaining 2 boats were in position by 2050 as ordered. At 2138 1 small patrol vessel and 1 coastal vessel came in sight from the west. At 2155 S 72 sank the coastal vessel of 600 tons with a double torpedo shot. When the explosion was heard, the coastal stations gave the alarm by firing white stars. The boats made off from the coast and S 72 reloaded. At 2210 the boats again approached the coast. 2 small patrol vessels were sighted steering east at high speed, then at 2226 4 or 5 M.T.B.s were caught by the Cape Idkopas searchlight as they proceeded east in broad formation at high speed. As the alarm was given on the coast and the weather was deteriorating, the boats commenced their return passage at 2300.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

The southern group had thus drawn the enemy patrol vessels from the Ghelenjik-Myshako area according to plan. This was confirmed by the patrol vessels and M.T.B.s proceeding eastwards at high speed.

I intend to repeat this operation to-night.

At 1400 "Ship 19" proceeded to reinforce the escort for the Sevastopol-Constantza convoy with which she remained until 2400. She then sailed independently to Ak Mechet and was granted full freedom of attack against submarines en route.

At 1443 the Anapa convoy No. 163 was bombed and machine-gunned by 12 Russian ground-attack planes. Our 7.5 cm. and 2 cm. anti-aircraft guns were unsuccessful. No damage, 1 man slightly wounded. The convoy continued according to plan. German fighters arrived just as the attacking formation flew off.

At 1450 the fishing smack T 265 struck a mine and sank off the channel entrance near the outer buoy some 3 km. off the port of Taganrog. The crew of 3 fishermen were killed. The Taganrog harbor entrance was immediately closed because of suspected mines and the area off the port announced as a declared area.

At 1930 naval ferry barges F 418 and F 467, 4 boats and 6 assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties.

At 2020 when the local thunderstorm had passed, 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put out from Theodosia for the operation as ordered and patrolled the area off Cape Utrich from 2315 onwards.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

At 1443 the Anapa convoy No. 163 was attacked by planes: see above. No further air raids on convoys or ports.

Novorossisk reported the usual mortar and artillery fire.

From 0415 to 0445, the harbor area of Taganrog was shelled from the direction of Morskaya. 8 rounds were fired, no damage caused.



CONFIDENTIAL

Minesweeping Activity:

Varna: 2 Bulgarian motor minesweepers swept the area off Varna-North. No mines swept.

Danube: Minesweeping planes swept the area from Mile 51 to Mile 54 nine times (15th to 23rd sweeps). No mines swept.

Sevastopol: Using towed loop gear, the FZ-group swept route Green eight times from the approach buoy northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards as far as the minefield. No mines swept.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 51, RA 52, and FR 4 escorted the Anapa convoy No. 163. No mines swept.

Motor minesweepers R 30, R 164, FR 2 and 8 checked route Red for moored mines between point 16 and Temriuk. No mines swept.

Mariupol: Motor minesweepers RM 1, 4, 2 and 3 put out to carry out a check sweep off Taganrog.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 163 ran with 4 naval ferry barges. For air raid, see above. Convoy No. 164 put out from Kerch at 1810 with 7 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 58 ran with 1 train ferry and 2 naval ferry barges. At 1800 convoy No. 59 put out from Kerch with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 5 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 51 ran with 1 motor sailing vessel and 5 naval ferry barges.
- e. At 1320 the Kerch-Berdyansk convoy No. 7 put out from Kerch with 1 tug and 1 lighter.
- f. The Mariupol-Taganrog convoy did not put out because of suspected mines.
- g. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan, except for the submarine attack on the tanker "Firuz".

CONFIDENTIAL

7 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 2130 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 5 vessels near landing area B. They were shelled by the batteries. 45 miles northwest of Trabzon, daylight reconnaissance sighted a submerged enemy submarine.

Apart from slight traffic off the Turkish coast, no enemy surface vessels were sighted.

In the Anapa - Sochi area night reconnaissance located several small vessels, while in the area off Cape Adler a convoy comprising 1 freighter of 1,500 tons and 3 escort vessels was intercepted.

Apart from single coastal vessels north of Yeisk, no enemy ships were observed in the Sea of Azov. Enemy shipping in port showed no important changes. No reports on the ports on the Caucasus coast.

According to radio traffic no large vessels seemed to be at sea, but M.T.B. and motor minesweeper activity was detected off the central to northern part of the east coast. Slight enemy activity off the southern part of the east coast. Submarines detected: 1 in the northwestern Black Sea - Crimean area, 3 in the southwestern Black Sea and Bosphorus area, including 1 submarine approaching from the east. 1 submarine in an unidentified position at sea. On the Army front, after softening up by artillery, several enemy divisions attacked with tank support. Hard fighting continues.

Own Situation:

At 0100 the 3 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla (northern group) which had to turn about owing to weather conditions put in to Ivan Baba from their operation against enemy supply traffic off the Caucasus coast. S 26, forced to return because of engine trouble, put in to Ivan Baba at 0200. The remaining 2 boats of the southern group put in to Ivan Baba at 0420.

For the action report on the boats' operation against enemy supply traffic off the Caucasus coast, see War Diary dated 6 August.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

At 0430 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla tied up in Anapa. The boats did not sight the enemy from their lurking positions off Cape Utrich.

At 0430 the patrol boats put in to Temriuk from their coastal defense duties. They had nothing to report except some parachute flares at sea in the north.

At 0615 the Anapa convoy No. 164 was attacked 18 miles north of Anapa by 12 enemy planes - 6 ground-attack planes and 6 fighters - using machine-guns and bombs from an altitude of 100 or 200 meters. 1 enemy plane dropped phosphorus. The effect of the ship's anti-aircraft guns was not observed. The boats were not damaged, but 2 men were seriously wounded and 2 slightly wounded. German fighters which arrived shortly after the attack shot down 3 enemy-planes with certainty and probably one more. The convoy continued its passage.

At 0630 the Sevastopol-Constantza convoy with "Prodromos" and "Kassa" was bombed and torpedoed 32 miles east of Sulina. It is not yet certain whether the torpedoes were fired by a plane or a submarine. A BV, acting as close escort, shot down 1 enemy bomber in air combat. Some of our bombs dropped on a torpedo track presumably sank this torpedo, as it was not observed later on. We suffered no damage or casualties.

Immediately afterwards, Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea ordered 2 submarine chasers to put out from Sulina to the area off the port to search for the suspected submarine.

As this convoy was raided far from the Russian bases, we are now forced to employ fighter escort even in the western Black Sea. I approved the decision of Commander, Convoys and Escorts who ordered an anti-submarine patrol on the assumption of a submarine attack.

At 0900 the submarine chaser "Xanten" on anti-submarine patrol off the Bosphorus with 4 motor minesweepers reported no sightings or locations. "Xanten" was therefore ordered to proceed to Varna with the motor minesweepers. She commenced return passage around 1000.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria -- Novorossisk and Sea of Azov winds southwest to west, force 3, during the day force 5, at night abating to force 2 - 3, cloudy, visibility 20 miles.



CONFIDENTIAL

The 1st E-Boat Flotilla was ordered to repeat the operation against enemy supply traffic between Chelenjik and the beachhead. The Flotilla will again be divided so that the northern group would consist of at least 3 boats. The southern group will operate between Chugovko passage and Vulcan Tal as on the previous night.

The 11th E-Boat Flotilla was ordered to repeat the operation off Cape Utrich during the night of 7/8 August. Boats were to reach the operational area by 2200 and commence return passage to Anapa half an hour before dawn.

Commander, 3rd Naval Landing Craft Flotilla (Guns) was ordered to lay mines at the entrance to Yeisk harbor during the night of 7/8 August. See appended operational order.

During an inspection trip in Tuganrog I came to an agreement with the Army that, in special circumstances, if the Army gave short notice of roughly 24 hours, naval landing craft (guns) would bombard the enemy coastal front. I laid down the following rules of procedure in such cases:

- a. The Army request is to be made via Naval Harbor Master, Tuganrog.
- b. Naval Harbor Master, Tuganrog will transmit the request directly to Admiral, Black Sea by "Most Immediate" radiogram, copy to Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine.
- c. To ensure speed in transmission, the request will be passed as a "Most Immediate" radiogram giving the cover name "Panzerzug" preceded by the date and hour. This will indicate the desired time for bombardment of the enemy coast.
- d. Admiral, Black Sea will immediately report to Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine by the quickest route that the cover name has been received, giving the date and hour ordered for the bombardment. He will order the number of naval landing craft (guns) to be employed by inserting a figure before "Panzerzug". If the landing craft are not already in Tuganrog as requested, Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine will then arrange for their sailing at once. One of the vessels should be equipped to assume navigational responsibility.

CONFIDENTIAL

- e. If there should be more naval landing craft (guns) available than Admiral, Black Sea ordered, Naval Shore Commander is empowered to employ them if it seems advisable, but he must inform Admiral, Black Sea. If the number of naval landing craft (guns) ordered is not to be exceeded, Admiral, Black Sea will insert the word "only" before the number in his confirming radiogram.

U-boat Situation:

At 0530 midget submarines CB 1 and 6 put out from Sevastopol for Yalta.

At 0845 U 24 reported: "At 0230 convoy in grid square 0323. Not observed putting in to Sukhum, but in case it actually did as indicated by photographic reconnaissance, intend to penetrate after recharging the batteries. Am in grid square 0329."

The boat had therefore made contact with the tanker convoy (tanker 1,800 G.R.T.) reported by U 19 on 6 August and again intercepted for a short period by night reconnaissance, but she had not been able to attack. She was then ordered to attempt the planned penetration as soon as possible because although there could be no photographic check owing to weather conditions, all our evidence seemed to indicate that there were freighters in Sukhum.

At 1530 CB 1 and 6 put in to Yalta. Here, during operational discussions, the boats were ordered to undertake a 3-days' operation off the south Crimean coast. For operational order, see Appendix.

CB 6 put out from Yalta on this operation at 1700 according to plan, CB 1 left at 1800.

At 1320 U 20 put in to Constantza from operations.

At 1300 2 submarine chasers put out from Constantza for anti-submarine operations off the Bosphorus.

At 1400 the southern group of 2 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out from Ivan Beba. The northern group of 2 boats put out at 1600. While proceeding to the operational area, the southern group was attacked in grid square CL 8584 at 1745 by 2 bombers: each plane dropped 6 - 8 bombs of medium caliber. Bombs landed close to E-boat S 72. No damage. At 2100 2 flying boats were sighted, apparently patrolling the area,

CONFIDENTIAL

but our boats were not observed. Cwing to bad visibility both boats proceeded close to the coast. At 2200 1 patrol vessel and 2 coastal vessels came into sight from the north and at 2218 the boats made a joint attack. S 72 and S 52, firing double torpedo shots, each sank 1 coastal vessel of 700 G.R.T. carrying ammunition. After the explosions both boats were forced to withdraw by coastal searchlights and gunfire from the patrol vessel. At 2230 the boats sighted 2 probable M.T.B.s off Chugovko passage and 1 patrol vessel in the north and one in the south. The boats made off to the southwest as the coastal stations seemed to be locating them and then training the searchlights on them. As S 72's port engine was threatened with a breakdown resulting from a tear in the exhaust pipe, the operation was abandoned. In any case the coast had been alerted and the many searchlights and patrols promised no further success. Both boats commenced return passage.

At 1910 1st Air Corps telephoned that at 1903 the Air Force anti-aircraft battery near Sevastopol (Alexandrovskaya Bay) had located 10 to 15 unidentified vessels in approximately 270°, some 20 to 35 miles from the coast. At about 1930 a second report was made, giving the bearing as 206°.

Although, in view of the general situation, this report seemed highly improbable - day reconnaissance had made no report and the anti-aircraft battery's radar gear is no surface-watching set - the following precautionary steps were taken:

1. 1st Air Corps was requested to send day and night reconnaissance planes into this area, and the request was immediately approved.
2. Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Crimean Coast was instructed to hold back the Crimea convoy which was to proceed from Sevastopol to Yalta at 2100.
3. Naval Shore Commander, Crimea was informed and himself gave instructions to Naval Port Commander, Sevastopol.
4. Commanding General, Crimea was informed that Admiral, Black Sea was investigating the validity of the report and would forward the results.



CONFIDENTIAL

The anti-aircraft battery continued to send in reports up to 2230. The direction and range of the vessels were not constant, while the number of ships varied between 7 and 15.

From 2045 to 2050 the anti-aircraft battery, using radar firing data, shelled a probable small vessel 9 km. northwest of Sevastopol.

Neither of the reconnaissance planes reported any sightings or locations. The naval surface watching radar set on Cape Khersonese, after locating uncertain targets at first, obtained no further locations from 2030. This convinced me that the anti-aircraft radar set observations could only be explained by atmospheric interference and certain shortcomings of the set. I have already experienced similar phenomena several times on the North Sea Islands. I therefore decided that S 45 which was still off the south Crimean coast on passage to Constantza should not be diverted to Sevastopol but merely informed of the locations and my opinion of them.

At 2115 and 2358 the boats were passed by what seemed to be our own planes. They flashed their lights, but failed to answer the radio recognition signals.

At 2125 the northern group of E-boats, S 61, S 26 and S 49, arrived in the operational area as ordered and took up lurking positions. No shipping was detected up to 0000 on 8 August.

At 1800 "Ship 19" put out from Ak Wechet for anti-submarine operations on route Green, with instructions to enter Sevastopol at 0800 on 8 August.

At 1900 S 45 put out from Ivan Paba to be repaired in Constantza. The boat was informed that she might meet U-boats proceeding in the opposite direction.

At 1945 naval ferry barge P 418, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 8 and 11, 4 boats and 6 assault boats put out from Tchernuk for patrol duties. 3 naval ferry barges were on the alert in the roads.

At 2115 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put out from Anapa for the operation ordered off Cape Utrich. They occupied their lurking positions from 2200.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

For air raids on the Anapa convoy No. 164, the

CONFIDENTIAL

Sevastopol-Constantza convoy and the southern group of the 1st D-Boat Flotilla, see above. Novorossisk reported 20 bombs dropped on the site at the east harbor and on the southern part of the town.

Between 0105 and 0340 14 rounds were fired on the town area of Taganrog from the direction of Korskaya; between 0330 and 0335 from the same direction, 30 rounds from a quick-firing gun on an armored train were fired on the harbor of Taganrog. No damage or casualties from either bombardment.

Between 0625 and 0655 the minesweeping formation operating off Taganrog was shelled from Pavlo-Ochakov. No damage.

Novorossisk reported the usual artillery and mortar fire.

Minesweeping Activity:

Sevastopol: Minesweepers with towed loop gear swept route Green four times from the approach buoy northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards as far as the minefield, no mines swept. Naval Port Commander, Kalta reported a drifting mine approximately 7 miles east of Sarich Point.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers BA 51, 52 and PR 4 escorted the Anapa convoy. No mines swept. Motor minesweepers R 30, R 164, PR 2, 7 and 8 twice swept channels on route Red from point 15 to point 2 to a distance of 200 meters on either side of the buoy line. No mines swept. The F4-group, the group with skid gear and the minesweeping planes patrolled routes in Kerch Strait and route Red. No mines swept.

Mariupol: Motor minesweepers RP 1, 2, 3 and 4 swept the Taganrog fairway without result. The route closed on 6 August can now be used if preceded by an anti-mine escort.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: Drop in tonnage owing to lack of trucks in Taman. Otherwise according to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 164 ran with 7 naval ferry barges. For air raids, see above. At 1615 convoy No. 165 put out from Kerch with 7 naval ferry barges.

CONFIDENTIAL

- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 59 ran with 1 tug, 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 5 naval ferry barges. At 1735 convoy No. 60 put from Kerch with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 51 ran with 1 motor sailing vessel and 5 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 0700 the Kerch-Berdyansk convoy No. 7 put in to Berdyansk with 1 tug and 1 lighter. At 0230 the Mariupol-Berdyansk convoy No. 28 put in to Tegenrog with 2 tugs and 3 lighters.
- f. The Crimea convoy from Sevastopol to Yalta did not put to sea because unidentified vessels were reported in the Yalta area.
- g. Convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan. For air raid and torpedo attack on the Sevastopol-Constantza convoy, see above.



CONFIDENTIAL

8 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1845 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk observed 1 vessel leaving Ghelenjik for the assembly area, course southwest, low speed. Daylight reconnaissance sighted no enemy vessels except a submarine which the planes bombed unsuccessfully some 60 miles west of Point Adler.

No aerial photographic reconnaissance was flown over the ports on the Caucasus coast or the Sea of Azov.

Enemy fleet radio traffic still slight. It gave no clue to movements. Same M.T.B. and motor minesweeper activity in the north-eastern Black Sea. Submarines detected: 7 receiving transmissions at sea: 3 in the southwestern Black Sea, 1 in the northwestern Black Sea and 3 in unidentified positions.

On the Army front after initial successes against an enemy point of penetration, our counter-attack was halted by strong enemy counter-attacks and air raids.

Own Situation:

Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine later reported that from 1930 to 1950 on 6 August a fishing boat was attacked by 2 planes off Strelka (on the Mariupol coast, halfway to Taganrog). At the same time the village of Strelka and other fishing boats were attacked with small bombs and machine-guns. 1 fishing boat was damaged by bomb splinters.

With reference to the torpedoing of the tanker "Firuz", it was further reported that a torpedo fan had been fired from a range of some 2,000 meters, 1 torpedo hitting the tanker in the forward collision compartment. Although the escorting Rumanian destroyer, motor minesweepers and submarine chaser "Xanten" immediately set off in pursuit, they were unsuccessful.

As enemy submarines have recently been appearing frequently off the northern exit of the Bosphorus, I intend to lay out the anti-submarine minefield previously planned by order of

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Group South. Group South states that there are no political objections as long as the minefield is laid outside the 10-mile zone with a depth setting of minus 12 meters. The operation is therefore to be carried out as soon as possible.

Supplementary reports on the air raid and torpedo attack on the Sevastopol-Constantza convoy on 7 August revealed quite clearly that the torpedoes were fired by torpedo planes and not by submarines. The planes also dropped objects like tin cans on the route along which the convoy was advancing. They were assumed to be canister mines, but they could not be examined more closely or shot up, as all the vessels were engaged in repelling a fresh enemy attack. 2 attacks were made in all and 3 torpedoes were dropped in each run in. Accurate defensive fire compelled the planes to drop their torpedoes prematurely at a range of about 1,500 meters and the ships were able to avoid them all. No damage or casualties. 1 enemy plane seemed to be badly damaged.

At 0410 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put in to Anapa coming from the operation off Cape Utrich. The enemy had not been sighted. The flotilla reported that owing to repairs the next operation could not be carried out until Monday night.

At 0530 motor minesweeper RM 1 struck a mine while minesweeping off Taganrog. She sank at once and her crew of 8 men including the commanding officer of the group was killed. The place of sinking was some 500 meters east of the 240-meter wide approach channel which had already been swept. Depth of water was approximately 3 meters. In view of probable mines in shallow water, minesweeping was temporarily discontinued.

Shipping traffic in the approach channel must be preceded by a minesweeping escort.

It is almost certain that these were moored mines.

The fishing vessel which struck a mine and sank on 6 August off Taganrog was a wooden boat without engine. Moreover, the mines reported swept in the Mariupol area near the wreck "Immanuel" were also moored mines. The necessary measures for sweeping the shallow moored mines off Taganrog have already been taken.

CONFIDENTIAL

At 0605 the Anapa convoy No. 165 was unsuccessfully attacked three times by planes between points 20 and 21 on route Brown. The convoy put up an accurate anti-aircraft barrage, particularly with the 7.5 cm. guns, and the enemy planes were compelled to discharge their bombs at a range of 1,500 meters. No damage or casualties. As far as could be seen no planes were shot down.

At 0715 3 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla (northern group) which had been operating against supply convoys between Ghelenjik and Myshako from 2125 (7 August) until 0300 put in to Ivan Baba. No shipping was observed despite good visibility. At 0135 a patrol vessel came in sight and the boats fired 4 cm. and 2 cm. guns, machine-guns and tommy guns at her from minimum range, after she had been heard to call. Hits were observed. Immediately after the attack, 7 searchlights were trained on the boats, blinding the gunlayers and enabling the enemy ship to make off under protection of her own coastal batteries. The flotilla commander reported: "Dome of light like the display at the National Socialist Party's rally." If the boats had had 4 cm. armor-piercing high explosive shells, the vessel would certainly have been destroyed. The E-boats withdrew 6 miles from the coast under fire from the coastal batteries and re-formed. At 0200 they ran in again. A patrol vessel was sighted entering Ghelenjik. At 0300 the boats commenced return passage. German fighters arrived at dawn. At 0506 2 bombers attacked with 16 or 20 bombs in air grid square 6542, and the boats avoided them all. No damage or casualties. Our fighters were unable to attack the enemy bombers because just when the attack began the 2 fighters were due to be relieved and apparently the relieving fighters had been some minutes late in taking off.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): A depression stretching as far as western Russia indicates a change for the worse in the course of the afternoon and night. Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: Slight, variable winds, mainly west, in the afternoon sea wind up to force 5, at night northwest, force 4 - 5, squally, cloudy, heavy local thunderstorms in the afternoon, visibility 20 miles.



CONFIDENTIAL

In view of the weather forecast and the possibility of air attacks at night, I allowed our boats to remain in Anapa harbor overnight. As the 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla lying in Anapa require repairs and cannot be employed in the coming night, they are free to proceed to Theodosia or Kamish Burun.

The minelaying of Yeisk harbor by Commander, 3rd Naval Landing Craft Flotilla (Guns) was also postponed for 24 hours. My reasons were as follows:

- a. I wanted to avoid assembling the 2 naval landing craft (guns) at night and one of them has still to come from Tagarog.
- b. Weather conditions were too uncertain for operations by naval landing craft (guns).

After examining all the radio traffic of the last few days, Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria announced that no cruisers or destroyers could have been operating in the Black Sea area. Radio traffic by small surface vessels and coastal radio stations was normal. It is unlikely that a formation of small vessels could have been at sea for long and maintained radio silence, since up to now, at least on return passage, they have always kept up lively radio traffic. None was observed during the last few days.

The "units" located by the Air Force at Sevastopol yesterday evening were therefore obviously decoys.

U-boat Situation:

At 0030 U 19 reported her position by short signal as air grid square 075, so she also had failed to attack the tanker reported on 6 August. The boat returned to the Tapir attack area as ordered.

At 0060 radiogram 0534 was received from U 24. The boat reported a tanker convoy at 0415 in grid square 13172, course 0300, slight speed. At the time of sighting, the boat was in grid square 0326 from where she tried to haul ahead. This report reveals that after a day's stay in Sulhum the convoy had proceeded to Poti. As the boat was far eastern and there was a strict air patrol, she had not much chance of success.

Approximate positions at 0800: U 24 grid square 1331, U 19 grid square 9460, Italian midget submarine CB 1 grid square 5520, CB 6 grid square

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

5550. During the day the mid-net submarines were assigned to definite grid squares, while at night they operated in patrol line south of the Crimean coast. 30th U-Boat Flotilla reported 10 August as the day for U 23's operation. CB 3 and 4 were reported ready for action by 11 August and 13 August. The special task planned for U 23 (landing of agents) has had to be postponed until the end of August because of illness among the agents.

No further reports from sea, no reconnaissance results from the Caucasus coast.

At 1750 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put in to Kamish Burun and reported that they would be ready for operations on Monday evening.

At 1900 "Ship 15" put out from Ak Mechet for anti-submarine operations in the Tarkhan area with orders to enter Sevastopol at 0300 on 9 August.

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 418, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 8 and 11, 4 boats and 6 assault boats put out from Taurik on coastal patrol.

At 2230 submarine chasers Nos. 2302 and 2305 put in to Sulina from anti-submarine operations. No enemy sightings or locations.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

Throughout the day enemy aircraft were very active over the southeast Crimean coast. For air raid on the Anapa convoy No. 165, see above. Naval Harbor Master, Lerdanek reported that 2 Russian planes machine-gunned Novo Petrovka in a low-level attack, wounding 2 soldiers. According to Rumanian statements both planes showed German markings.

Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported artillery, anti-tank and mortar fire on the site at the east harbor and on the southern part of the town.

From 2025 to 2105 and from 2300 to 2400 on 7 August, Tayanrog harbor and the surrounding area were shelled by an armored train from the direction of Morskaya. 20 rounds were fired in each bombardment. At 0210 another 28 rounds were fired at the harbor and the lighthouse area. From 0720 until 1230 heavy caliber shelling in the direction of the railway station.

CONFIDENTIAL

No damage or casualties were reported from any of these bombardments.

Minesweeping Activity:

Varna: Bulgarian motor minesweepers Nos. 1, 2 and 3 swept the area off Varna South. No mines swept.

Danube: Minesweeping planes swept the area between Mile 61 and 65 in 2 operations. In swoops 18 to 29 no mines were swept.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 51, 52 and FR 4 escorted the Anapa convoy No. 165. No mines swept. The FZ-group and the group with skid gear swept the channel to Senaya between points 101 and 108. No mines swept. Minesweeping planes swept route Red six times between point 15 and point X without result.

Mariupol: Motor minesweepers RM 1, 2, 3 and 4 swept the declared area off Taganrog. For report on RM 1 striking a mine, see above.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 165 ran with 7 naval ferry barges. For air raid, see above. At 1755 convoy No. 166 put out from Kerch with 8 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 60 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges. At 1800 convoy No. 61 put out from Kerch with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 4 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1100 convoy No. 50 put out from Temriuk with 1 train ferry, 1 tug and 2 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1950 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Taganrog with 2 tugs, 2 lighters and 2 naval landing craft (guns). At 2015 the Kerch-Berdyansk convoy No. 7 put out from Berdyansk with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 1 naval landing craft (guns).
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan and without incident.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

9 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

One general reconnaissance of the Black Sea flown in the forenoon produced no reports of the enemy. 5 Turkish freighters were observed off the Turkish coast in the area between Zile and Zonguldak, another one was observed off Ordu, all on varying courses. Average tonnage 3 - 4,000 tons.

The Caucasus coast was examined as far as Poti. Only slight patrol vessel and patrol boat activity observed. At 0706 2 patrol boats lying stopped 12 miles west of Ghelenjik, at 0800 1 minesweeper 5 miles southwest of Sukhum on a northeasterly course, at 0957 1 motor minesweeper 12 miles south of Sukhum, course west, high speed.

Enemy Shipping in Port (photographs):

Ghelenjik 0705: 5 motor minesweepers, 16 M.T.B.s, 5 coastal vessels totaling about 1,500 tons, 65 boats.

Tuapse 0645: 2 motor minesweepers, 4 M.T.B.s of which 2 were beached, 1 small armed vessel, 4 coastal vessels totaling 2,500 tons, 1 floating crane, approximately 20 boats.

Sochi 0620: 1 coastal vessel of about 100 tons, several boats.

Sukhum 0555: 1 gunboat, 1 coastal vessel of about 250 tons, 1 floating dock, about 25 boats, some beached, and the 7,000-ton tanker which had been torpedoed.

No enemy shipping was detected in the reconnaissance area in the Sea of Azov. Enemy shipping in port showed no essential change.

At 2240 night reconnaissance located 2 small vessels 18 miles south of Tuapse.

Slight shipping movements off the east coast according to radio traffic. Submarines detected: 2 in the southern Black Sea, one of which proceeded eastwards in the central Black Sea in the evening; 1 in the eastern Black Sea, 2 in unidentified positions, probably

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

in the northwestern Black Sea or in the Crimean area.

At the Kuban bridgehead further enemy attacks supported by tanks were driven off, but in some of them our losses were high.

Own Situation:

At 0400 the vessels on patrol duties put in to Temriuk.

They had nothing to report.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Nupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: northwesterly winds, force 2 - 3, by day sea wind up to force 5, at night again force 3 - 3, cloudy, visibility 20 miles.

Commander, 3rd Naval Landing Craft Flotilla (Guns) was ordered to carry out the minelaying operation off Yeisk in the coming night.

As proposed by the flotilla commander who is very hopeful of success, all operational boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla will be employed on the night of 9/10 August to attack enemy supply traffic close to the Caucasus coast between Cape Idokopas and Olginskaya Bay. The boats will put out by direct route to reach the operational area towards 2000. They will withdraw at approximately 0100. The flotilla has been informed that at the same time the 11th E-Boat Flotilla will be operating between Ghelenjik and Myshako, returning by direct route to Theodosia. Anti-submarine operations allowed.

Commander, 11th E-Boat Flotilla reported that he had sufficient boats at readiness for large-scale operations off Novorossisk also. The 11th E-Boat Flotilla was therefore ordered to operate between Ghelenjik and the Myshako landing point during the night of 9/10 August. Boats will approach by direct route south of the enemy declared area off Kerch Strait. The flotilla has been warned of the strong shore searchlights which are trained according to data obtained from listening sets. The boats must therefore proceed to their positions at crawling speed. If driven off, they should withdraw to a safe distance and if possible approach later, finally withdrawing at 0200 at the latest. Return passage by direct route to Theodosia. Boats may call at Anapa in emergency. Anti-submarine operations allowed. Naval Port Commander, Anapa will transmit enemy sightings by "Most Immediate" radiograms. The flotilla has similarly

CONFIDENTIAL

been informed of the operation of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla south of Cape Idokopas.

U-boat Situation:

No reports from our U-boats at sea. The 1st CB-Boat Flotilla reported that Italian midget submarine CB 2, the last lost lying in Constantza, would be ready for transfer to Sevastopol on 12 August. Commander, Convoys and Escorts was ordered to execute the transfer on 13 August as for the first boats.

U 23 received her sailing orders for 10 August. She is to proceed via the southern route to the operational area off Sukhum, so that U 24 which is there at present can be transferred to the operational area off Pit unda on 11 August.

After the arrival of U 23 in the operational area, it is planned to employ the 3 U-boats in mobile patrol lines at right angles to the coast, until U 24 and U 19 have exhausted their fuel supplies.

The Italian midget submarines at sea were informed that a German naval ferry barge convoy would be passing from Yalta to Sevastopol during the night of 9/10 August while the commanding officer of the convoy was notified of the boats' positions.

At 1600 5 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out from Ivan Baba for the operation ordered in the Idokopas - Olginskaya area.

At 1730 the naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 1 and 2 and motor minesweeper RA 56 put out from Mariupol for the minelaying operation off Yeisk.

At 1745, as ordered, Commander, 11th E-Boat Flotilla put out from Kemish Burn for the operation with 3 boats. From 1820 to 1849 the formation lay stopped as S 505 had engine trouble. At 1822 S 501's main port engine broke down completely; the boat was dismissed from the operation and proceeded to Theodosia with a Kerch-Theodosia convoy. With only 2 boats, the operation off Cholenjik was abandoned and the fleet reported to Admiral, Black Sea. From 2200 the boats took up lurking positions off Cape Utrich.

At 1800 Ship 13 put out from Iskhmet for anti-submarine operations. She had orders to proceed at 0400 on 10 August to reinforce the escort of a Constantza-Sevastopol convoy.



CONFIDENTIAL

At 1915 naval ferry barge # 418, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 8 and 11, 4 minesweepers and 6 assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties.

A report was received from Group Franjer (Divisional H.Q. on the Mius front) that for psychological reasons another bombardment of the enemy Mius front in the near future would be most welcome. Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine and Commander, 3rd Naval Landing Craft Flotilla (Guns) were ordered to repeat the bombardment at daybreak on 11 August. The boats to take part were 2 naval landing craft (guns) and 1 boat as navigational aid. To reduce the danger from mines, the intended route into the operational area was to be swept free of moored mines from the approach fairway eastwards; if possible the minesweeping force was to remain unobserved. No mines were expected at the firing position as the water there was too shallow.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

At 1751 the Kerch-Temriuk convoy No. 31 was approached by 4 enemy planes 5 miles northwest of Temriuk. The planes dropped their bombs on land and the convoy suffered no damage or casualties.

At 2230 Naval Port Commander, Anapa reported several planes circling at an altitude of approximately 100 meters over route Brown, 7 miles southeast of point 20. No bombs were dropped, but mine-laying is suspected. In addition to the usual artillery and mortar fire, Novorossisk reported an air raid during which about 25 bombs were dropped.

Taganrog was again shelled by an armored train near Morskaya during the evening of 8 August. Later that night, about 40 rounds of heavy caliber shells were fired from the same direction. No damage or casualties were reported.

Berdiansk reported enemy penetration from 1800 to 1810; 2 planes dropped 8 - 10 bombs in a low-level attack 8 km. east of the town area.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: The 24th to 31st sweeps were carried out between Mile 51 and Mile 54. No mines swept. The sweeping of the Danube-Delta from Mile 61 to Mile 65 was completed and the ban on anchoring in that area was lifted.

CONFIDENTIAL

Sevastopol: The FZ-group with towed loop gear swept route Green four times from the approach buoy northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards to the minefield. No mines swept.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 51, and MR 4 escorted the Anapa convoy No. 166. No mines swept. Motor minesweepers R 30, R 164, and R 197 swept route Red for moored mines between point X and point 220. No mines swept. The FZ-group and the group with skid gear checked the route to Senaya. No mines swept. The position of the wreck HOEFLEIN was marked by fairway buoys.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: As there were still no goods trucks in Taman, unloading was delayed. If the goods truck situation does not change, present supply requirements cannot be met and further demands for the Todt Organization will be impossible. On 10 August tonnage dropped by 370 tons.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 166 ran with 8 naval ferry barges. At 1800 convoy No. 167 put out from Kerch with 8 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 61 ran with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 4 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 50 ran with 1 train ferry, 1 tug, 2 lighters and 2 naval ferry barges. At 1645 convoy No. 52 put out from Genichesk with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 4 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Berdyansk-Kerch convoy No. 7 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, naval landing craft (guns) No. 10 and motor minesweeper RA 54. The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 2 tugs, 2 lighters, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 1 and 4.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1000 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 1 freighter of 1,000 tons, 1 medium motor lighter and 2 mine-sweepers entering Ghelenjik, course northwest, medium speed. From 2200 to 2300 6 vessels off landing point B.

Daylight reconnaissance over the central and western Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. No reconnaissance reports from the Caucasus coast. No enemy shipping in the reconnaissance area in the Sea of Azov. Enemy shipping in port showed no essential change.

According to radio traffic, moderate activity of small vessels off the east coast, in the northern part mostly M.T.B.s and patrol vessels, in the southern part minesweeping vessels. Submarines detected: 2 in the northwestern Black Sea and the Crimean area, 1 in the southeastern Black Sea and 1 in an unidentified position.

Own Situation:

At 0400 "Ship 19" reported that she was attacking a submarine 7 miles southwest of Eupatoria. After taking in more depth charges in Sevastopol, the attack was continued in the afternoon but broken off around 1830 without result, as the listening set broke down. "Ship 19" proceeded to Ak Mechet.

At 0540 S 502 and S 505 of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put in to Anapa from the operation in the Anapa-Cape Utrich area. No observations apart from lively enemy air activity.

At 0605 the Anapa convoy No. 137 was attacked by 6 - 8 ground-attack planes with bombs, phosphorus and machine-gun fire. 1 boat was slightly damaged by splinters. One man seriously wounded, one slightly wounded. As far as could be seen, no planes were shot down by ship's anti-aircraft guns. In view of this second attack with phosphorus, Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus ordered:

1. Respirators are to be carried in case of air raids.
2. Superfluous men to go below.

CONFIDENTIAL

-52-

SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

3. Personnel on the deck to wear dry oiled or leather clothing and leather shoes with protective covers on top.
4. When the attack begins, the mask is to be put on.
5. If burning phosphorus reaches the skin or clothes, the clothes should be removed, the burn on the skin should be treated at once with decontamination ointment, Losantin paste or any oil.
6. Burning clothes and fires on board should be extinguished with sand.
7. Commanding officers are authorized to order any men who have been burned to jump overboard to wash off the phosphorus, if they can be spared from fire-fighting aboard ship.

In driving off enemy air raids on the Anapa convoys, the quick-firing 7.5 cm. guns of the naval ferry barges were repeatedly very successful, so much so that when on 8 August 15 ground-attack planes attacked several times, the barrage promptly put up prevented them from using their machine-guns and forced them to discharge their bombs at a range of some 1,500 meters. Furthermore, most of the planes shot down recently were claimed by the accurate barrage fire.

At 0645 the vessels which had put out for coastal defense duties and mine observation put in to Temriuk. In the course of the night, engine noises were heard several times from various directions, but the enemy was not sighted.

At 0730 5 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put in to Ivan Baba from the operation against enemy supply traffic close to the Caucasus coast off Olginskaya Bay. Up to 0100 no patrol or searchlight activity. No traffic was observed despite good visibility. No special incidents on the return passage.

At 0730 naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 1 and 4 and motor minesweeper FA 56 put in to Mariupol. From 0000 to 0020 the formation had carried out the minelaying as ordered 3 miles northwest of Yeisk harbor entrance, laying 12 LMB (S) mines according to plan, unobserved by the enemy. During the operation, searchlights on the coast were periodically switched on as auxiliary lights and the outer mole lights were also lit.

CONFIDENTIAL

It was assumed that an arrival or departure of enemy vessels was imminent. This assumption was strengthened when three and a half hours after the mines were laid, 2 explosions followed by fires were observed by the returning formation in the direction of the minefield. This might be its first success. 1st Air Corps was requested to make investigations.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: winds northwest, force 3 - 4, in thundery squalls up to force 7, cloudy, visibility 15 miles.

The 1st E-Boat Flotilla was ordered to repeat yesterday's operation. The boats were to remain in the operational area for any length of time that should be necessary.

Naval Shore Commander, Crimea reported that the Naval Ordnance Arsenal, Sevastopol had succeeded in repairing a quick-firing 13 cm. gun with captured material and that the gun should be ready for action by the end of August.

As it was vital that the Ivan Pava battery be reinforced to a strength of 4 guns, immediate construction of a fourth gun emplacement was ordered.

Group South was informed by "Most Immediate" radiogram: Captain Weygold, Naval Liaison Officer on the staff of Army High Command, reported by telephone that Army Group A was attempting to have Führer Directive No. 40 altered. It dealt with the transfer of coastal defenses, in particular the operating of the coastal batteries by Army divisional commanders. The Naval Liaison Officer was referred to Naval Staff as this was a question of primary importance. In this area, naval control of coastal defense as laid down in the Führer Directive is fully approved by C-in-C, 17th Army H.Q., Commanding General, Kerch Strait and the n. c. Commanding General, Crimea. Any change would be extremely unwelcome and would adversely affect naval operations. From the statement of the Naval Liaison Officer on the staff of Army High Command, it seems that he and Captain Junge, the Naval Liaison Officer on the staff of Armed Forces High Command, are not being sufficiently forceful in their representation of naval requirements.

At 1230, motor minesweeper RA 56, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 3 and 4 put out from Mariupol escorted by "Theinkontor", 1 lighter and motor minesweeper RM 6 with orders to repeat the bombardment of the enemy Mius front. The convoy put in to Taganrog.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

At 1758 the convoy was attacked off Wesselo by several Russian ground-attack planes with machine-guns and 15 bombs. 5 men were wounded on naval landing craft (guns) No. 4, while RA 54 and naval landing craft (guns) No. 4 were slightly damaged. The enemy planes were attacked with 8.8 cm. and 8 cm. guns, but although the fire was accurate it was not very effective because there was not enough armor-piercing high explosive ammunition. At 2400 motor minesweepers RM 2 and 3 joined the convoy as anti-air escort.

U-boat Situation:

No reports from boats at sea. Coastal reconnaissance was canceled owing to lack of planes. Approximate positions at 0800: U 24 air grid square 0820, U 19 air grid square 9430. Midget submarines CP 1 and 6 on return passage to Sevastopol.

At 1300 CB 1 and 2 put in to Sevastopol. At 1400 U 23 put out on operations from Constantza via the southern route. The boats at sea were informed. The Italian midget submarines were temporarily unfit for operations.

At 1600 5 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out from Ivan Kaba for the operational area off the Caucasus coast southeast of Cape Idokopas.

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 415, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 3 and 11, 4 minesweepers and 6 assault boats put out from Temrluk for patrol duties and mine observation.

At 2053 in 45° 09' N, 32° 50' E an aerial torpedo attack was made on the "Boy Peddersen"/"Varna" convoy proceeding from Sevastopol to Constantza. "Boy Peddersen" was torpedoed amidships; although out of control she remained afloat. One plane was shot down by ship's anti-aircraft guns. Every effort is being made to tow "Boy Peddersen" to Sevastopol. "Varna" escorted by the gunboat "Dimitrescu" continued to Constantza. 1st Air Corps promised close protection and fighter escort from dawn on 11 August. 1 motor minesweeper, 2 trigs and 3 E-boats were sent from Sevastopol to the place of the attack and 2 naval ferry barges put out from Eupatoria to give support. Ship 19 and motor minesweeper R 36 were also ordered to proceed there. No further reports as yet.



CONFIDENTIAL

At 1550 1st Air Corps reported by telephone that a radiogram sent at 1445 by a Russian reconnaissance plane to its base had been deciphered: it reported the sighting of a convoy. At 1755 the convoy was warned by "Most Immediate" radiogram: "At 1445 convoy reported by radio by a Russian reconnaissance plane." Commander, Convoy and Escorts, Black Sea was informed by first priority telephone, and the advisability of recalling the convoy to Sevastopol was discussed. This would, however, entail postponing passage until the full moon period. The combined bombing and aerial torpedo attacks carried out a few days ago off the Rumanian coast showed that the enemy now covers the entire sea route (passage of about 30 hours). It was therefore essential for the convoy to proceed and Commander, Convoy and Escorts refused to be influenced to recall it.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

For the air raids on the Anapa convoy No. 167 and the Sevastopol-Constantza convoy, see above. Naval Port Commander, Novorossiysk reported an air raid with 10 bombs on the site at the west harbor and slight artillery fire on the site at the east harbor.

Minesweeping Activity:

Ochakov: Motor minesweeper No. 7 swept the Beresanski channel, no mines swept.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group with towed loop gear swept route Green seven times from the approach buoy at Sevastopol northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards to the minefield, no mines swept.

Kerch: The anti-mine escort for the Anapa convoy swept no mines. Motor minesweepers R 30, R 164 and R 197 swept route Red for moored mines without result. The FZ-group and the group with skid gear swept the route to Senaya four times from point 10 to point 108 without result. The channel was widened by 400 meters on each side of the buoy line. Minesweeping planes swept route Red four times for ground mines from point 201 via Z to point 220. No mines were swept. The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla carried out a check sweep between point 220 and point Z, no mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

a. Kerch Strait: Drop in tonnage owing to lack of goods trucks in Taman.

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 167 ran with 8 naval ferry barges. For air raid, see above. At 1735 convoy No. 168 put out from Kerch with 8 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1735 convoy No. 62 put out from Kerch with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 6 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1615 convoy No. 52 put out from Temriuk with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 motor sailing vessel and 4 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1230 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 1 lighter, motor minesweepers RM 6 and RA 56, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 3 and 4.
- f. The Crimea convoys ran according to plan. For the aerial torpedo attack on the Sevastopol-Constantza convoy, see above. The other convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

11 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1850 the observation post at Novorossisk reported 1 patrol vessel putting out from Ghelenjik on a southwesterly course.

Daylight reconnaissance over the central and western Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. Reconnaissance of the Caucasus coast and the Sea of Azov was canceled owing to the weather.

On the morning of 11 August, one of our U-boats reported a towed convoy with 4 escort vessels on a northwesterly course 12 miles southwest of Cagry.

According to radio traffic, slight activity of small vessels in the east coast area, including M.T.B.s and patrol vessels in the northern part and some minesweepers in the southern part. Submarines detected: 2 in the northwestern Black Sea to the area southwest of the Crimea, 1 of them probably on a northnortheasterly course, 1 in the southern Black Sea, 4 in the eastern Black Sea, 2 of them probably proceeding westwards, 1 in an unidentified position.

Own Situation:

At 0415 the vessels on coastal defense duties and mine observation put in to Temriuk. Nothing to report.

At 0425 the formation of naval landing craft (guns) with naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 3 and 4 and motor minesweeper RA 56 put in to Taganrog. At 0030 the boats left the Taganrog roads to take up their firing positions in the swept channels. At 0310 they opened fire. Visibility was reduced by mist. At 0328 the action was concluded. Hits were observed on the railway embankment. 3 enemy batteries replied by firing ahead of the boats' course. The boats then concentrated on the eastern battery which ceased fire after about 30 rounds from the naval landing craft (guns). The battery was hit more than once, but no details were observed. No special incidents during return passage.

At 0715 5 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put in to Ivan Baba from the operation against enemy supply traffic close to the Caucasus coast.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

At 2255 on 10 August en route for the operational area, the boats were attacked by a plane which dropped 4 bombs, then turned off when hit by anti-aircraft machine-guns. It was not seen to crash. On reaching the area off Vulcan Tal, the boats were immediately caught by searchlights. As the flotilla's presence was already betrayed, the boats assembled in a reconnaissance line and operated at a speed of 9 knots 1 mile off the coast near Chugovko passage. No enemy shipping was observed. At 0015 the boats were detected by searchlights and shelled by coastal batteries. The flotilla withdrew beyond the range of the batteries and, as all the coast was now lit up, they proceeded to the operational area between Ghelenjik and Myshako. This area was chosen because of a radiogram received from Naval Port Commander, Anapa which stated that either gunboats or M.T.B.s were believed to be proceeding on a southwesterly course off Anapa. At 0300 1 motor gunboat and 2 M.T.B.s came in sight in air grid square 7549. They were not far from the boats, proceeding in the opposite direction. The leading boat opened fire at a range of 25 meters and the gunboat at once started to burn and then there were several explosions. 3 E-boats finally sank her. One of the M.T.B.s was also sunk after hits from 4 cm. and 2 cm. guns resulting in her petrol exploding. A second M.T.B. was hit, but escaped under cover from the coastal searchlights and batteries firing shells of every caliber. Searchlights and barrage fire and the fact that dawn was breaking prevented pursuit. At 0315 the flotilla commenced return passage to Ivan Baba. In air grid square 7534 the boats were attacked four times by 3 fighter-bombers using rockets and fragmentation bombs: our anti-aircraft guns were unsuccessful. No casualties or damage.

The steamer "Boy Feddersen" which was torpedoed from the air yesterday was reported to be in 44° 57.3' N, 32° 56.2' E at 0830.

By this time the commanding officer of Ship 19 had assumed command of the situation. The steamer was drifting with a list of 25 degrees. The crew had been rescued by 2 motor minesweepers. "Dumitrescu" had failed in all her efforts at towing, as the lines had constantly broken. 3 motor minesweepers, 2 naval ferry barges and "Dumitrescu" were also with the damaged steamer. The Rumanian destroyers which had fled were ordered by German Naval Command to return. Their behavior will be investigated further. 3 harbor tugs, the tug "Baikal" and

CONFIDENTIAL

2 more motor minesweepers put out from Sevastopol to join the other vessels there. Around 1500 the damaged ship was taken in tow by the 4 tugs at a speed of approximately 3 knots. At 2000 their position was reported as 44° 51' N, 33° 4.5' E. Escorting the towing formation were 5 minesweepers, 2 naval ferry barges, 2 boats of the 23rd Submarine Chaser Flotilla, "Ship 19", 3 harbor defense boats, "Murgescu" and "Dumitrescu". 3 more naval tugs with motor minesweeper MR 7 and 2 D-boats arrived during the night to add their support. In the course of the day, enemy reconnaissance planes repeatedly flew over Eupatoria Bay but no further attacks were made.

Meanwhile, reports received indicated that the attack had been made at 1915 (10 August). In rapidly fading light a DB 3 plane attacked from astern on the port side, launching 1 torpedo which missed. Shortly afterwards 2 more DB 3 attacked, launching 2 torpedoes. One torpedo passed astern of the steamer "Varna", the other hit the steamer "Boy Feddersen" amidships. The convoy was proceeding in line abreast with "Varna" on the port side and "Boy Feddersen" to starboard. The close escort and fighters were no longer with the formation, although a few minutes before the attack 1 Me 110 had still been circling around the convoy.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: winds northwest, force 2 - 4, in squalls up to force 7, cloudy, visibility 15 miles.

The 1st E-Boat Flotilla had 24 hours in port.

To protect Anapa convoys as far as possible from air raids, I instructed Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus to try out an experiment from 12 August. Convoys were to run so that they would pass through the area from Cape Takil to Anapa during the hours of darkness, to reach Anapa at dawn.

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was ordered to send 2 minelaying naval ferry barges from Kerch to Sevastopol as soon as possible. From there Commander, Convoys and Escorts will transfer them with the next suitable convoy to Constantza, where they will be at the disposal of the Commander Convoys and Escorts for the minelaying operations planned off the northern exit of the Bosphorus.

An order was also given for the transfer of motor minesweepers R 164 and R 197 to Sevastopol on 13 August. There, the boats will be at the disposal of Admiral, Black Sea for minesweeping tasks. The boats have orders to sweep route



CONFIDENTIAL

Brown from point 17 to point 1 while proceeding from Kerch to Sevastopol. Sailing is to be arranged so that they reach Sevastopol before nightfall on 13 August.

On 5 August, 1943 Admiral, Black Sea reported that, owing to lack of repair facilities, spare parts, tools and reserve engines, operations by the 11th E-Boat Flotilla would be restricted and later might not be possible at all. All measures so far taken to improve this unfortunate situation have been more or less unavailing. Group South considers that if the 11th E-Boat Flotilla's operations are to be restricted, the flotilla should be dissolved as soon as possible and its personnel given other duties. Admiral, Black Sea replied to the Group that the above-mentioned report on the 11th E-Boat Flotilla had not been made with the aim of dissolving the flotilla, but with the object of enlisting energetic assistance to provide the necessary material. Admiral, Black Sea laid great value on the maintenance of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla, because the boats were still serviceable and indeed, in view of the well-known scarcity of offensive forces in the Black Sea, operations by the flotilla, even if restricted, were urgently necessary. Furthermore, overhaul of the main engines of at least 2 boats was assured at once, and as the delivery of 2 main engines had been promised every two months from August onwards, the others would be repaired gradually. The main stumbling block is the necessary exchange of and repairs to the auxiliary engines. These cannot be delivered in the foreseeable future. Spare parts for these engines must be brought from Germany, as the further employment of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla depends on them. In the Admiral's opinion, the purpose justifies production of single parts, especially in view of the small number required. At present, we are considering whether boat No. 7 could not be put out of service and her parts used for other boats. It is doubtful whether she can be repaired and, if at all possible, it would be a tedious business.

U-boat Situation:

During the night nothing to report from the boats at sea. Approximate positions at 0800: U 24 air grid square 0310, U 19 air grid square 9430, U 23 air grid square 0460, outward bound. At 1630 U 24 reported: at 0830 towed convoy in air grid square 0489, course 295°, speed 7 knots, 4 escort vessels dropping depth charges,



CONFIDENTIAL

3 torpedoes, 12.4 cu. m. fuel; am in grid square 0325.

U 19 which was in a northerly position should have received the radiogram in time to operate on the report if the convoy had been proceeding as far as Tuapse, but no reports have been received.

All the Italian midget submarines are in Sevastopol for overhaul except the one in Constantza which is still unable to proceed.

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 418, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 8 and 11, 4 minesweepers and 6 assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties and mine observation.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

No air attacks on convoys in the course of the day. Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported artillery and anti-aircraft fire, also 10 bombs dropped on the southern part of the town.

Taganrog: From 2115 to 2205 on 10 August and at 0655 on 11 August, 10 rounds from heavy caliber guns were fired on the western part of the town. From 0425 to 0450 17 rounds from heavy caliber guns were fired on the harbor and at a formation entering port. No damage or casualties. From 0125 to 0150 several probable gunboats at sea shelled Wesselo with 7.5 cm. guns from a westerly direction. From 0140 to 0200 a community settlement 2 km. west of Roshok was shelled by several enemy vessels.

Minesweeping Activity:

Varna: 2 Bulgarian motor minesweepers swept the area off Varne South without result.

Kerch: Motor minesweeper RA 56 was ordered to transfer to Kerch, if possible via Mariupol, Berdyansk and Genichesk. En route she was to act as anti-mine escort to convoys. Motor minesweepers RA 54, FR 2 and 7 escorted the Anapa convoy, sweeping an inertia contact mine seaward of Brown 20. The mine was sunk by rifle fire. Motor minesweepers R 30, R 164 and 197 swept route Red. No mines swept. The FZ-group and the group with skid gear covered route 80 twelve times. No mines swept. Minesweeping planes swept route Red for ground mines eight times from point 202 to 220. No mines swept. The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla carried out a check sweep and mine observation duties. At 1335 a mine exploded

CONFIDENTIAL

in Kerch Strait near point 103. The cause of the explosion is not known, no damage.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoy: Convoy No. 168 ran with 8 naval ferry barges and the tug "Kreuzenstein", carrying part of a net barrage. At 1755 convoy No. 169 put out from Kerch with 7 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1130 convoy No. 62 put in to Kerch with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 6 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 52 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 motor sailing vessel and 4 naval ferry barges. Convoy No. 53 proceeding to Temriuk with 3 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1230 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 2 naval landing craft (guns) and 11 transport barges. At 1945 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Taganrog with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 2 naval landing craft (guns) and motor minesweeper RA 56.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

12 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 2200 the observation post at Novorossisk sighted 8 vessels off landing point B and shelled them.

Daylight reconnaissance over the western and central Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. 1 enemy submarine was identified 25 miles south of Alupka.

At 0605 1 freighter of 2,500 tons was detected 20 miles northwest of Inebolu, course southeast, moderate speed. At 0755 1 freighter of 3,500 tons was detected 8 miles northwest of Amasra, course northwest, moderate speed. At 0800 in the harbor of Hisaronu there was 1 freighter of about 3,000 tons, one of 1,500 tons, one of 1,000 tons and several small fishing vessels. 3 freighters totaling 5,000 tons off the port of Zonguldak.

No shipping traffic in the reconnaissance area in the Sea of Azov. According to radio traffic, slight activity of small vessels in the evening and at night.

Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria reported moderate M.T.B. and patrol activity off the northern part of the east coast, slight activity in the central and southern part. Submarines detected: 2 in the northwestern Black Sea to the southwestern part of the Crimean coast, 1 off the south Crimean coast, 1 in the eastern Black Sea and 1 in an unidentified position.

On the Army front, strong enemy forces attacked the eastern sector of the bridgehead in the early morning. The attacks are expected to continue.

Own Situation:

It was reported by radio that the steamer "Boy Peddersen" sank suddenly by the stern in 45° 0' N, 33° 5' E at 2302. It is assumed that the cause was breaking-up of the bulkheads.

According to reports, details of the attack on the convoy on 10 August are as follows:  
Position - 45° 3' N, 32° 55' E. Weather - wind northwest, force 3 - 4, sea 3, early twilight, low ceiling. At 1920 the first attack was made by 2 DB III, altitude 200 meters, from

CONFIDENTIAL

-64-

SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

the starboard beam. These planes launched 2 torpedoes at the steamer "Boy Feddersen", hitting her amidships and causing her to get out of control. The planes were shelled, then turned and flew off astern. At the same time the second attack was made from 40° on the port quarter. The planes approached unobserved at an altitude of 200 meters up to a range of 3,000 meters, when they were accurately shelled. They dropped 2 aerial torpedoes at a range of 2,000 meters, but scored no hits. "Boy Feddersen", motor minesweepers R 204 and R 196 were then machine-gunned. No damage or casualties. 500 meters ahead of the convoy, the planes turned off astern. While turning, one of the planes crashed into the water at 1924. It had been hit by R 104, R 196 and "Boy Feddersen". At 1945 the third attack was made by 2 planes from the port quarter. The motor minesweepers lay close to "Boy Feddersen" engaged in rescuing the crew. This attack came as a surprise: 7 bombs were dropped between the motor minesweepers and "Boy Feddersen". The nearest bomb dropped 30 meters from one of the motor minesweepers. Our 3.7 cm. and 2 cm. guns scored hits, but none of the planes was seen to crash. No damage or casualties. At 2015 the fourth attack was made by 1 plane flying in from astern at an altitude of 10 meters. The plane passed the ships at a range of 200 meters without dropping any bombs or firing any torpedoes. This plane was also attacked by the motor minesweepers and "Boy Feddersen", but it disappeared rapidly in the increasing dusk. All the planes were of Type DB III. The German fighter escort had left our formation about 10 minutes earlier. A complete survey cannot be made until all reports have been received.

At 0445 the vessels employed on coastal defense duties and mine observation put in to Temriuk with nothing to report.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Yalta: winds northeast, force 3 - 4, in the afternoon sea wind up to force 5, at night south to southwest, force 3 - 2, fair, visibility 20 miles. Yalta - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: slight wind, predominantly northeast, in the afternoon a sea wind, at night southeast, force 2, fair, visibility 20 miles, morning mist.

The 1st E-Boat Flotilla was ordered to repeat the operation against enemy supply traffic close to the Caucasus coast on the night of 12/13 August. Procedure in accordance with the operational order of 5 August.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was instructed to dispose 1 naval landing craft (guns) and motor minesweeper R 30 in patrol line between Brown 19 and Brown 20 on the night of 13/14 August to attack the enemy M.T.B.s and motor gunboats constantly appearing off the south Taman coast. The boats will put out so that they will reach the patrol line one hour after nightfall, leaving again one hour before dawn. Depending on the weather, they will anchor off Shelesni Rog or Cape Takil. On the evening of 13 August the boats will join the passing Anapa transport convoy as far as Brown 19. During their stay in the patrol line, they will proceed at very slow speed between Brown 19 and Brown 20. If they encounter the enemy, they will transmit a "Most Immediate" report. This first attempt to employ a naval landing craft (guns) in the Black Sea seems to be justified by the weather situation in the east, but a safety service vessel must accompany her.

The following report was received from Commanding General, 3rd Infantry Division on the sixth bombardment of the Mius front:

"Operation 'Memel 6' of 11 August was particularly effective. A large-scale Russian shock troop assault was driven off when the enemy had almost reached our lines. The Division wish to convey their thanks for the allocation of forces which made the operation possible."

The Division was informed that operations of this or similar type could be repeated on request.

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was directed to switch the Kerch-Temriuk and Genichesk-Temriuk convoys experimentally to night passage during the next full moon period (from 12 August). The latter convoy should proceed to Temriuk by night.

At 1430 2 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla (southern group) put out from Ivan Baba for the operation as ordered.

At 1600 3 more boats (northern group) followed. While they proceeded eastwards, the wind freshened to north-northeast, force 5 - 6, sea 4. At 1830 the northern group turned about owing to the weather; the southern group had already done so at 1755 as the weather prevented them from making any appreciable use of their weapons. At 2045 the northern group made fast in Ivan Baba followed by the southern group at 2100.

Although the violent wind was unexpected, I did not sanction the boats' return passage.



CONFIDENTIAL

The prevailing direction of the wind indicated that weather conditions in the vicinity of the coast might have been better and that the boats could have used their weapons there. This assumption was strengthened by the observation of an enemy landing at the beachhead. With wind and sea behind them, the boats would have had no difficulties during their return passage, and even if they had, the formation could have proceeded under the protection of the coast. Whenever there are easterly winds, even if they are fairly strong, every effort must be made to carry out operations. Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla has been informed accordingly.

At 1905 naval landing craft (guns) No. 10 put out from Kerch for patrol duties off the southern Taman Peninsula, followed at 1930 by motor minesweeper R 30.

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 418, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 8 and 11, 4 minesweepers and 6 assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties and mine observation.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no air raids on convoys or naval forces.

Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine later reported that Taganrog had been shelled from the direction of Primorsko at 1500 on 11 August and that the center of the town had been bombarded from the same direction at 1725 and 2035. (Reprisal for night bombardment by our naval forces?).

At 2040 planes machine-gunned the center of the town. At 0000 on 12 August the harbor area was shelled by an armored train off Mershenovka. 40 rounds were fired. These bombardments caused no casualties. From 0755 to 0830 on 12 August the armored train continued the bombardment. The "Bazar" was hit. Many dead, one member of the Navy seriously wounded. Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported the usual artillery and mortar fire and 40 bombs dropped on the southern part of the town and the site at the west harbor.

Minesweeping Activity:

Sevastopol: The FZ-group swept route Green six times with towed loop gear from the approach buoy northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards to the minefield. No mines swept.



Kerch: The anti-mine escort for Anapa convoy No. 169 swept 1 moored-mine at 1930 on route Brown off Maria-Magdalena bank: it was exploded by rifle fire. The FZ-boats swept the route to Taman for moored mines five times without result. Minesweeping planes swept route Red eight times from point 201 via point Z to point 220. No mines swept.

Temriuk: Route Red was swept from point 220 to point 201 by motor minesweepers RK 01, 03, RT 02 and 04. No mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 169 ran with 7 naval ferry barges. Owing to lack of freight, convoy No. 170 will not put out from Kerch until 1900 on 13 August.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1430 convoy No. 62 ran with 1 train ferry and 6 naval ferry barges. At 1900 convoy No. 63 put out from Kerch with 5 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1430 No. 53 put in to Temriuk with 1 goods train ferry, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 2 naval landing craft (guns) and anti-mine escort. At 1930 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy No. 30 put out from Taganrog with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 11 transport barges and 2 naval landing craft (guns).
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

13 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1822 the observation post at Novorossisk reported 1 naval tug and 1 lighter heading for Ghelenjik. At 1840 1 minesweeper put out from Ghelenjik on a southeasterly course. At 2230 20 vessels were observed off landing areas B and C. About 15 vessels turned off again because of artillery fire.

At 2355 on 12 August, night reconnaissance located 1 small vessel, apparently a patrol boat, 28 miles west of Tuapse. Daylight reconnaissance over the western and central Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. Owing to bad visibility, no enemy forces were sighted off the Caucasus coast. Only Ghelenjik harbor was examined: at 0655 5 motor minesweepers, 10 M.T.B.s, 7 coastal vessels totaling 1,800 tons, 60 boats. Since 9 August 2 coastal vessels had arrived and 6 M.T.B.s had put out. No enemy shipping in the reconnaissance area in the Sea of Azov. At 0758 7 motor gunboats, 3 coastal vessels and 70 boats were identified by visual reconnaissance in Primorsko Akhtari.

According to radio traffic, patrol activity was slight off the northern east coast, increasing off the central and southern parts. In the evening 1 destroyer was detected, probably in the southeastern Black Sea. Submarines detected: 1 off the south Crimean coast, 1 in the southwestern Black Sea, 1 in the evening in the central Black Sea off Kerch Strait on return passage from the northwest, 2 more in unidentified positions, presumably proceeding to the operational area. Moderate activity of small vessels in the Sea of Azov.

Own Situation:

At 0215 a report was received in Bugaz that mine carrier No. 2 which was proceeding in convoy from Odessa to Constantza had been hit in the stern and had exploded. It is not yet clear whether this was caused by a mine or a torpedo. Naval ferry barge F 139, assuming a submarine attack, dropped 2 depth charges. No results were observed. The stern of the mine carrier quickly filled with water up to the engine room bulkhead. At 0222 her crew was taken on board by F 139. Casualties numbered 6 civilians dead. Mine carrier No. 2 was still afloat and was towed

CONFIDENTIAL

to a point off Bugaz harbor, where she was beached. At present attempts are being made to trim the ship which is lying down by the stern and to tow her to Odessa.

At 0430 the vessels employed on coastal defense duties put in to Temriuk. There was nothing to report.

At 0730 naval landing craft (guns) No. 10 and motor minesweeper R 30 put in to Kamish Burun from the patrol line off the south Taman coast. There was nothing to report. The boats had to leave their positions much earlier than had been ordered owing to sudden deterioration of the weather.

At 0850 the Theodosia-Taman convoy No. 38 was attacked 10 miles west of Cape Opuk by Russian bombers. They flew in in 3 waves at very high altitude from the direction of the sun, dropping 25 bombs. Anti-aircraft guns could therefore not be employed. One bomb exploded close to naval ferry barge F 471 on the starboard side, piercing the bulkheads of the P.O.s' quarters and flooding the quarters, the galley and later also the hold. However, the ship remained afloat and reached Kerch at 1640. The cargo was damaged by the water. One man was seriously wounded, one slightly wounded.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk: winds northeast to east, force 4 - 6, fair, visibility 20 miles.

Sea of Azov: northerly winds, force 4, fair, visibility 20 miles.

U-boat Situation:

U 19 reported from the operational area that her potash cartridges and oxygen stocks were exhausted. The boat was immediately requested to report whether this meant that she would have to put in at once.

The Italian midget submarines CB 1 and 6 reported that they were at operational readiness.

It is planned to employ the boats again on anti-submarine operations in the Cape Sarich area, especially since locations seem to indicate enemy forces in this area. However, the weather prevents immediate operations. As soon as it improves, the boats are to put out for the operational area.

U 19, U 23 and U 24 were ordered to leave their present operational areas to form a patrol line



CONFIDENTIAL

from air grid square 13394 lower edge center to air grid square 13383 lower edge left at 0300 on 15 August. They should remain submerged until 2000 on 15 August, then begin to advance on the surface, if possible, at a speed of 5 knots. Their route will be via the position line from air grid square 13174 lower edge right to air grid square 03462 lower edge center. They should pass it at 0000, to reach the patrol line from air grid square 03234 upper edge left to air grid square 03293 lower edge left by 0300 on 16 August. Procedure as on the previous day. At 2000 on 16 August the boats will advance to pass the position line from air grid square 03213 to air grid square 03193 right edge center at 0000, reaching the patrol line from air grid square 04763 center to air grid square 03121 center left at 0300 on 17 August. U 19 will occupy the inner position and U 24 the outer position, with U 23 between them. These times and positions should be observed exactly. The courses given are general courses towards the reconnaissance lines, speeds are average, so that each boat should be able to calculate her speed to reach the new position at the right time. Every target sighted from the patrol line or reconnaissance position should be attacked, also any targets reported within a range of 40 miles other than single coastal vessels and submarine chasers. Thus, the main targets will be naval vessels from torpedo boats upwards, towed convoys, freighters over 800 tons and convoys.

After operating independently, each boat will proceed to the next position in the patrol line without any direct orders. If necessary, new times may be ordered.

This is the first attempt at a joint U-boat operation. I place my trust in the level of training attained by the young commanders.

The Naval Liaison Staff, Rumania reported by telephone that only 40% of the previous fuel allocation could be delivered for August and September.

Investigations are being carried out to determine how far this affects the operations of the naval forces.

At 2302 Temriuk reported that the patrol vessels could not put out because of the weather (Wind northeast, force 5, in squalls force 6, sea 3 - 4). The ships remain at operational readiness.

CONFIDENTIAL

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

No further raids were made on convoys after the air attack reported on the Theodosia-Kerch convoy No. 38.

At 1542 Yalta was attacked by 8 bombers which dropped about 50 to 60 bombs. The tug "Seefalke" was damaged in the harbor and was reported unfit for operations until 15 August. Another ship was slightly damaged. 4 or 5 houses were damaged in the town area, one 4.5 cm. gun of Naval Gunnery Detachment 601 was slightly damaged. One man was killed, 1 soldier slightly wounded, 1 man of the Naval Port Command seriously wounded and 1 slightly wounded. No planes were shot down.

For the first time it was observed that the enemy bomber formation was protected by 2 fighters at sea. No enemy fighters have appeared so far from their bases for a long time. 1st Air Corps has been informed.

Close to the coast off Anapa an enemy plane dropped 7 bombs without causing any damage.

Novorossisk reported artillery and mortar fire.

Minesweeping Activity:

Bugaz: 3 D-boats made a check sweep for moored mines off Bugaz, no mines swept.

Sevastopol: Route Green was swept six times from the approach buoy northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards to the minefield. Towed loop gear was used, no mines were swept.

At 1815 motor minesweepers R 164 and R 197 put in to Sevastopol from Kerch. On passage, they had swept the area as ordered but no mines were found.

Kerch: Minesweeping planes swept the route from Kerch to Taman 16 times for ground mines without result.

Temriuk: The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla swept route Red between points 201 and 220. No mines swept. At 1500 sweeping had to be broken off owing to the seaway.

Supply Traffic:

a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.

b. Anapa convoys: At 1810 convoy No. 170 put out from Kerch with 8 naval ferry barges. (24 hours' delay owing to lack of cargo.)

CONFIDENTIAL

- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 63 ran with 5 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 53 ran with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1305 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 1 lighter, transports Nos. 2 and 4 and 2 naval landing craft (guns).
- f. Crimea convoys ran according to plan. (For air raid on the Theodosia-Taman convoy No. 38, see above.)

Convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan with the exception of the above-mentioned mine or torpedo hit on mine carrier No. 2 off Buzaz.



CONFIDENTIAL

14 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1720 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported a freighter of 250 tons entering Ghelenjik from the south. No enemy shipping identified by daylight air reconnaissance over the western and central Black Sea or the Sea of Azov. Reconnaissance of the Caucasus coast produced no reports of the enemy. Slight patrol activity observed off Ghelenjik only.

In answer to a query, 1st Air Corps reported that, owing to the strained situation and lack of suitable planes, air reconnaissance of the Caucasus coast could still only be flown by 1 plane every second day. This means that the survey of the enemy situation and of the enemy supply traffic off the Caucasus coast will be very difficult and incomplete.

According to radio traffic, slight activity of patrol vessels and patrol boats off the east coast. Submarines detected: 1 in the northwestern Black Sea, 1 in the central part of the southwestern Black Sea, 3 in the eastern Black Sea, 2 in unidentified positions, presumably proceeding westward. Slight activity of small vessels in the Sea of Azov.

Own Situation:

At 0300 mine carrier No. 2 was towed in to Odessa by the tug "Pawle". Close examination of the leak showed that the explosion had most probably been caused by a torpedo. This belief was strengthened by the fact that no mines had been detected during sweeps off Bugaz.

At 0420 Naval Harbor Master, Taganrog reported that the transport cutter of the economic commission, T 2, had run aground while being towed by "Rheinkontor" from Mariupol to Taganrog. The rope had broken in a stiff southeasterly gale and high seas 4 miles southwest of Taganrog. The transport sank while an attempt was being made to refloat her, but the crew were rescued.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Yalta: winds north to northwest, force 3 - 4, cloudy, local thunderstorms in the afternoon, visibility 15 miles. Yalta - Novorossisk: winds northeast to east, force 4, otherwise as above. Sea of Azov: winds northeast to north, force 4, otherwise as above.

CONFIDENTIAL

As it is now particularly urgent to save fuel, the 1st and 11th E-Boat Flotillas did not operate owing to the changeable weather conditions and the unfavorable phase of the moon.

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was directed to dispose naval landing craft No. 10 and motor minesweeper R 30 in patrol line between Brown 19 and Brown 20 on the next two nights if weather permitted.

Most of the recent Constantza-Sevastopol steamer convoys have been organized so that they entered Sevastopol in the forenoon. The escort forces then put out again with the return convoy on the afternoon of the same day. The enemy will have discovered this arrangement by air reconnaissance and agents' reports, making it easier for them to dispatch torpedo planes and bombers at the right time. This was shown in the attack on "Boy Peddersen" which was carried out to the enemy's advantage shortly before nightfall.

Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea was therefore directed to organize future Sevastopol convoys, which would again run after the full moon period, so that they would pass the particularly dangerous area between Cape Tarkhan and Sevastopol during the hours of darkness. It is not expected that the threat from submarines off the already dangerous Eupatoria Bay will increase during darkness, especially since the steamer convoys will be canceled during those full moon nights which are especially favorable for submarine attacks.

The longer stay of the escort forces in Sevastopol from daybreak until nightfall must be accepted. The times ordered for leaving and entering Sevastopol will occasionally compel the ships to wait within the belt of mines off Constantza to avoid entering and leaving during darkness. This will depend on the speed of the convoys. The most important thing is to alter the rigid timetable.

The air raid on Yalta on 13 August again emphasizes the particular danger to which this port is subjected. Moreover, it does not have adequate anti-aircraft defenses. Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Crimean Coast has therefore been instructed to organize the Sevastopol-Theodosia and Theodosia-Sevastopol convoys so that the vessels calling at Yalta as intermediate port will remain



CONFIDENTIAL

there for a minimum length of time.

Subordinate units were ordered to use the D-type and F-type depth charges as deterrents only when absolutely necessary, as the depth charge supplies are very low. They are, however, not to be spared in attacks on submarines.

Group South was informed that naval transport No. 39 would probably be ready to sail on 16 August when her last minor repairs had been completed. On 18 August the ship will be inspected by Naval Port Commander, Nikolaiev, on 19 August her compensating trials will be executed and then she will proceed to Constantza for degaussing and installation of the artificial smoke device. Plans have been made for a 14 days' training period, with one of our U-boats participating from time to time. On 21 August the ship will undergo her acceptance trials and then her minor repairs will be completed. She should be at full operational readiness with her training completed by the end of September, 1943.

U-boat Situation:

Owing to lack of potash cartridges and oxygen, U 19 reported that she could only remain in the operational area for one more day. She was ordered to commence return passage from the operational area to Theodosia on the evening of 14 August. The patrol line and reconnaissance line will be occupied as ordered by U 23 and U 24. U 24 has been in the operational area off Pitsunda Point since the evening of 12 August. It is regrettable that the effectiveness of this first attempt at a joint operation by 3 U-boats along the Caucasus coast should be reduced by this unexpected event, which leaves only 2 boats for the task. According to the last reports from these boats, they have enough fuel and ammunition and there was no mention of any scarcity of potash cartridges or oxygen. Both Command and the boats will have to learn from this experience.

Group South was informed of the operational plans for the Italian midget submarines in the south Crimean coast area and of the postponement of the operation owing to the weather.

1st Air Corps reported that during the night of 14/15 August the Air Force would be carrying out anti-submarine operations in the entire western Black Sea west of 34° E and in the north, north of the Sevastopol-Constantza line.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

At 1050 submarine chasers Nos. 2301 and 2303 put in to Ak Mechet from anti-submarine operations in the Eupatoria area. No enemy sighted.

At 1155 5 bombers (twin-engines seaplanes) and 2 fighters attacked the Yalta-Theodosia convoy, escorted by "Novatie" and 2 naval ferry barges, 3.5 miles southeast of Cape Moganom. They dropped 24 bombs. No damage or casualties. Altitude while attacking 1,800 meters. The ships defended with 7.5 cm. and 2 cm. guns without success.

Attacks on the Crimea convoys sailing by day during the full moon period must be accepted, especially since enemy planes have been active off the east and south of the Crimea during the recent bright nights and also because the danger from submarines, surface forces and planes would be greater during the full moon nights than by day.

At 1910 naval landing craft (guns) No. 10 and motor minesweeper R 30 put out from Kamish Burun for patrol duties off the south Taman coast.

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 419, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 8 and 11, 4 minesweepers and assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties and mine observation.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

Apart from the above-mentioned air raid on the Crimea convoy, no convoys or naval forces were attacked.

Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported that, in addition to slight artillery shelling, 18 bombs had been dropped in an air raid on the site at the east harbor and the southern part of the town.

Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine later reported that Tagenrog harbor had been shelled by heavy caliber guns from the direction of Morskaya. 12 rounds were fired from 1750 to 1810 on 13 August. From 2120 to 0100 (14 August), 17 rounds were fired on the town area and from 0825 until 0830 a further 11 rounds on the harbor by the same battery. No damage or casualties.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: On 13 August mine exploding vessel No. 193 left for trials. The Galatz-St. George

CONFIDENTIAL

Arm route of 107 km. was patrolled with magnetic gear and an anti-turbine noise box, no mines were detected. After it had touched the bottom, the noise box was drawn in and the ship proceeded with only magnetic gear as far as Mahmudia and then back again to Mile 56. One mine was swept midway between Mile 95 and 96. The lower Danube was swept by 2 mine-sweeping planes. No mines swept.

Odessa: Motor minesweeper No. 7 and D 8 carried out a check sweep of route Green from Odessa to point 25. No mines swept.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group swept route Green six times with towed loop gear from the approach buoy northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards to the minefield. No mines swept.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 51, 54, FR 4 and 8 escorted the Anapa convoy. No mines swept. The FZ-boats swept the route to Taman for moored mines without result. Minesweeping planes searched for ground mines in Kerch Strait. No mines swept.

Temriuk: The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla carried out minesweeping and escort duties on route Red from point 220 to point 201. No mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 170 ran with 8 naval ferry barges. At 1910 convoy No. 171 put out from Kerch with 8 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1810 convoy No. 64 put out from Kerch with 2 tugs, 2 lighters and 4 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1900 convoy No. 54 put out from Temriuk for Genichesk with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 4 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Mariupol-Taganrog convoy ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 2 naval landing craft (guns) and 1 transport cutter. (The transport cutter sank 4 miles off Taganrog.)

At 1830 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Taganrog with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 2 naval landing craft (guns) and 1 transport barge. At 1315 the Kerch-Berdyansk convoy





CONFIDENTIAL

15 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1225 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported 1 freighter of about 1,000 tons, 1 towing vessel of about 300 tons with a lighter of about 200 tons, 1 coastal vessel of about 200 tons and 2 gunboats entering Ghelenjik from the southeast. At 1655 1 M.T.B. was cruising in Ghelenjik Bay. At 1825 1 M.T.B. put in to Ghelenjik from the south.

Daylight reconnaissance over the western and central Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. At 0710 2 motor minesweepers were sighted off the Caucasus coast 10 miles south of Tuapse, proceeding northwest at moderate speed. At 0715 1 patrol boat proceeding at high speed was sighted 10 miles west of Tuapse. At 0723 2 M.T.B.s 5 miles south of Ghelenjik. At 0805 coastal vessels totaling 1,200 tons and some 40 boats in Ghelenjik harbor (only partially examined owing to clouds). Bad weather prevented examination of the other ports.

No shipping traffic in the reconnaissance area in the Sea of Azov. At 0605, approximately 10 boats were spotted in the estuary of the Protoka River, the other ports were not examined owing to the weather.

At 2135 night reconnaissance located 1 probable submarine 18 miles northwest of Sevastopol. Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria reported that according to radio traffic there was 1 destroyer off the northern part of the east coast in the evening. Slight M.T.B. and patrol vessel activity in the same area as far as the southern part of the east coast. Submarines detected: 1 in the northwestern Black Sea and 1 in an unidentified position.

On the Army front a German attack mopped up an enemy penetration.

Own Situation:

At 0500 the patrol forces employed on coastal defense duties put in to Temriuk. Nothing to report.

At 0630 naval landing craft (guns) No. 10 and motor minesweeper R 30 entered Kerch from the

CONFIDENTIAL

patrol line south of the Taman Peninsula. Nothing to report. This was the first time that a naval landing craft (guns) had operated in a patrol line off the Taman coast (Black Sea).

At 0600 I went to the Kuban bridgehead (Temriuk), Anapa and Novorossisk for inspections and discussions.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0820): Eupatoria - Yalta: winds north, force 3, sea wind, thundery showers, visibility 20 miles, morning haze off the coast. Yalta-Novorossisk and southern Sea of Azov: southerly winds, force 3, sea wind up to force 5, otherwise as above. Northern Sea of Azov: winds north-east, force 3, otherwise as above.

On the basis of information received up to now on the torpedoing of "Boy Feddersen", the following report was made to Group South:

"On 10 August the "Boy Feddersen" - "Varna" convoy was proceeding in line abreast with "Boy Feddersen" as guide on the starboard side. Escorting forces: "Murgescu" ahead, "Maria" on the starboard bow, "Maresti" on the port bow, motor minesweeper R 163 on the starboard beam, motor minesweeper R 196 on the starboard quarter, motor minesweeper R 204 on the port quarter, gunboat "Dumitrescu" astern, course 258°, speed 11 knots."

Weather and light: wind northwest, force 2 - 3, slightly clouded, bright moon bearing 200°, last remaining daylight in the west, moderate visibility, becoming quickly darker in the east with haze and bad visibility.

At 1922 in 45° 01' N, 32° 49.5' E, 2 Russian torpedo planes, type DB III, flew in from the southeast and attacked from the port quarter. 2 torpedoes were launched at "Boy Feddersen": one of them struck her amidships, causing a high column of smoke and water. Astern of "Boy Feddersen", the planes turned off to the northeast. While they were turning, the ship's guns were trained on them and 1 plane was shot down. At the same time 1 DB III attacked from the starboard quarter from the northeast. One torpedo was launched on "Boy Feddersen": it struck her amidships on the starboard side and a high column of smoke and water and heavy steam clouds immediately developed. The plane flew off to the northwest. 3 German signalmen of the "Maria" claim to have sighted a periscope on the starboard quarter and 2 torpedo tracks from this

CONFIDENTIAL

direction, hence the torpedo hit on the starboard side. The periscope disappeared off the bow of "Boy Feddersen". These statements seem doubtful.

German defense: The attack was not observed until very late, but nevertheless, before any torpedoes were launched, all the guns aboard the steamers and escorting vessels had found the range accurately. Presumably the plane was shot down by "Boy Feddersen", "Varna", motor minesweeper R 204 and "Dumitrescu".

At 1934 another attack was made on "Boy Feddersen" by 2 Russian bombers which flew in from the east at an altitude of 600 - 800 meters. They dropped several bombs which landed close astern of the ship, but did not hit her. The planes flew off in a westerly direction and our anti-aircraft guns failed to hit them.

Defensive maneuvers of the steamers: "Boy Feddersen"'s attempt to turn off failed because the attacking planes were not observed until too late. On observing them, "Varna" made off to the southwest on zig-zag courses. At 1945 "Murgescu" continued passage to Constantza with "Maresti" and "Varna". The other escort vessels protected and attempted to salvage "Boy Feddersen" which was still afloat. At 1953 another unsuccessful attack was made from the starboard quarter by a single DB III. Our one fighter and close escort had left the convoy 10 minutes before the attack. Air protection had not been specially requested as it was a moonlight night. The convoy had been first detected at 1500 by a Russian reconnaissance plane. On being informed of this fact by radio, the commander of the convoy had ordered increased readiness of the anti-aircraft guns.

Comments by Admiral, Black Sea:

The serial torpedo attack was made at the most favorable moment from a dark horizon. Our fighter escort had just left as darkness fell. The success of the attack was largely due to the fact that the approaching planes were not observed and also to the skill of the execution in attacking simultaneously from port and starboard.

The formation adopted by the convoy and the procedure of allotting escort forces for the defense of "Varna" and "Boy Feddersen" after the attack were correct.

Commander, Naval Air reported that the Me 110 acting as fighter escort had remained with the convoy until 1920. The plane had then to fly



CONFIDENTIAL

back to reach its base before the end of twilight. It had arrived at approximately 1935. Commander, Naval Air has no night fighters at his disposal. 1st Air Corps has approximately 6 night fighters, which are employed over the Kuban bridgehead and Kerch Strait. After discussion with Commander, Naval Air, it was planned to request night fighters from the 4th Air Force for special operations, such as the escorting of important convoys on bright nights.

U-boat Situation:

U 24 reported that as all her oxygen had been used up, she would be compelled to commence return passage from the operational area to Theodosia on the morning of 16 August. From that morning, U 23 will occupy the operational area off Pitsunda and Sukhum. The first joint U-boat operation was thus abandoned entirely. (See U-boat Situation of 14 August.)

U 19 will put in to Theodosia on 16 August. She is expected to remain there for several days. Preparatory measures have been taken by Naval Port Commander, Theodosia.

The midget submarines CB 1 and 6 have been ordered to carry out anti-submarine operations in the south Crimean coast area from 16 to 18 August. The boats will operate independently against enemy submarines and surface forces. Their task is to destroy the enemy. Sailing orders will be issued for 0600 on 16 August. 1st Air Corps, Naval Shore Commander, Crimea and Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Crimean Coast have been informed of the submarines' operational area. This area will be barred for anti-submarine operations by the Air Force until further notice and also for surface forces unless submarines attack our own vessels or convoys. Measures have been taken to inform coastal defenses and convoys between Sevastopol and Yalta.

The boats were to operate in the area south of the Crimean coast because enemy submarines had been reported there almost daily. They had been attacking our supply transports close to the Crimean coast, constituting a continuous threat to our convoys which followed fixed routes along the coast. It is therefore vital that effective attacks should be made on these submarines.

For the same reasons I plan to employ the other 2 Italian midget submarines CB 2 and 3

CONFIDENTIAL

on anti-submarine operations in the Eupatoria area from 17 August to 19 August.

1st Air Corps informed me that the Air Force will repeat the anti-submarine operations carried out yesterday during the night of 15/16 August.

At 1052 Odessa reported that while proceeding from Sulina to Odessa in a towed convoy, D 6 sank from a leak in her bow. How it was caused has not yet been discovered. There was no explosion. The crew were rescued, and some of the equipment salvaged.

At 1500 the gunboat "Stihi" gave a submarine alarm from the Sulina-Odessa convoy approximately 15 miles south of Odessa. "Xanten", "Stihi" and 3 submarine chasers were sent on anti-submarine operations but no further reports have come in.

At 1715 the Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria reported an enemy destroyer, located roughly in the Ghelenjik area. In the course of the evening there were further reports from radar operators of M.T.B. activity off the southern exit of Kerch Strait.

The following measures were adopted:

- a. 1st E-Boat Flotilla was ordered to immediate operational readiness on receipt of the code-word.
- b. The Anapa convoy was stopped off Cape Tkil. It was not to continue passage until dawn.
- c. Naval landing craft (guns) No. 10 and motor minesweeper R 30 were to protect the southern exit of Kerch Strait.
- d. Naval forces alarm was given for the south Crimean coast until 0300 on the night of 15/16 August.
- e. Night reconnaissance will be flown by 1st Air Corps in the Ghelenjik-Theodosia area.

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus ordered 2nd degree of alarm for Anapa. No engagements were reported.

At 1815 naval landing craft (guns) No. 10 and motor minesweeper R 30 put out from Kerch for patrol duties off the south Taman coast.

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 419, naval landing craft (guns) Nos. 8 and 10, 4 minesweepers and 6 assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol.

CONFIDENTIAL

duties and mine observation.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no air attacks were made on convoys or naval forces.

Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported that, in addition to the usual artillery and mortar fire, there had been slight air activity over the town. Two bombs were dropped on the southern sector.

From 2020 to 2130 Taganrog was shelled by heavy caliber guns from Primorsko. 16 rounds were fired. No damage.

Minesweeping Activity:

Cape Burnas: D 7 swept 1 inertia contact mine 7 miles southwest of Cape Burnas. The mine exploded 30 seconds after being cut.

Sevastopol: 4 boats of the 3rd Motor minesweeper Flotilla began to sweep the northwestern minefield gap off Sevastopol, but the operation had to be broken off owing to the weather.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 51, 54, PR 2 and 8 escorted the Anapa convoy No. 171. At 0200 on 14 August 2 inertia contact mines were cut on route Brown between points 18a and 19a. Minesweeping planes swept route Red for ground mines from point 201 via Z towards point 220. No mines swept.

The FZ-boats made a check sweep for ground mines in Kerch Strait. No mines swept.

Temriuk: The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla carried out minesweeping and mine observation duties between points 201 and 220. No mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 171 ran with 8 naval ferry barges. At 1930 convoy No. 172 put out from Kerch with 7 naval ferry barges and anchored off Cape Takil because of danger from M.T.B.s.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 64 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.



CONFIDENTIAL

- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 54 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 motor sailing vessel and 4 naval ferry barges. At 0930 convoy No. 55 put out from Genichesk with 1 train ferry, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1330 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 10 transport barges and 2 naval landing craft (guns).

The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 transport cutter and 2 naval landing craft (guns).

At 0600 the Kerch-Berdyansk convoy No. 8 with 1 tug, 1 lighter, motor minesweeper No. 52 and naval landing craft (guns) No. 9 returned to Kerch on account of the weather.

- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.  
(For the sinking of D 6 from the Sulina-Odessa convoy, see above.)

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix to War Diary of 5 August, 1943

C o p y

Admiral, Black Sea  
Serial No. 4785 AI.

5 August, 1943

To:

1st E-Boat Flotilla, Iven Baba.  
1st Air Corps/Commander, Naval Air, Black Sea  
via Naval Liaison Officer,  
17th Army HQ via Naval Liaison Officer,  
Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus, Kerch.  
Copy to Naval Group South.

Subject: Operational order for attacks on enemy  
supply traffic between Chelenjik and  
Mysbako by 1st E-Boat Flotilla.

Codeword: "Treibjagd"

A. Situation:

Thorough long-term observations and investigations revealed that supply vessels for the beachhead south of Novorossisk obviously put out from Chelenjik for point I, approximately 44° 31.5' N, 37° 59' E. From there the vessels follow a general course of 310° as far as point II, 44° 38.5' N, 37° 47' E to the only landing points in use in landing area B. With fair regularity the traffic reaches the vicinity of the beachhead between 2200 and 0000. Delays do not often occur. Thus, the approach area between point I and point II is passed approximately between 2100 and 2200. The ships assemble at point I shortly before dark. This supply traffic proceeds through the enemy declared area.

B. Task:

To disrupt supply traffic effectively between points I and II.

C. Execution:

1. On receipt of cover name "Treibjagd", giving date and time, 1st E-Boat Flotilla will operate against the above mentioned supply traffic. The date will indicate the day of sailing from the base and X-hours the time of arrival at point III. At least 3 boats equipped with 4 cm. guns are to carry out the assignment. If any mines are encountered, the operation is to be abandoned.
2. 2 more boats will be between Chugovko passage and

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Vulan Tal at X-hours to distract attention from the task described in Para. C 1.

3. The boats should sail from the base so that the northern group will reach position III (approximately 3 - 5 miles northwest of point I) at X-hours and the southern group their position at Y-hours. Camouflage of the boats should be carried out if visibility makes it advisable. If no enemy forces are met on the approach to the beachhead, the boats will remain in a lurking position west of the route from point I to point II until half an hour before dawn. It is hoped that they will intercept returning enemy boats. If the flotilla has to withdraw after an encounter with the enemy, the boats are to continue to thrust towards the enemy supply route all night until it is time to leave, unless any other operational reasons force them to make off earlier.
4. The southern group of boats will begin their return two and a half hours before dawn.

D. Communications arrangements:

The boats will tune to the E-boat and tactical Air Force frequencies as the commander of the flotilla orders.

E. 1st Air Corps is requested:

1. To send a Liechtenstein plane to the area between points I and II to transmit reconnaissance reports on the tactical Air Force frequency.
2. To allocate fighter escort for the northern group at dawn, as the boats must continue to operate until then. (If no fighter escort can be allocated, the boats will be ordered to return earlier.)



CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix to War Diary of 6 August, 1943

C o p y

Admiral, Black Sea  
Serial No. Gkdos. 4826/43 AIII.

6 August, 1943

To:

Naval Group South, Sofia.  
Copy to 30th U-Boat Flotilla, Constantza.

Subject: U-boat pack tactics in the Black Sea.

Reference:

Group South Op. 3914/43 Gkdos. of 23 July.  
Comments by Group on War Diary of Admiral,  
Black Sea of 25 May, page 581, sections 1 - 3.

The suggestions made by Group South in the above reference for a new form of U-boat operations in the Black Sea have already been thoroughly examined here, but the attempt to develop pack tactics has been abandoned as a result of the commanders' experiences in such operations. Further considerations are as follows:

1. Pack tactics were developed by the U-boat command in the Atlantic as an answer to the increased defenses of the convoys there, when it became impossible for a single boat to attack. The idea was to dispose a concentration of boats against concentrated escort forces and massed targets. Half the boats would engage the escort forces and keep them busy, while the other half was able to attack.
2. Conditions in the Black Sea area are totally different from the Atlantic. Here, there is no question of submarine warfare in free sea areas against concentrated, strongly escorted targets. In the Black Sea we have a purely coastal war against coastal vessels which sail very close to the coast or against single, escorted freighters which are only encountered occasionally at irregular intervals.

In the Mediterranean where conditions have hitherto been similar, we do not use pack tactics.

Admiral, Black Sea is planning a special form of joint operation, whereby several boats will form a mobile reconnaissance line with position lines parallel to the coast. Depending on the operational numbers, the boats will cover an area up to 12 - 18 miles from the coast. Thus they will harass stationary anti-submarine patrols by continuously altering position and at the same time will be free to operate against any targets within range reported by reconnaissance.

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix to War Diary of 7 August, 1943

C o p y

Teletype/Radiogram - Emergency.

6 August, 1943

To:

Italian Naval Command, Sevastopol,  
Italian CB-Operational Radio Station, Yalta  
for Capt. Torri.

For information Naval Group South,  
Naval Liaison Officer to 1st Air Corps,  
Naval Shore Commander, Crimea, Yalta,  
Commander, Convoys and Escorts,  
Crimean Coast, Sevastopol.

Gkdos.

Operational Order No. 3 for 1st CB-Boat Flotilla  
(Italian midget submarines).

1. Situation:

Radio traffic revealed the presence of 2 enemy  
submarines south of the Crimea, but no exact  
details of their positions were gained.

2. Order:

CB 1 and 6 will put out from Sevastopol at 0500  
on 7 August, proceeding via route Brown to Yalta.  
Cruising speed 5 knots. If necessary, they will  
take in more fuel there. They will put out again  
after discussion with the flotilla commander:  
CB 1 at 1700 on 7 August and CB 6 at 1800.  
They will proceed southeast at some distance from  
the coast in accordance with the special directions,  
returning on 10 August. Both boats could reach  
Brown 4 at 0600 to proceed together to Sevastopol  
via route Brown.

Additional note for Naval Shore Commander and Commander,  
Convoys and Escorts:

Coastal defenses and convoys should be informed of the  
intended routes and times. No anti-submarine operations  
unless enemy submarines attack first.

Additional note for Naval Liaison Officer to 1st Air  
Corps:

Air grid squares 4540 to 4580, 4610, 5530 and 5550  
barred for anti-submarine operations until 0000 on  
10 August.

Admiral, Black Sea Gkdos. 4809 A 1.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix to War Diary of 7 August, 1942

C o p y

Admiral, Black Sea  
Serial No. 04205, 4791 A1.

5 August, 1942

To:

Commander, 3rd Naval Landing Craft Flotilla  
(Guns), Mariupol,  
Copy to Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine, Mariupol,  
Naval Group South, Operations Staff, Sofia.

Subject: Minelaying off Veisk.

Cover name: "S a s m u n d"

1. Situation:

Air reconnaissance confirmed that Veisk is currently used as a base for naval forces (motor gunboats and small armed vessels). Minelaying is therefore necessary north of the harbor entrance.

2. Order:

a. Mines are to be laid at irregular intervals in the area between the connecting lines shown in the sketch between points I and IV (I - 46° 40.0' N, 36° 12.8' E, II - 46° 36.4' N, 36° 13.7' E, III - 46° 43.7' N, 36° 12.8' E, IV - 46° 46.3' N, 36° 11.5' E).

b. Mines required: 12 LFP (S) mines, 6 with firing unit M-1 and 6 with firing unit M-1 to be laid mixed. The mines will be available in Mariupol.

c. Craft to be employed: 1 naval landing craft (guns) as mine carrier, another naval landing craft (guns) and 1 motor minesweeper (M-1 or M-2) as navigational craft.

d. The mines should be laid in 2 rows from general southeast to north-northeastly courses, distance between the rows 150 - 200 meters.

e. Command: Commander, 3rd Naval Landing Craft Flotilla (Guns).

3. Execution:

a. On receipt of message "S s m u n d", the mines are to be moved toward the "S s m u n d" on 4-day. "S s m u n d" will be provided with date and time, date of next

CONFIDENTIAL

201-

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

the day of sailing from Mariupol and time zero hour for minelaying. (If the hour denoted should be early morning, it will refer to the following day.)

- b. The boats should leave Mariupol on X-day to reach point E one hour before X-hours along the route laid down in the sketch through points A and D.
  - c. From point E, the navigational boat should set course for point F, so that the mine-carrying naval landing craft (guns) can follow in her wake with the second naval landing craft astern. The latter will remain in a rendezvous position near point F. The mines should be laid in 2 rows either along the route marked blue or that marked green according to the wind direction. The sketch is only approximate. If winds are favorable, it is advisable to put up a slight smoke screen.
  - d. Return passage after execution of minelaying via points G and D to Mariupol.
  - e. If enemy naval forces appear, they should be attacked and the minelaying abandoned. If minelaying has already begun, it should be continued approximately as planned and the enemy challenge accepted so that they will not discover the real purpose of the operation.
4. After entering port, execution should be reported by teletype and the minelaying report with sketch sent in triplicate to Admiral, Black Sea.



CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DIARY  
OF  
ADMIRAL, BLACK SEA

Commanding Admiral: Vice-Admiral Kieseritzky.

16 - 31 AUGUST 1943

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
Naval History Division  
Washington 25, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

16 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

From 0820 to 1040 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted the following ships entering Ghelenjik from the south: 2 freighters of 800 to 1,000 tons, 1 coastal vessel of about 600 tons, 2 gunboats, 1 tug of approximately 800 tons with 1 lighter of approximately 400 tons. At about 0000, 8 vessels were observed off landing areas B and C: they were shelled and forced to turn about.

Daylight reconnaissance by the Air Force over the western Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. The Caucasus coast and the eastern Black Sea were not reconnoitered. No large surface ships at sea according to radio traffic. Slight M.T.B. and patrol vessel activity off the east coast. Submarines detected: one 26 miles west of Eupatoria, one 43 miles south of Sevastopol, 2 in unidentified positions.

In a bright moonlight night, reconnaissance did not detect any enemy activity in the Tuapse-Ghelenjik area or in the area south of Kerch Strait. Planes on anti-submarine patrol in the western Black Sea sighted 1 enemy submarine 14 miles southeast of Tarkhan. 14 bombs were dropped, but no results were observed.

Own Situation:

It was later reported that D 6 which was yesterday reported lost had not sunk but had been towed in to Odessa at 0100 by motor minesweeper No. 7. She is beached there in water 2 meters deep. It is assumed that D 6 collided with a wreck. Investigation by Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea has been arranged.

At 0100 submarine chasers Nos. 2301 and 2303 put out from Ak Mechet for anti-submarine operations in the Tarkhan-Eupatoria area.

At 0430 the vessels employed on coastal defense and mine observation duties put in to Temriuk. They had nothing to report.

At 0610 motor minesweeper R 30 put in to Temriuk, followed at 0650 by naval gunnery lighter No. 10.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

They had been on patrol duty at the southern entrance to Kerch Strait, where they had not sighted the enemy.

At 0640 the submarine chaser "Xanten" put in to Odessa from operations in the area off Odessa. She had pursued 1 submarine with depth charges but could not definitely claim a success. Air bubbles were observed after the depth charges had been dropped, but there was no trace of oil. 2 submarine chasers were sent out to give support. As the enemy submarine was believed to be lying on the bottom, the suspected area was searched with a line, but without success. No further locations by search gear. The operation was badly impeded by the weather.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: light northerly winds, sea wind in the afternoon, generally fair, visibility 20 miles.

U-boat Situation:

At 0615 the Italian midget submarines CB 1 and CB 6 put out from Sevastopol for anti-submarine operations south of the Crimean coast. At 0830 U 19 put in to Theodosia. It is planned that she should put out again for a short operation on 18 August when she has replenished with oxygen and potash cartridges. U 24 reported that she would put in to Theodosia on 17 August. Naval Port Commander, Theodosia will make the necessary preparations and inform the coastal authorities.

Because of the bad weather this evening (north-westerly winds, force 4 - 5) and the unfavorable forecast for 17 August, the operation of the midget submarines CB 3 and 4 planned for 17 - 18 August in the Eupatoria area will be postponed until further notice.

At 1030 submarine chaser No. 2303 reported serious engine trouble in the Tarkhan area. Submarine chaser No. 2301 took her in tow and was instructed by Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea to proceed to Sevastopol.

At 1900 Taganrog reported an air raid on the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy. Naval gunnery lighter No. 1 reported some men wounded, otherwise no damage. The convoy is continuing passage.

CONFIDENTIAL

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 419, naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11, 4 minesweepers and 6 assault boats put out from Temriuk on patrol duties.

I returned from the Kuban bridgehead in the evening.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

Apart from the above-mentioned air raid on the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy, no attacks were made on convoys or naval forces.

In addition to slight artillery fire, Novorossisk reported an air raid on the southern part of the town in which about 20 bombs were dropped. Several enemy penetrations as far as Mariupol and Berdiansk, but no bombing. Taganrog was again shelled from Primorka. 21 rounds were fired from heavy caliber guns. No damage was reported.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: Minesweeping planes swept the area off the Danube estuary between points Green 31a and Green 22 for the 33rd - 36th times. No mines swept. As this area has now been swept 19 times without result since the last penetration of enemy planes, it is believed to be clear of magnetic mines and no further sweeps will be made.

West Coast: D 9 swept an oblong, horned mine in 46° 5.3' N, 50° 34.3' E.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group swept route Green six times with towed loop gear from the approach buoy at Sevastopol northwards as far as the 40-meter line and eastwards as far as the minefield, no mines swept.

The 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla swept 1 Russian mine, type M 51, in 44° 42' N, 33° 24' E.

Kerch: Motor minesweeper R 50 swept route Red for moored mines from point 15 to point 1 without result.

Motor minesweepers RA 51, 54, FR 4 and 7 escorted the Anapa convoy. No mines swept.

Minesweeping planes swept route Red three times from point 201 to point 220. No mines swept.



CONFIDENTIAL

The FZ-group searched for ground mines in Kerch Strait without result.

Temriuk: The harbor defense flotilla swept route Red from Point 220 to point 201. No mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 172 ran with 7 naval ferry barges. At 1900 convoy No. 173 put out from Kerch with 6 naval ferry barges. Owing to lack of cargo convoy No. 173 consisted of only 6 naval ferry barges. For the same reason convoy No. 174 comprising 6 naval ferry barges will not sail until 18 August.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1815 convoy No. 65 put out from Kerch with 1 tug and 2 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1225 convoy No. 55 put out from Temriuk with 1 towing vessel, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges. Necessary military re-dispositions will delay convoys here also on 17 August.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Mariupol-Taganrog convoy No. 32 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 2 naval gunnery lighters and 10 transport barges. During passage the tug "Henl" ran aground off Petrushino but was refloated without damage.  
  
At 1200 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 2 lighters and 2 naval gunnery lighters. (For air raid, see above.)  
  
The Berdyansk-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, motor minesweeper RA 36 and WM 6001.
- f. Crimea convoys ran according to plan. Some of the convoys in the western Black Sea were delayed by the weather.

CONFIDENTIAL

17 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 0230 Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported 18 vessels off landing areas B and C operating a shuttle service. The landing points and the vessels were shelled and the vessels made off, putting up an artificial smoke screen. At 0435 1 minesweeper was sighted putting out from Ghelenjik heading for Cape Doob. No reports from planes on daylight reconnaissance over the Black Sea. Very lively shipping traffic identified off the Turkish coast: at 1157 1 coastal vessel of about 400 tons 5 miles north of Inculu, at 1325 1 passenger vessel of 3,000 tons 5 miles west of Cibe. At 1402 3 coastal vessels totaling 800 tons 15 miles west of Zonguldak, 3 freighters totaling 4,000 tons, 1 freighter of 1,000 tons and 2, each 800 tons. At 1403 7 merchant ships totaling 13,000 tons were sighted 10 miles northeast of Zonguldak roads, at 1407 5 merchant ships totaling 3,500 tons in Eregli roads.

The Caucasus coast was reconnoitered as far as Poti. Batum was not examined owing to the weather. At 0715 3 motor minesweepers, 1 tug, 1 coastal vessel of about 500 tons, 3 patrol vessels, 2 boats heading southeast at medium speed in the Tuapse area near Chubga jetty. Ghelenjik 0755: 4 motor minesweepers, 14 M.T.B.s, 2 coastal vessels totaling 800 tons, 1 motor minesweeper towing 1 seaplane. Tuapse (photographic reconnaissance) 0708: 3 motor minesweepers, 3 M.T.B.s, 2 of which were beached, 3 small armed vessels, 1 freighter of about 1,500 tons, 9 coastal vessels totaling 3,000 tons, 1 floating crane and about 40 boats. Sochi (visual reconnaissance) 0730: 1 coastal vessel and 4 motor minesweepers. Chobi estuary (photographic reconnaissance) 0650: 1 tanker of 7,000 tons, 7 freighters totaling 18,000 tons, 1 torpedoboat, 4 submarines, the hull of a cruiser and the hull of a destroyer. Since the last photographic reconnaissance, the number of ships has increased by 1 torpedoboat, the hull of a cruiser with the stern cut off, 4 submarines, 1 tanker of 7,000 tons and 4 freighters totaling 13,000 tons. Poti (oblique view): 1 battleship and 1 tanker of 7,000 tons. No enemy shipping in the reconnaissance area in the Sea of Azov.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 6 -

93

CONFIDENTIAL

At 2125 the Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria located 1 submarine 90 miles southwest of Sevastopol. Further submarines detected: 1 in the northwestern Black Sea, 2 in the area southwest of the Crimea, 2 in the eastern Black Sea and 1 in an unidentified position, probably in the southwestern Black Sea. Slight activity of small vessels in the Sea of Azov in the forenoon.

At 1750 the Rumanian Air Force bombed and machine-gunned 1 submarine 22 miles south of Odessa. The submarine submerged, results not yet known.

No actions of any importance were reported from the Army front. A minor enemy attack was repulsed.

Own Situation:

D 6 which was damaged and towed in to Odessa yesterday has been raised and secured by stocks on land.

The commander of naval ferry barge F 307 later reported an unsuccessful attack on a submarine at 0715 on 16 August 7 miles westsouthwest of Sudak. A periscope had been sighted and 6 depth charges dropped without result. No torpedo attack was made. F 307 was sailing in a Theodosia-Yalta convoy.

The other vessels of the convoy did not see the submarine.

An additional report on yesterday's air raid on the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy was received: The attack was made at 1815 by 2 planes which bombed and machine-gunned the convoy. 1 man seriously wounded and 3 slightly wounded on board naval gunnery lighter No. 2, otherwise no damage. Neither plane was shot down.

At 0300 the vessels employed on coastal defense duty put in to Temriuk and had nothing to report from the patrol line.

At 0630 I went from Simferopol to Theodosia to inspect the U-boats which had put in there and to have discussions with the commanders.

I returned to Simferopol about 1300.

At 0700 submarine chaser No. 2301, towing submarine chaser No. 2303, put in to Sevastopol from anti-submarine operations. Submarine chaser No. 2303 had engine trouble. She reported





CONFIDENTIAL

that she would be ready for operations again at 1800 on 18 August.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: northerly winds, force 4-5, veering northeast in the afternoon and abating at night to force 3, generally fair, local thunder showers, visibility 15 miles, morning mist.

U-boat Situation:

At 0930 U 24 put in to Theodosia from operations.

At 0000 U 9 put out from Galatz after dockyard repairs and arrived at Sulina at 1635. From there she is to be escorted by a group of motor minesweepers to Constantza on 18 August.

U 23 did not report from sea.

After their engines had been overhauled, E-boats S 28 and S 46 put out from Constantza for Ivan Baba. En route they called at Theodosia with oxygen and potash cartridges for U 19 and U 24. The boats will remain in Ivan Baba ready for operations. Anti-submarine operations have been prohibited in air grid squares 3500 and 4500 (the operational area of the Italian CB-boats).

The 1st and 11th E-Boat Flotillas did not operate because of the unfavorable moon phase and the scarcity of fuel.

At 1900 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11, naval ferry barge F 419, 4 minesweepers and 6 assault boats put out from Tomriuk on patrol duties.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day there were no air raids on our convoys or naval forces. In the evening there was strikingly lively enemy air activity in the area south of Kerch Strait.

In the early morning hours enemy planes flew over the south Crimean coast at high altitudes without dropping any bombs.

Naval Port Commander, Anapa reported an air raid in which 8 bombs were dropped without causing any damage.

Enemy planes penetrated to Taganrog and dropped 2 bombs on the town. No damage. In the

afternoon and evening of 16 August, the fishing harbor and the town area of Taganrog were shelled by heavy caliber guns. Altogether 25 rounds were fired. The tug "Reni" and the harbor defense boats engaged in towing off the tug which had run aground off the harbor entrance were shelled by the Pavlo-Ochakov battery. 23 rounds were fired without causing damage. Novorossisk reported shelling of the site at the west harbor and of the southern part of the town. 1 soldier was slightly wounded by a direct hit on a billet.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: 1 minesweeping plane swept St. George Arm twice for ground mines between Kilometers 109 and 86. No mines swept.

West coast of the Black Sea: In all 9 mines were swept: 1 mine 4 miles eastnortheast of Bugaz, 5 mines 7 miles northeast of Sulina, 2 mines 4.5 miles south of Burgas, 1 mine 7.5 miles east-northeast of Burnas.

At present, we are investigating whether the 5 mines swept 7 miles northeast of Sulina were mines from our own minefield. It seems certain that all the other mines were of enemy origin.

Sevastopol: Owing to the weather, minesweeping by the group of motor minesweepers had to be broken off at 0545.

Kerch: Minesweeping planes swept route Red for ground mines from point 201 as far as Temriuk without result. The FZ-group and the group with skid gear swept Kerch Strait for ground mines without result.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 173 ran with 6 naval ferry barges. Owing to lack of cargo, the next convoy will not leave Kerch until the evening of 18 August.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 65 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 2 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: No convoy owing to lack of cargo.



CONFIDENTIAL

- e. Sea of Azov: The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 8 transport barges and 2 naval gunnery lighters. At 1930 another Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Kerch with 1 tug, 2 lighters and 2 naval gunnery lighters.
- f. Apart from a few which were delayed by the weather, Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

18 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1050 Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported the following vessels entering Ghelenjik: 1 freighter of about 800 tons, 1 tug with 1 lighter, 2 gunboats and 2 minesweepers. At 1755 1 gunboat put out from Ghelenjik. At 2050 17 vessels were observed in landing areas B and C operating a shuttle service.

As on the previous day, air reconnaissance detected lively shipping traffic off the Turkish coast. No reports from the other areas of the Black Sea or the Caucasus coast.

At 0757 2 small armed vessels, course northeast, medium speed, were sighted in the Sea of Azov 3 miles north of Yeisk. In Primorsko-Akhtari 7 motor gunboats, 1 coastal vessel and about 30 boats were detected by photographic reconnaissance. At 0736 there were 3 motor gunboats, 2 coastal vessels and about 45 boats in Yeisk. There were 2 motor gunboats less than on previous days.

On the basis of the radio traffic, the Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria detected 1 destroyer, 1 submarine tender and 2 submarines at sea during the night of 18/19 August. They were presumably on night maneuvers. Several M.T.B.s and motor minesweepers were detected off the northern and central east coast. 1 submarine was intercepted off the Crimean coast. Moderate activity of small vessels in the Sea of Azov.

No important engagements were reported from the Army front.

Own Situation:

At 0045 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 1 and 2 which were escorting the Paganrog-Mariupol convoy sighted at first 2, and later on, 3 more enemy motor gunboats close to the shore 8 miles east of Kossa Krivaya. They opened fire at once. At first the range was 2,000 meters, so they closed to 500 meters. 5 hits were scored on 1 boat, which caught fire and sank rapidly. At 0101 3 hits were scored on another boat, breaking her apart. 4 prisoners were rescued from the floating wreck of the latter boat; 3 of them, among them a Lieutenant, were wounded. The

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

fourth, a boy of ten, was unhurt. According to papers which were found, the boats belonged to the Azov-Don Defense Division. Our own vessels were not damaged and had no casualties. They continued passage as planned.

Both gunboats which were sunk were stationed at Yeisk. Today's air reconnaissance showed that there were 2 boats less in that port than yesterday.

Moreover, Naval Port Commander, Taganrog reported that from 0900 to 1100 2 enemy M.T.B.s were cruising around the spot where the night engagement took place, presumably searching for the missing crews of the boats, which were sunk. At 0900 enemy planes landed on the water for 4 minutes 2 km. off Fish.....kaya. At 1000 2 enemy boats carried off 2 fishing boats after 6 men of the Russian crew had been captured.

At 0430 the vessels employed on coastal defense duties put in to Temriuk with nothing to report.

At 0500 E-boat S 28 put in to Ivan Baba from Constantza, at 0515 S 46 put in to Theodosia to discharge the potash cartridges and bottles of oxygen for U 19 and U 24.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: northerly winds, force 4-5, sea wind in the afternoon, northerly winds again at night, force 3, fair, visibility 20 miles.

Owing to the unfavorable moon phase and scarcity of fuel, E-boat flotillas did not operate, as there were no prospects of success to justify their employment.

Naval gunnery lighter No. 10 and motor minesweeper R 50 were ordered via Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus to occupy a patrol line between point Brown 19a and Brown 20 on the night of 18/19 August. 1st Air Corps has been informed. In Nikolaiev the inspection of naval transport No. 39 was made and no faults found. The ship will be transferred to Constantza for further fitting-out.

U-boat Situation:

Anti-submarine operations in the Eupatoria area by the 2 Italian midget submarines, already postponed owing to the weather, were further delayed by passing convoys. The plan is now for



CONFIDENTIAL

CB 1 and CB 6 to operate from 21 August to 24 August when no Sevastopol convoys should be running.

CB 3 and CB 4 have been ordered to carry out anti-submarine operations off the south Crimean coast from 19 August to 21 August. They are to sail from Sevastopol at 0600 on 19 August. 1st Air Corps, Naval Shore Commander, Crimea and Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Crimean Coast have been informed.

At 1445 CB 1 and CB 6 put in to Sevastopol. During the operation the boats did not sight the enemy. Both were reported ready for action again for the evening of 21 August.

U 23 did not report from sea.

At 1918 U 19 and U 24 put out from Theodosia for the operation after replenishing with oxygen and potash cartridges. Their orders are: From 0300 on 20 August until 0300 on 23 August joint operation by U 19, U 23 and U 24 in patrol and reconnaissance lines close to the Caucasus coast from off Lasarevskaya to off Sukhum. At 0300 on 23 August, U 19 and U 23 will commence return passage to Constantza in a reconnaissance line via the northern route to search for enemy submarines close to the Crimean coast and in the Cape Sarich/Constantza area. At 1300 U 9 escorted by 1 motor minesweeper put out from Sulina for Constantza.

At 1810 naval gunnery lighter No. 10 and motor minesweeper R 30 put out from Kerch for the patrol duties ordered off the south Taman coast.

According to a report from Naval Harbor Master, Taganrog at 1830, 2 enemy boats were observed by the post at Wesselo laying mines 7 km. from the shore. The boats turned off to the west. In view of the danger of mines, the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy which left Mariupol at 1210 with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 9 transport barges and 2 naval gunnery lighters was ordered to return to Mariupol.

At 1915 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 and naval ferry barge F 419 put out from Temriuk on patrol duties. The small boats could not put out because of the weather.

#### Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no air raids on convoys or naval forces. At 0100 Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

reported an air raid in which 12 bombs were dropped on the southern sector. 3 high explosive bombs were dropped on the area of Anapa Battery IV; one of them did not explode. Telephone communications slightly damaged. At 0600 a Boston bomber flew over Yalta from east to west at an altitude of 6,000 meters. Anti-aircraft guns had no successes, no bombs were dropped.

During the night of 17/18 August, enemy planes were again active south of Kerch Strait. No shelling was reported.

Minesweeping Activity:

According to a communication from 1st Air Corps, an agent reported that the Russian Naval Staff had requested exact charts of the Dnieper estuary and of the coastal area of Ochakov from the Hydrographic Institute in Kubyshev. As these charts are probably needed for aerial minelaying in the fairway, Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea has been instructed to look out for minelaying planes and to patrol these areas constantly.

Danube: Minesweeping planes swept St. George Arm four times between Kilometers 109 and 86. No mines swept. Mine exploding vessel No. 193 searched for mines in St. George Arm between Kilometers 109 and 164. No mines swept.

West Coast: 1 inertia contact mine was swept by submarine chaser No. 2304 3.6 miles south of Bugaz. A motor minesweeper swept 1 new Russian anti-submarine horned mine 3 miles east of Bugaz.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group with towed loop gear swept route Green from the approach buoy at Sevastopol northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards to the minefield without result.

4 motor minesweepers continued minesweeping off Sevastopol without result.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers RA 52 and RA 56 acted as anti-mine escort for the Bordyansk-Kerch convoy. No mines swept. RA 56, up to now at the disposal of Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine, will remain in Kerch at the disposal of 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla. Motor minesweeper R 30 and 2 motor minesweepers (FR) swept route Red for moored mines between point 15 and point Z.

Temriuk: At 0730 the harbor defense flotilla broke off minesweeping owing to the weather.

CONFIDENTIAL

Taganrog: As a result of statements made by the captured Russian Lieutenant Commander on declared areas, Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine announced the area south of Kossa Byelosaratzkaya as a declared area. (The route between Berdyansk and Mariupol.)

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: At 1745 on 18 August, convoy No. 174 put out from Kerch with 7 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1810 convoy No. 66 put out from Kerch with 1 towing vessel, 2 tugs, 2 lighters and 4 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1600 convoy No. 56 put out from Genichesk with 1 tug, 1 motor sailing vessel and 4 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, 2 lighters, naval gunnery lighters Nos. 1 and 2. (For action in which 2 enemy gunboats were destroyed, see above.) At 1210 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 9 transport barges and 2 naval gunnery lighters. (Returned to Mariupol owing to suspected mines.)  
  
At 1830 the Berdyansk-Kerch convoy No. 8 (bound for Senaya) put out from Berdyansk with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 naval gunnery lighter and 2 motor minesweepers (RA).
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the northwestern Black Sea ran according to plan.



CONFIDENTIAL

19 August, 1943

Simferopol.

Enemy Situation:

At 0420 Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported 2 gunboats entering Ghelenjik from the south. From 2100 until midnight, 24 vessels were observed operating a shuttle service off landing areas B and C. Our own guns shelled the vessels and landing places, seriously damaging 1 vessel. No shipping was detected off the Caucasus coast between Novorossisk and Sukhum. As on previous days lively shipping traffic was observed off the Turkish coast.

Enemy Shipping in Port:

Ghelenjik 0750: 6 motor minesweepers, 19 M.T.B.s, 6 coastal vessels totaling 2,000 tons and 60 boats. Compared with 17 August, there are 3 motor minesweepers less and 5 M.T.B.s and 4 coastal vessels more. Sochi 0700: 5 motor minesweepers, 20 boats, some beached, i.e. 1 motor minesweeper more and 1 coastal vessel less than on 17 August. No further ports were examined owing to the weather.

No reconnaissance reports from the Sea of Azov.

According to radio traffic, no large surface vessels were at sea in the evening. Activity of small vessels was normal. 4 submarines were detected in the northwestern Black Sea as far as the area west and southwest of the Crimean coast. Enemy air reconnaissance activity was observed over the same area in the forenoon. Radio traffic indicates that the enemy reconnaissance planes are cooperating with submarines.

Increasing artillery and shock-troop activity on the Army front.

Own Situation:

It was later reported that at 1810 on 18 August the Marupol-Taganrog convoy had been attacked by 4 ground-attack planes off Krivaya Kossa. Approximately 30 bombs were dropped. At 1816 1 plane was shot down by ship's anti-aircraft guns. No damage, 1 man slightly wounded.

At 0500 naval ferry barge F 419 and naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 9 put in to Temriuk from

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

patrol duties. On account of the weather the vessels had returned to Temriuk at 2000 on 18 August, leaving again at 2250 for patrol duties when the weather improved. From 2300 to 2340 (18 August) the boats were engaged with enemy gunboats north of the harbor entrance. 1 large and 2 to 3 smaller enemy boats were sighted. The enemy only used 4.7 cm. guns and did not have any success. Some of our guns got a good range but no direct hits were observed. The naval gunnery lighters fired star shells, but no accurate observations could be made owing to bad visibility. The enemy boats turned off to the northeast, avoiding the ensuing pursuit. No damage or casualties.

At 0730 motor minesweeper R 50 and naval gunnery lighter No. 10 put in to Kerch from patrol duties south of the Taman Peninsula, nothing to report.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0950): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: northerly winds, force 4-5, sea wind in the afternoon, fair, visibility 20 miles.

When the full moon period is past, I intend to dispose the E-boat flotillas in 2 groups presenting a broad front against enemy supply traffic. In order to scatter the enemy defenses, the enemy landing points near Myshako and the vessels lying there are to be attacked simultaneously by boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla. The orders are as follows:

During the night of 20/21 August, 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla are to attack landing area B which, according to observations made during the last few days, is most generally used by the enemy. The vessels which are lying there at the landing points are to be sunk by torpedo. The attack should be made as early as possible to create the intended diversion at the right time. The 1st E-Boat Flotilla will be operating further south on the same night. If no vessels are observed at the landing stages, the 11th E-Boat Flotilla is to fire one torpedo at the landing stages and if the torpedo does not explode, another torpedo is to be fired. The E-boats are to put out from Theodosia via route Brown as far as point 17. From there they should proceed on a direct route to Anapa until they are 5 miles from the coast. They should then withdraw another 5 miles from the coast as far as the longitude of Cape Myshak. From there they should approach landing area B directly at crawling speed. Sailing and procedure should be arranged so that the boats will arrive off Anapa about 1900 and off Cape Myshak about 2030.

CONFIDENTIAL  
EXCLUDED FROM RELEASE

CONFIDENTIAL

After firing torpedoes at the vessels lying at the landing stages or at the jetties themselves, the 11th E-Boat Flotilla is to withdraw at approximately 5 miles from the coast, proceeding to Cape Utrich where they will occupy a single patrol line at right angles to the coast until 0300. The length of the patrol line will be determined by visibility: the next boat is to remain in sight.

At 0300 the entire flotilla will commence return passage to Theodosia via the approach route. The operation is to be carried out by 3 boats and if 1 boat has to drop out, the flotilla is to return.

The approach via point 17 on route Brown through the Russian declared area is being risked intentionally on the assumption that there can no longer be any shallow mines there. The area has been frequently patrolled by the Italian E-Boat Flotilla. Probably the route will be safer for shallow draft vessels than route Red between Kerch Strait and Anapa. The torpedo which is to be fired at the enemy jetty even if there are no vessels there will primarily have a diversionary effect and also, according to statements made by their commanding officers, a good psychological effect on our own infantry forces.

The 1st E-Boat Flotilla received the following orders:

Repetition of the operation against enemy supply traffic close to the Caucasus coast as in the operational order Admiral, Black Sea Gkdos. 4785 A I of 5 August. X-hours as in para. C 1 will be 2100, Y-hours as in para. C 2 will be 2230. The northern group will consist of 3 boats with 4 cm. guns, the southern group of 2 boats. In order to avoid meeting the boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla, the 1st E-Boat Flotilla must not cross north of 44° 35' N west of Cape Sushuk.

U-boat Situation:

At 0130 U 9 put in to Constantza from Sulina. The boat has undergone routine dockyard repairs in Galatz.

No reports from the other boats at sea.

At 0600 Italian midget submarines CB 3 and 4 put out from Sevastopol on anti-submarine operations in the area south of Cape Sarich.



CONFIDENTIAL

At 0730 CB 5 put in again because her radio broke down, putting to sea again at 0840 after repairs.

Transfer of CB 5 from Constantza to Sevastopol is planned for 0800 on 20 August. The boat will be towed via DS 5 and DS 1 as far as 31° 30' E, then she will proceed alone. Escort and protective sweep have been arranged for Eupatoria Bay.

According to a communication from Naval High Command, Naval Staff, First Division, the 13th Armored Division will be transferred from the Crimea to the Mius front. With Army Group A we investigated whether part of the division could be transferred from Kerch in naval ferry barges to avoid overcrowding the trains. For the following reasons, the plan for sea transportation was rejected:

1. Only Genichesk could be considered as a port of disembarkation because forces cannot be transferred across the Sea of Azov to Mariupol owing to the danger of mines and air raids. This transportation by sea to Genichesk would not essentially relieve the railroads.
2. Moreover, sea transportation to Genichesk would entail danger which would not be justified unless there was no other form of transport possible.
3. For one of these companies, 7 to 8 naval ferry barges would be necessary. This would mean withdrawing craft from the supply traffic.
4. With 8 naval ferry barges, transportation of the division from Kerch to Genichesk would take much longer than a month.

On learning of these objections, the Army Group abandoned the project of sea transportation for the Armored Division.

It was also reported that, in the event of further powerful enemy attacks on the Mius front, the Army considered that the open sea flank would be constantly exposed to danger. Naval High Command pointed out that naval gunnery lighters were operating in the Mariupol-Taganrog area.

At present there are 4 naval gunnery lighters in the Mariupol-Taganrog area employed as escorts for the supply convoys.

CONFIDENTIAL

As the division in position near Taganrog had already requested naval gunnery lighters on the evening of 18 August because of the sudden withdrawal of heavy forces and the lively enemy activity in the coastal area by the Taganrog-Mius estuary, 4 naval gunnery lighters lying in Mariupol were sent to Taganrog at 1230. On passage, they escorted 1 tug with 2 lighters. Two of them had orders to leave the convoy off the Mius estuary and to occupy a patrol line there, while the other two took the convoy as far as Taganrog Harbor entrance and then occupied a patrol line in the area west of Taganrog.

The presence of naval gunnery lighters in Taganrog by day means a certain danger for these vessels, which in view of the lack of other craft are important for the conduct of naval operations. Enemy shelling of the harbor area is increasing daily. As the low speed of the craft will not allow them to sail daily from Mariupol to the patrol line off Taganrog, they must have Taganrog as their operational base, where we must therefore expect to incur losses.

At 0605 Naval Harbor Master, Taganrog reported that heavy motorized traffic had been observed on land near Pavlo-Ochakov. As this seemed to indicate enemy landing operations, the Army requested that patrol lines should be occupied at night between the Mius estuary and east of Novomarkovskaya, insofar as this could be done in view of the danger of mines. This measure had already been ordered.

Air reconnaissance during the evening detected a total of 43 unidentified vessels on the opposite shore. Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine informed the coastal authorities of the imminent danger of landing operations.

I do not really think that there is any danger of a landing operation from the south coast because the enemy has too few boats for the purpose. If it actually does happen, it can only be a matter of small harassing forces and sabotage units. Nevertheless, particularly for psychological reasons, I am going to comply with the Army requests to intercept these forces.

At 1900 "Swoyswomo" sighted a periscope off Yalta harbor entrance. 2 naval ferry barges which were escorting 1 tug, 1 lighter and the tanker "Swoyswomo" dropped some depth charges without success at the place where the periscope was sighted by "Swoyswomo". No torpedoes were observed. "Swoyswomo" reported that she sighted

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

the periscope at a range of 150 meters. While turning off using full helm, her rudder was damaged and she was compelled to put in to Yalta again. The rest of the convoy proceeded according to plan. The report from "Swoyswono" is not very reliable.

At 1938 Temriuk reported that owing to the weather the patrol line could not be occupied. The vessels remain at immediate readiness.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

Apart from the air raid reported on the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy, no other air attacks were made on convoys or naval forces.

At 1730 Taganrog harbor was bombed and machine-gunned in a low-level attack by 6 twin-engined planes. Phosphorus was also dropped. No damage; 1 civilian seriously wounded and 1 prisoner slightly wounded. In addition to the usual gunfire, Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported an air raid in which 2 bombs were dropped on the site at the west harbor.

Minesweeping Activity:

During the day minesweeping activity was impeded by unfavorable weather conditions.

Danube: Mine exploding vessel No. 193 swept the route between Kilometers 109 and 65 without result. The stretch was covered three and a half times.

Sevastopol: 4 minesweepers of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla carried out minesweeping operations in the northwestern minefield gap. No mines swept. Owing to the weather, they had to abandon the task at 1600.

Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea transmitted a request that motor minesweeper R 209, which is employed here, should be assigned to him for escort duties. She cannot be released however, because minesweeping activity would be interrupted for several days and it is considered vital that a gap in the minefield be swept as soon as possible to simplify the running of convoys. From approximately 23 August, 1 motor minesweeper could be made available for about 4 days for escort duties, since at this time the 5 other motor minesweepers are to be on a minelaying operation in the Sea of Azov.

The FZ-group continued to search for ground mines. No mines swept.



CONFIDENTIAL

Kerch: 2 motor minesweepers (RA) and 2 motor minesweepers (FR) escorted the Anapa convoy. No mines swept.

The FZ-group and the group with skid gear swept both sides of the channel to Senaya without result.

Owing to lack of fuel the minesweeping planes did not operate.

Tomriuk: Owing to the weather, the harbor defense flotilla put in again from the mine-sweeping assignment.

Mariupol: With immediate effect, the Genichesk harbor defense flotilla will be subordinated temporarily to Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine for minesweeping on the Berdyansk-Mariupol route.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 174 ran with 7 naval ferry barges. Convoy No. 175 has been postponed until 20 August owing to lack of cargo.
- c. Kerch-Tomriuk: At 0630 convoy No. 66 put in to Tomriuk with 1 towing vessel, 1 tug, 2 lighters and 4 naval ferry barges. Sailing postponed owing to the weather. If the weather improves, sailing is planned for daybreak on 20 August.
- d. Genichesk-Tomriuk: At 1100 convoy No. 56 put in to Tomriuk with 1 tug, 1 motor sailing vessel and 4 naval ferry barges. If the weather improves, sailing is planned for daybreak on 20 August.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1155 convoy No. 8 put in to Senaya with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 naval gunnery lighter and 2 motor minesweepers (RA).  
  
At 0725 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy which had left on the previous day and had been ordered to return when minelaying was observed put in to Mariupol again. Since the naval gunnery lighters were urgently needed in Taganrog, the convoy put out again at 1230 with 1 tug, 2 lighters and 4 naval gunnery lighters once the situation was clarified. For air raid, see above.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the Western Black Sea ran according to plan. "3woyswome" put in to Yalta with a damaged rudder (see above).

20 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1355 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 4 M.T.B.s entering Ghelenjik. From 2100 4 vessels in landing area B were shelled.

No enemy forces reported at sea by daylight reconnaissance of the Air Force. The Turkish steamer "Erzerum" was sighted on an easterly course off the Turkish coast and the Bosphorus. She was carrying troops. No reports from the Caucasus coast.

No shipping detected in the Sea of Azov. According to photographic reconnaissance the following ships were lying in Yeisk harbor: 3 motor gunboats, 1 coastal vessel and 30 boats, some beached. In Primorsko-Akhtari there were 7 motor gunboats, 1 coastal vessel and about 30 boats, some beached.

Submarines detected by the Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria: 4 in the western Black Sea, 1 in the southwestern Black Sea and 2 in unidentified positions.

No important actions were reported from the Army front.

Own Situation:

At 0040 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 put in to Taganrog from the patrol line west of Taganrog. Nothing to report.

At 0749 in 45° 13' N, 32° 53' E the steamer "Varna", which had been preceded by an anti-mine escort, sank after exploding. As neither periscope nor torpedo track was seen, the source remains a mystery.

According to a later report from the Naval Lieutenant observer of the BV 138 which was providing close escort for the convoy, a fan-of-two was fired at "Varna" from the port side by a submerged submarine; the submarine was approximately 500 meters inside the screen of escorts. The BV was unable to attack the submarine because the smoke clouds from the exploded steamer blocked the view.

CONFIDENTIAL

Despite the presence of the anti-mine escort, until the cause of the explosion was established, the possibility of moored mines had to be considered. Ground mines were ruled out as the water was 55 meters deep. The Crimea group of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla which was sweeping the northwestern minefield gap at Sevastopol was placed at the disposal of Commander, Convoys and Escorts to patrol the area where the sinking occurred. When the cause of the sinking was established on the basis of the BV's report as a submarine torpedo attack, Commander, Convoys and Escorts was instructed to employ the Crimea group of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla to pursue the submarine. At the same time he released 2 submarine chasers to help. Commander, Convoys and Escorts was also instructed to despatch the return Sevastopol-Constantza convoy, comprising "Kassa", "PLM 16" (?) and "Burgas" on 21 August either via the southern route or via the northern route. In the latter case procedure had to conform to Admiral, Black Sea Ghdos. 5007 A I (see War Diary of 14 August), i.e. the ships must not put out from Sevastopol before dark.

The Evdokia-Odessa towed convoy, due to sail from Sevastopol at 1800 on 20 August, was postponed for 24 hours.

According to a later report, 7 men of the crew and 4 men of the ship's anti-aircraft personnel have been rescued; 3 soldiers belonging to the ship's anti-aircraft crew were found to be dead when rescued. 1 Italian N.C.O. carrying "Most Secret" books is still missing. Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea ordered the vessels at the place of sinking to look out specially for any books. Further investigation of casualties continues.

I ordered that with immediate effect no passengers (such as soldiers on leave, men on official journeys, etc.) were to be carried on board steamers of the convoys. In future they will be embarked on escort vessels which are safer.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: winds veering from north to northwest to west, force 4, sea wind in the afternoon, fair, visibility 20 miles.

On the basis of experiences in the North Sea and the Channel area, I am planning to employ barrage balloons aboard steamer escorts. The balloons are available in Sevastopol. The more frequent appearance of enemy torpedo planes in the last few weeks may make the use of barrage balloons

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

profitable. Moreover, after the enemy's undoubted success in sinking "Boy Feddersen", further aerial torpedo attacks must be expected. At present, the employment of barrage balloons is being investigated. Reports on experiences have been requested.

Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine was instructed to deal with the following points while questioning the prisoners taken in the naval gunnery lighter engagement on 18 August:

1. Number and types of naval vessels in the Sea of Azov.
2. The route by which vessels are transferred.
3. Whether more Russian naval forces are to be expected.
4. Data concerning the motor gunboats which were sunk and other vessels at present in the Sea of Azov.
5. Tactical and operational considerations prior to previous tasks and operations in the Sea of Azov and their execution.
6. Use of mines in the Sea of Azov since Yeisk, Akhtari etc. were recaptured.
7. Enemy artillery positions on the coast of the Sea of Azov.

On the question of anti-submarine operations, the following teletype/radiogram, based on experiences, operations, a survey of the employment of Q-ships and the short operations off the west Crimean coast by "Ship 19" and "Xanten", was sent to Group South: "In the Black Sea, all our merchant vessels proceed under escort. The enemy will therefore be suspicious of any single ships and their submarines will submerge for torpedo attacks on any ships which they suspect. Q-ships could not use their guns in such conditions.

The main operational area of the Russian submarines is the Crimean coast, with the focal point in Eupatoria Bay. Experience has shown that, proceeding independently, "Xanten" and "Ship 19" have insufficient anti-aircraft armament to cope with the danger from the air. For that reason they have recently been sent on anti-submarine operations in Eupatoria Bay only during the hours of darkness. The boats on the other hand normally put in to Ak Mechet during daylight unless it does not seem advisable to break off a certain anti-submarine operation.

Single operations by armed fishing vessels acting as submarine chasers do not seem promising because the boats are not equipped with depth charge throwers and therefore cannot make the pattern of depth charges, the preliminary condition for success. Moreover, these anti-submarine

CONFIDENTIAL

operational areas are exposed to air attacks and single armed fishing vessels do not have sufficient defensive guns to ward off simultaneous attacks by several planes. It is therefore planned to employ "Xanten" and "Ship 19" together with 4 or at least 3 armed fishing vessels, as soon as there are enough armed fishing vessels available. The few armed fishing vessels at present available are now urgently needed as anti-submarine escorts for convoys, as are "Xanten" and "Ship 19".

The naval transports are far superior to all previous submarine chasers.

1. They are equipped with depth charge throwers.
2. They are more seaworthy.
3. They have a greater speed.
4. They are more suitable for location sets because of their greater draft.

As they have excellent anti-aircraft guns, the naval transports can operate singly even in areas where the threat from the air is great. If the commanding officers and their listening staff are well-trained, good results may be expected from anti-submarine operations."

U-boat Situation:

No reports from the U-boats at sea.

Commander, 30th U-Boat Flotilla reported U 18 ready to put to sea on 21 August.

He was ordered to dispatch the boat via the southern route on 21 August. She will be allocated to operational area "Otter". Orders for a joint operation with U 30 will be sent by radio if the situation seems suitable.

The inclining and rolling trials carried out by U 18 as the first boat with a new conning-tower (1 anti-aircraft gun, Type 38 on the tower, 1 anti-aircraft gun, Type 38 on the deck forward of the tower) proved satisfactory.

In addition to the normal complement of torpedoes, U 18 has been equipped with a periscope mine. Orders for its use will be given by radio. It was planned to use the next U-boat for a minelaying operation, but with the unexpected breakdown of U 19 and U 24, the gap became too great and U 9 is to operate with torpedoes on her next operation. Commander, 30th U-Boat Flotilla was instructed to prepare the next boat, U 20, for a minelaying operation and to report the provisional date by which she would be ready to put out.

CONFIDENTIAL

At 1400 submarine chasers Nos. 2305 and 2306 put out from Sevastopol for anti-submarine operations in the Eupatoria area.

Naval gunnery lighters Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 were ordered to put out at 2200 with the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy. Boats Nos. 1 and 2 were to withdraw west of Taganrog for patrol duties there, putting in to Taganrog at daybreak. Boats Nos. 3 and 4 were to escort the convoy to its destination.

At 1430 the southern group of 2 boats put out from Ivan Baba, while the 3 boats of the northern group put out at 1630 for the offensive operation ordered against enemy supply traffic close to the Caucasus coast.

At 1815 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put out for the same operation. The flotilla turned about when 1 boat developed engine trouble and put in to Theodosia again at 1950.

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 419, naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11, 4 minesweepers and 6 assault boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties. F 419 put in again at 2000 as one of her screws was out of order.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day there were no air raids on convoys or naval vessels. Very lively enemy air activity again in the evening, especially in the south Crimean coast area and south of the Taman Peninsula.

During the evening of 19 August, 21 rounds from heavy caliber guns were fired on Taganrog from the direction of Primorka. No damage was reported. During the evening of 20 August there was further shelling from the same direction.

Novorossisk reported slight artillery fire.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: Minesweeping planes swept St. George Arm four times between Kilometers 86 and 64. No mines swept. Mine exploding vessel No. 193 swept St. George Arm three times between Kilometers 109 and 65. No mines swept. A minesweeping plane swept the upper Danube near Kalarasi. No mines swept.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group swept route Green another six times. No mines swept. The Crimea



CONFIDENTIAL

group interrupted the minesweeping operation at the northwestern minefield gap to give help at the place where "Varna" sank.

Kerch: Minesweeping planes did not operate owing to lack of fuel. The FZ-group and the group with skid gear swept the route to Senaya ten times without result.

Temriuk: The harbor defense flotilla swept route Red for moored mines as far as off the Porosyp estuary. No mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: At 1900 convoy No. 175 put out from Kerch with 5 naval ferry barges. No convoy is planned for 21 August owing to lack of cargo.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 66 ran with 1 towing vessel, 2 tugs, 1 lighter, 1 motor sailing vessel and 4 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 56 ran with 4 naval ferry barges. In view of the small amount of cargo, convoy No. 57 was announced for the afternoon of 22 August. This would restore traffic to the normal schedule.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Mariupol-Berdyansk convoy ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 2 motor minesweepers (RB). At 2110 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Taganrog with 1 tug, 2 lighters and 4 naval gunnery lighters. Two of the naval gunnery lighters withdrew from the convoy for patrol duty, putting in to Taganrog again at daybreak.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan. For torpedoing of the steamer "Varna", see above.

CONFIDENTIAL

Tonnage carried by convoys to Gotenkopf  
bridgehead from 11 - 20 August, 1943

I.	Kerch Strait (Navy's tonnage in brackets) ...	19,158 (9020) tons
II.	Ropeway service .....	2,240 tons
III.	Kerch-Temriuk .....	3,501 tons
IV.	Genichesk-Temriuk .....	3,633 tons
V.	Kerch-Anapa .....	3,776 tons
VI.	Theodosia-Taman .....	2,596 tons
VII.	Sevastopol-Kerch .....	924 tons
VIII.	Wood supplies .....	<u>345 tons</u>
	Total:	<u>30,173 tons</u>

Tonnage carried by the Navy: 26,055 tons

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

21 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 0940 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 1 vessel cruising off Ghelenjik Bay and at 1055 1 freighter of 660 tons, 1 motor lighter of about 800 tons, 2 mine-sweepers and 4 M.T.B.s entering Ghelenjik.

During the night of 20/21 August, air reconnaissance detected no enemy surface forces off the Caucasus coast as far as Cape Pitsunda and in the Cape Sarich - Cape Idokopas - Cape Takil area. Daylight reconnaissance sighted no enemy shipping off the Caucasus coast as far as Cape Pitsunda. At 1058 1 tug with 1 coastal vessel, 1 boat and 2 patrol vessels were putting in to Ghelenjik. Reconnaissance over the Black Sea sighted no enemy forces.

Compared with 19 August, the number of ships lying in Ghelenjik had increased by 1 motor minesweeper and 1 M.T.B. In Tuapse, compared with 17 August, there was an increase of 2 torpedoboats, 1 minesweeper, 3 motor minesweepers, 5 M.T.B.s, 1 patrol vessel and 2 coastal vessels.

During the evening and night, Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria detected 2 destroyers heading southeast between the central and southern east coast. It is assumed that these are the 2 torpedoboats reported by air reconnaissance. Activity of small vessels was decreasing in the east coast area. In addition to some patrol vessels, there were still 5 M.T.B.s at sea. Submarines detected: 3 in the northwestern Black Sea as far as the west and southwest Crimean coast, 1 in the southwestern Black Sea. Enemy naval planes in cooperation with submarines were observed by reconnaissance over the northwestern Black Sea. No reconnaissance reports from the Sea of Azov. No particular engagements reported from the Kuban bridgehead.

At 0002 6 M.T.B.s were sighted about 2-3 miles west of Anapa. When shelled they turned off, putting up a smoke screen.

At 0010 the Anapa airport was bombarded from a range of 11,000-13,000 meters. 2 long silhouettes were observed from the shore. They may have been destroyers because the Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria claimed to have intercepted destroyer traffic off the north Caucasus coast.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

The bombardment only lasted 1 minute. The silhouettes disappeared to the southwest. No damage or casualties were reported.

The 11th E-Boat Flotilla should have been in exactly the right position, but unfortunately the flotilla had to break off operations again owing to engine trouble.

As it was assumed that the ships were enemy destroyers, the 1st E-Boat Flotilla operating in the area south of Ghelenjik was informed by "Most Immediate" radiogram that they had made off to the southwest. In the course of the day, air reconnaissance showed that they were probably torpedobcats.

At 0500 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 and 10 combined operations assault boats put in to Tomriuk from patrol duties. Nothing to report.

At 0620 2 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put in to Theodosia from operations. They belonged to the southern group and had occupied lurking positions from 2030 (20 August) until 0030 in air grid square 7558. No shipping was observed despite good visibility. On receipt of the "Most Immediate" radiogram from Admiral, Black Sea reporting the bombardment of Anapa, they returned via air grid squares 7575, 7572, 7553, but no enemy forces were sighted.

From 2100 on 20 August the 3 boats of the northern group were in position in the Ghelenjik-Novorossisk operational area. The coast was clearly visible, no shipping was observed. In the operational area there was lively enemy air activity. Some flying boats were seen, but they did not sight the boats. At 2338 the boats were shelled from the Myshako area from a range of about 15,000 meters, no damage. Despite their camouflage, the boats had been sighted at this great distance. They made off at slow speed to the south. At 0215 they commenced return passage via air grid squares 7474, 7533, 6543, 6528 to meet the enemy forces returning from Anapa. However, they did not sight them. (The report had again not been passed quickly enough. The methods of transmitting orders will be investigated further.)

From 0345 to 0400 3 fighter bombers made several attacks with rockets and machine-guns in air grid square 7539. Apart from one hit on S 49's smoke container, no damage was inflicted. No casualties. At 0411 S 51's main engine broke down and she could only continue return passage at 18 knots. At 0930

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

she put in to Ivan Baba. The other 2 boats put in to Theodosia at 0845 for refuelling.

According to a report from the flotilla commander, the moon phase was still not good enough for such an operation. The boats could not approach the coast unobserved, as was confirmed by the bombardment from a range of 15,000 meters, and it was particularly difficult to approach the coast in the Myshako area in bright moonlight. The repetition of the operation planned for the coming night has been postponed until moon and visibility allow better conditions for approaching the coast.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Yalta: northerly winds, force 3-4, fair, visibility 20 miles.

Yalta - Novorossiisk and Sea of Azov: north to northeast winds, force 4-5, sea wind in the afternoon, fair, visibility 20 miles.

A later report was received on the sinking of the steamer "Varna" at 0749 on 20 August: The convoy had been proceeding on route Green, course 102°, speed 10 knots since 0700. The ships were in the following formation when attacked: ahead motor minesweeper R 206 with Oropesa gear, some 1,000 meters astern "Varna", forward port protection by "Murgescu", bearing 300° from "Varna" and turning towards, distance apart some 600-700 meters, motor minesweeper R 204 astern, bearing 225°, turning about 60° to port. Forward starboard protection "Maresti", motor minesweeper R 203 astern. Weather and light: east winds, smooth sea, very good visibility, sunshine, no clouds. On receipt of the warning report, increased submarine look-out and strong zig-zagging in closer disposition were ordered. Although the sea was calm and the sharpest look-out was maintained, "Murgescu", motor minesweepers R 206 and R 204 (with the group commander aboard) did not sight either the periscope or the torpedo track. Torpedo tracks on the port beam and further ahead were observed only by the BV 38 and three of the crew rescued from "Varna", among them the helmsman and a boatswain. No stars were fired either by "Varna" or by the plane. The latter made no report to the convoy commander. The impression was that torpedoes and mines were out of the question. Motor minesweeper R 204 stopped at once and switched on the revolving directional hydrophones, no sound location. This was the first skillfully executed Russian submarine attack, indeed their first success in this narrow area which had always been a most unfavorable stretch for our ships.



CONFIDENTIAL

Description of the explosion: there was a tremendous, broad black mushroom of smoke followed by other explosions with tongues of flame. The ship completely disappeared. Not until 2 minutes later did the forecastle re-appear with some men on it. It then overturned to port and sank by the stern, listing 45°. Several men jumped into the water.

Measures: Motor minesweepers were ordered to proceed to the place of sinking: motor minesweeper R 206 to slip gear, "Maresti" to provide anti-submarine protection on the starboard side and ahead, "Murgescu" on port side and astern. The motor minesweeper transferred seriously wounded men to "Maresti" which, preceded by motor minesweeper R 204 with 11 survivors, was then despatched to Sevastopol to make the first report via Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Crimean Coast.

At 0930 an Arado fired a white star and dived south of the place of sinking to drop a depth charge. Thereupon, 2 motor minesweepers and "Murgescu" were ordered to proceed on anti-submarine operations at full speed. The place where the submarine was sighted was not immediately marked with a fluorescent sac and as locations obtained were weak the 3 depth charge barrages on board were dropped without result. No further locations were obtained.

According to all reports received up to now, the escort forces were correctly formed up and the best possible measures taken after the sinking of "Varna".

On 20 August Group von Buelow (now divisional command near Taganrog) reported that, in view of the number of boats off the south coast of the Gulf of Taganrog, landings might be expected. It would be vital for Group von Buelow if naval gunnery lighters could operate energetically between Taganrog and the Mius estuary to intercept the landing operation in time to alert our own weak formations promptly so that the reserves could be brought up at the right time. 2 naval gunnery lighters would be inadequate for patrol of the wide sector.

The Group was informed via Naval Harbor Master, Taganrog that on 20 August a German reconnaissance plane had identified the boats assembled in the Margaritopku - Savion - Ochakov area as fishing boats. There were therefore no fresh indications for intended operations. Nevertheless, Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine was ordered to organize the daily transports from Mariupol - Taganrog and back so that they would pass the dangerous coastal



areas at night escorted by 2 naval gunnery lighters. If the naval gunnery lighters were withdrawn from escort duties, Mariupol-Taganrog supply traffic would have to be stopped. If there were any fresh signs of enemy landing preparations in Taganrog Bay, it was planned to transfer 2 naval gunnery lighters at present employed on coastal defense duties in the area of Army Group A to reinforce the coastal defense forces in Taganrog.

Rumanian reconnaissance planes claim that the concentration of boats in the area south of Taganrog is no longer there: the ports are free of boats and no troops are moving on the roads. 1st Air Corps has been requested to provide German reconnaissance planes to check this report.

Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea has been informed that the Crimea group off the Sevastopol harbor entrance is at his disposal to act as anti-mine escort for the northbound convoy as far as the 100-meter line. After execution of this task, the Crimea group is to put in to Sevastopol to have a day in port on 22 August.

U-boat Situation:

U 19 reported that her periscope lenses had been continuously clouded and it was impossible for her to continue the operation. The boat was then ordered to put in to port via the northern route on the morning of 22 August.

At 1400 U 18 put out from Constantza for operations via the southern route.

U 23 and U 24 continue the operation as ordered. U 19's position remains unoccupied.

The Italian midget submarines CB 1 and 6 were ordered to search for submarines in Eupatoria Bay from 22 to 24 August. Anti-submarine operations by our surface forces will be canceled in this area until further notice. Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea has been told to report at once whether convoys will pass Eupatoria Bay between 22 and 24 August as planned, and if so, which convoys.

At 0300 CB 5 put out from Constantza towed by "Lucbeck" and escorted by 2 submarine chasers. This plan was not reported in advance. The convoy was then instructed to proceed to Sulina to avoid disturbing anti-submarine operations planned for 22 to 24 August in the Eupatoria-Tarkan area.

CONFIDENTIAL

At 1455 CB 3 and 4 put in to Sevastopol from anti-submarine operations in the area south of Cape Sarich, enemy not sighted.

At 1945 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 and 10 combined operations landing boats put out from Temriuk for coastal defense duties.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

Apart from the above-mentioned fighter-bomber attack on the northern group of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla, no air raids were made on convoys or naval forces. Lively enemy air activity again off the south Crimean coast and Taman coast in the evening and at night.

At 1132 5 Boston bombers raided Yalta, dropping about 20 bombs off the harbor entrance; no damage or casualties reported.

The Myshako Battery reported a plane, Type P 2, shot down.

On the evening of 20 August, Taganrog was shelled with 12 rounds from heavy caliber guns. 1 plane penetrated, dropping 2 bombs off the harbor entrance and machine-gunning the area. No damage. In the course of the night and during the early hours of the next morning, the port was shelled by heavy guns. 2 bombs were also dropped, no damage in either incident. Novorossisk reported slight artillery fire.

Minesweeping Activity:

Sevastopol: The Crimea boats continued their minesweeping off the northwestern minefield gap, no mines swept. The FZ-group swept route Green off Sevastopol four times. No mines swept.

Kerch: Motor minesweepers B 30, RA 56 and 2 motor minesweepers (FR) swept route Brown for moored mines. No mines swept. The FZ-group and the group with skid gear swept 1 ground mine on passage to the winter harbor. Minesweeping planes searched route Red six times for ground mines between points 201 and 220. No mines swept.

Mariupol: Minesweeping on the Mariupol-Taganrog route was without result.

Supply Traffic:

a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Anapa convoys: Convoy No. 175 ran with 5 naval ferry barges.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: No convoys owing to lack of cargo.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: No convoys owing to lack of cargo.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 0715 the Kerch-Berdyansk convoy No. 9 put in to Berdyansk with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 naval gunnery lighter and motor minesweeper RA 54. The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 2 naval gunnery lighters.  
  
At 1330 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 2 lighters and 2 naval gunnery lighters.
- f. Crimea convoys in the northwestern and western Black Sea ran according to plan.



CONFIDENTIAL

22 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1805 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted a gunboat leaving Ghelenjik, course southwest; at 1825 another leaving Ghelenjik and then cruising off the bay. From 2130 3 vessels were shelled off landing area B.

Around midnight night reconnaissance located a small vessel, probably a submarine, 13 miles south of Cape Chauda.

Daylight reconnaissance over the Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. Only a few reports were received from the Caucasus coast. At 1215 2 coastal vessels were sighted entering Ghelenjik. At 1226 1 coastal vessel was unsuccessfully bombed 30 miles northwest of Tuapse.

No reports from the Sea of Azov. No large surface vessels at sea according to the radio traffic. Slight activity of small vessels off the east coast. Submarines detected: 2 in the eastern Black Sea and 2 in the Danube estuary area. Radio traffic was generally slight during the day and night.

An attack by an enemy battalion was repulsed at the Kuban bridgehead.

Own Situation:

At 0430 the vessels employed on coastal defense duties put in to Temriuk. Nothing to report.

At 0900 naval gunnery lighter No. 9 put in to Kerch from the patrol line off the south Taman coast, enemy not sighted. Motor minesweeper R 30 and naval gunnery lighter No. 9 were on patrol and put in to Kerch at 0700. Nothing to report.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0030): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: north to north-easterly winds, force 4-5, fair, visibility 20 miles.

Owing to the changeable weather, the unfavorable moon phase and the scarcity of fuel, the 1st and 11th E-Boat Flotillas did not operate.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Naval gunnery lighter No. 9 and motor minesweeper R 30 were ordered to occupy the patrol line off the south Taman Peninsula during the night of 22/23 August as on the previous day.

U-boat Situation:

U 24 reported that she had used her guns to sink a tug in air grid square 0457. Explosive charges were attached to 2 more vessels (type and size not reported), as the 2 cm. gun was out of order. The explosion of the charges was observed. With 6 prisoners on board, U 24 commenced return passage to Theodosia. She is due to arrive in Theodosia on the morning of 23 August. Naval Port Commander, Theodosia was instructed to take the necessary preparatory measures.

Around 0515 the midget submarines GB 1 and 6 put out from Sevastopol as ordered for anti-submarine operations in the Eupatoria-Tarkan area.

At 1915 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 and 10 combined operations boats put out from Temriuk for coastal defense duties.

At 1430 naval gunnery lighter No. 9 put out from Kerch for the patrol line. The boat was to meet motor minesweeper R 30, which was putting out later, off Cape Takil.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

No air raids during the day on convoys or naval forces.

Taganrog: From 1410 to 1430 on 21 August, 15 rounds from heavy caliber guns were fired on the town area from an armored train in the direction of Primorka; at 1510 rapid fire from the same area, no damage.

Mariupol: At 2215 on 21 August, an enemy vessel was sighted about 3 miles off the coast near Mariupol - Port. At 2213 she shelled the coast. Several hits were scored in the vicinity of the harbor area, but they caused no damage or casualties. After the bombardment, which was evidently made with rocket guns, the enemy put up a smoke screen and made off. Several enemy penetrations without any bombing.

Novorossisk: Artillery and grenade-thrower fire as on previous days. Today and during the night lively enemy air activity was again observed.

Minesweeping Activity:

Mine exploding vessel No. 195 swept the area between Kilometers 65 and 109 three and a half times. No mines swept.

Kerch: Motor minesweeper R 30, RA 56 and 2 motor minesweepers (FR) swept route Brown for moored mines from point 17 to Anapa. Motor minesweepers RA 51, 52, and 2 motor minesweepers (FR) swept route Red for moored mines from point 201 to point Z. No mines swept. Minesweeping planes swept route Red three times for ground mines from point 201 via Z to point 220. No mines swept.

Temriuk: The harbor defense flotilla was out on minesweeping and escort duties.

Berdyansk: 2 boats of the Genichesk harbor defense flotilla which were on passage to Mariupol put in to Berdyansk.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: No convoys ran owing to lack of cargo.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1500 convoy No. 67 put in to Temriuk with 3 naval ferry barges, 1 tug and 1 lighter.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1500 convoy No. 57 put out from Genichesk with 1 towing vessel, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Berdyansk-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug and 1 harbor defense boat.  
  
At 1915 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Taganrog with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 1 transport barge and 2 naval gunnery lighters.  
  
At 1900 the Berdyansk-Temriuk convoy put out from Berdyansk with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 1 naval gunnery lighter and 1 motor minesweeper (RA).
- f. Crimea convoys ran according to plan. In view of the submarine danger off the Danube estuary, the planned diversion of the steamer convoy from Sevastopol to Sulina-Constantza ("Burgas", "Kassa", "Tissa" and "PLM 16") was not made and the convoy was escorted as one unit to Constantza.  
  
Other convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.



CONFIDENTIAL

23 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 0915 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 5 vessels off Cape Idokopas proceeding from the southeast. At 1400 1 minesweeper put in to Ghelenjik from the south. At 2110 7 vessels were observed and shelled off landing area B.

No reports on the enemy from air reconnaissance in the Black Sea. Slight coastal traffic off the Caucasus coast between Ghelenjik and Tuapse. The number of enemy ships lying in port showed no essential change.

No large surface vessels at sea according to radio traffic. Slight activity of M.T.B.s and small vessels off the east coast, especially in the southern part. Submarines detected: 1 in the above area, 3 in the northwestern Black Sea as far as the Crimean area, 1 in an unidentified position and 3 heading west in the eastern Black Sea.

Shock troop activity by both sides was reported from the Army front.

Own Situation:

At 0035 Naval Harbor Master, Anapa reported that at 2232 on 22 August the Topolnaya ravine south-east of Cape Utrich was shelled by 3 medium vessels using light caliber guns. Our defensive fire was accurate and after an explosion was heard and flames observed, the enemy turned off to the south. No damage was reported.

At 0332 lighter No. 2019 struck a mine 20 miles southeast of Taganrog. The ship was a total loss, 2 men were killed. The lighter was taken in tow and proceeded to Mariupol escorted by 2 naval gunnery lighters.

At 0340 a report was received from naval ferry barge F 413 from Cape Kasantip. She was with the Genichesk-Temriuk convoy. The report stated that engine noises had been heard fading towards the east.

Presumably these were enemy motor gunboats, probably on a minelaying operation.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

At 0430 the vessels employed on coastal defense duties put in to Temriuk. Nothing to report.

At 0432 Roshok reported that the coast west of the Mius estuary had been bombarded by enemy motor gunboats. No damage.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: light winds, mainly east, sea wind in the afternoon, variable winds at night, force 2-3, fair, visibility 20 miles.

The 1st and 11th E-Boat Flotillas were ordered to repeat the operation against enemy supply traffic during the night of 23/24 August. (See War Diary of 19 August.)

U-boat Situation:

Approximate positions at 0800: U 23 in the operational area off Sukhum, U 24 just off Theodosia which she will enter to deliver 6 prisoners of war, U 19 24 hours' passage from the convoy rendezvous at Constantza, U 18 outward bound in air grid square 4310. At 1840 U 24 put out from Theodosia after a short stay to return to Constantza.

According to a report from the commander of U 24 and prisoners' statements, the towed convoy destroyed on the morning of 22 August consisted of 1 tug of about 10 tons and special service landing boats. It had been proceeding from Poti to Ghelenjik. The distance was to have been covered in stages, first stop at Sukhum.

The landing boats were each 9 tons, capacity 40-50 men with assault kit, speed 8.6 knots, steel construction 5 mm. thick, closed fore-deck, otherwise open, propulsion by 2 petrol engines. The boats were constructed in Gorki and transferred to Poti by railroad. So far 10 boats have arrived, all of which are to be transferred to Ghelenjik. Nothing definite is known of plans for their employment. The prisoners assume that the boats are to be employed to supply the beachhead.

U 9 reported ready for action on 26 August.

Around 2300 Italian midget submarines CB 1 and 6 returned from their operation in the Eupatoria-Sevastopol area. At 0315 CB 1 sighted 2 enemy submarines stopped in 45° 14' N, 32° 38' E, range 1200 and 600 meters respectively. At 0325 2 torpedoes were fired at the second boat from a range of 400 meters. The port torpedo ran to the left at irregular speed, the starboard

CONFIDENTIAL

torpedo pierced the surface of the water after covering 80 meters and then sank. Shortly afterwards, CB 1 was attacked by an enemy boat, firing 1 torpedo which missed. At 0345 CB 6 sighted an enemy submarine stopped in 45° 14' N, 32° 58' E at a range of 4,000 meters. At 0353 3 torpedoes were fired from a range of 800 meters. The starboard torpedo sank after covering 100 meters. The port torpedo missed the target.

The Italian base reported that the torpedo failures would be investigated.

At 1500 the 3 boats of the southern group of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out on operations from Ivan Baba, followed at 1630 by the 4 boats of the northern group.

At 1630 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put out on operations from Theodosia.

At 1950 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 11 and 8, naval ferry barge P 419 and 10 combined operations boats put out from Tomriuk for patrol duties.

At 2045 the radar operators at Cape Takil located 7 enemy vessels 2 miles south of Cape Takil. The coast was alerted and a coastal battery opened fire with location firing data only. The location revealed an easterly course, then the vessels were lost. In view of the reported range of 20 to 30 km. and the high position of the radar station, the report does not seem very credible.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no air raids on convoys or naval forces. No change in the situation at Novorossiysk. No artillery bombardment was reported.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: Mine exploding vessel No. 193 swept the area between Kilometers 65 and 109 three and a half times. No mines swept.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group swept route Green a further six times off the harbor entrance. No mines swept.

The Crimea group continued their minesweeping off the northwestern minefield gap, sweeping 3 mines, type M 26 in 44° 47' N, 33° 14' E.

Kerch: 2 motor minesweepers (RA) and 2 motor minesweepers (FR), acting as anti-mine escort on route Red, swept no mines. The group with skid



CONFIDENTIAL

gear and the FZ-group swept the route to the winter harbor for ground mines. They covered the area six times. No mines swept.

Minesweeping planes did not operate owing to scarcity of fuel.

Temriuk: The harbor defense flotilla swept route Red for moored mines between points 202 and 205. No mines swept.

Mariupol: Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine announced the area south of the Mius estuary as a declared area (lighter No. 2019 struck a mine there). Convoys proceeding between Mariupol and Taganrog must have an anti-mine escort. Up to now no mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: No convoys ran owing to lack of cargo. The next convoy is planned for the evening of 24 August.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 67 ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 3 naval ferry barges and anti-mine escort. At 1730 convoy No. 68 put out from Kerch with 4 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 1100 convoy No. 67 put in to Temriuk with 1 towing vessel, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Berdyansk-Kerch convoy No. 9 ran with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 1 naval gunnery lighter and 1 motor minesweeper (PA). At 1310 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 fishing boat, 1 naval gunnery lighter and anti-mine escort.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

24 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 2122 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 6 vessels off landing area B. The vessels were shelled. Last night's air reconnaissance reported 1 probable submarine south of Kerch Strait, 2 small vessels in the area off Tuapse and 1 coastal vessel in the area south of Tuapse.

Daylight reconnaissance in the Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. After a gap of several days, the Caucasus coast was again reconnoitered as far as Poti.

Enemy Shipping in Port:

Ochemchik 0825: 7 submarines, 7 motor minesweepers, 2 freighters of 1,000 tons and 2,000 tons, 1 coastal vessel. Sukhum 0835: 1 gunboat, 10 boats. Pitsunda Point 0845: 2 motor minesweepers. The Pilenkovo jetty (between Adler and Gagra) was for the first time reported occupied by 1 motor minesweeper and 20 boats. Sochi 0900: 5 motor minesweepers, 2 M.T.B.s, 2 small armed vessels, 1 coastal vessel, 30 boats.

Tuapse 0925: 15 motor minesweepers, 7 M.T.B.s, 1 minesweeper, 1 freighter of 1,500 tons, 8 coastal vessels totaling 2,800 tons, 15 special purpose boats, 50 boats.

Ghelenjik 0945: 27 M.T.B.s, 10 motor minesweepers, 7 coastal vessels totaling 2,000 tons, 16 special purpose boats, 65 boats.

No enemy shipping observed in the Sea of Azov. At 1804 20 boats were detected in Yeisk, 31 boats at 1825 in Primorsko Akhtari and 3 motor gunboats.

No large surface vessels at sea according to radio traffic. Slight activity of small vessels off the east coast. Submarines detected: 4 in the northwestern Black Sea as far as the Eupatoriia area, 2 in unidentified positions.

Shock troop actions and artillery activity were reported from the Army front.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

At 0500 the vessels employed on coastal defense duties put in to Terriuk. From 2250 to 2500 on 23 August they engaged a small gunboat which made off after a short action. No hits observed, no damage.

At 0625 2 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla returned to Theodosia from operations. The third boat, S 505, put in to Anapa at 0430 because her port engine had broken down in air grid square 6534. The other 2 boats continued the operation. As S 503's auxiliary engine failed, she could not approach the coast unobserved at crawling speed and S 505 attacked the Myshako landing stages alone. She fired a torpedo from a range of 2,500 meters at 2 or 3 small boats lying at the jetty, but it did not explode. In the second torpedo the discharge apparatus failed. S 503 then joined S 505 to occupy a lurking position off Cape Utrich until 0830. Nothing was sighted. The boats then returned to Theodosia with nothing to report. Of the 3 boats, each carrying 2 torpedoes, only one reached the target, and even she could only fire 1 torpedo which did not explode. Everything will be done to make the 11th E-Boat Flotilla finally ready for operations.

At 1000 the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put in to Ivan Baba from operations. From 2045 to 2400, the 3 boats of the southern group were in lurking positions off Vulcan Tal, nothing sighted. At 2400 the boats had to leave the coast because they were detected by flares and continuously bombed until 0500. It was thought that flying boats with flares were detecting our E-boats and leading the bombers to attack them. Nothing to report on their return to Theodosia to refuel.

From 2105 to 0500 the northern group was in position between Cheljenjak and Novorossisk. At 0100 close to the coast off Cape Doob 3 M.T.B.s and 1 motor cutter were sighted. It was impossible to approach to within firing range, as the boats would have been recognized too soon from the coast. On return passage the boats were attacked in air grid square 6527 from 0445 to 0105 by a mixed formation of ground-attack planes and fighters (10 planes). The planes used rocket bombs, fragmentation bombs, machine-guns and phosphorus. At 0509 another attack was made by 3 Boston bombers, which dropped 4 heavy bombs in air grid square 6519. According to a communication from 1st Air Corps, the fighter escort shot down 1 enemy plane and damaged another. Damage to our own boats: S 40 had slight splinter damage and fires on the

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

upper deck, S 49's after fuel tank was pierced, 3 depth charges and the chute were damaged or destroyed by splinters. According to the observations of the flotilla commander, enemy supplies are now being directed close to the coast via Cape Doob and then in an easterly arc off Kabardinka Bay to the beachhead.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: northerly winds, force 2-3, sea wind during the day, fair, visibility 20 miles.

No operations are planned for the E-boat flotilla. Because the anti-torpedo net barrage at Pavlovski constantly altered position owing to the bad anchoring ground, the Net Barrage Group, Black Sea in Kerch was ordered to replace it by a hawser boom. This will prevent enemy M.T.B.s from penetrating into the harbor and it is extremely unlikely, although not impossible, that a torpedo fired outside this barrage (i.e. south) at Kerch harbor could reach its target.

#### U-boat Situation:

U 24 reported that she would arrive in Constantza on the morning of 26 August. At 1100 U 19 put in to Constantza from operations. U 23 and U 18 which had just arrived in the operational area were ordered to operate together in patrol line or reconnaissance line along the Caucasus coast, turning to the northwest west of Ochomchiri at 0300 on 26 August.

The Italian Naval Command reported that CB 3 and CB 4 would be ready for operations on 25 August. As recent air reconnaissance established the presence of 2 or 3 enemy submarines off the west and southwest Crimean coast, the operational order for CB 3 and CB 4 for anti-submarine operations in the Eupatoria-Tarkan area on 25 - 27 August was canceled.

The steamer convoy, comprising "Kassa" and "Tissa", due to run from Constantza to Sevastopol on 26 August has therefore been postponed for 24 hours. Although it is a pity to be compelled to postpone a convoy during the new moon period, energetic measures must be taken against the numerous submarines which have been reported. The southern route cannot be considered for the convoy because it has not been fully reconnoitered from the air.

CB 2, the last Italian midget submarine, is being transferred to Sevastopol.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

At 1915 naval ferry barge F 419, naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 and combined operations boats put out from Temriuk on patrol duties.

At 1947 the radar operators at Anapa located 3 vessels 5 miles west of Anapa, presumably destroyers. According to a report made at 1955, the enemy vessels were proceeding at the high speed of 18-22 knots, course south. A further report at 2001 gave an alteration of the enemy course to east.

On receipt of the radar report of suspected destroyers off Anapa, the 1st E-Boat Flotilla was ordered at 2058 to leave at once to protect the convoy proceeding from Theodosia to Kerch. The convoy put to sea at 2000 and should be off Cape Takil at 0430. The group of E-boats was ordered to occupy a reconnaissance line between Cape Chauda and Cape Takil until daybreak. They were to proceed at a distance of 5 miles from the coast at a speed determined by the convoy.

At 2109 the Liaison Officer of 1st Air Corps reported that sea and coastal reconnaissance had found no indications of the presence of destroyers at sea. He considered the destroyer report most improbable, since during the day examination of harbors and reinforced sea reconnaissance in the eastern Black Sea had revealed no large enemy ships. It is assumed that they were M.T.B.s or motor gunboats. Nevertheless, I did not recall the 1st E-Boat Flotilla from the reconnaissance line, because destroyers and torpedo boats have repeatedly appeared off the Crimea coast without being spotted by air reconnaissance.

At 2215 3 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out from Ivan Baba for a patrol line between Cape Chauda and Cape Takil.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

Apart from the above-mentioned air attack on the E-boats returning from operations, no attacks were made on convoys and naval forces.

At 2215 on 23 August an enemy plane flew over Mariupol, dropping several bombs inaccurately. At 2235 probable phosphorus bombs were dropped near Mariupol. Anti-aircraft guns were unsuccessful. Novorossisk reported the usual artillery and mortar bombardment.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: Mine exploding vessel No. 195 swept the area between Kilometers 95 and 100 three and a half times without result. After 31 sweeps, the route has been declared free of ground mines.

Minesweeping planes swept the area between Kilometers 515 and 525. No mines swept.

Sevastopol: No mines were swept when minesweeping operations were continued on route Green from the approach buoy northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards to the minefield.

Kerch: Motor minesweeper R 30 and 3 motor minesweepers (RA) swept 4 inertia contact mines on route Brown between points 20 and 21: all the mines were exploded by gunfire.

As mines are constantly being laid on this important supply route, presumably by enemy M.T.B.s or gunboats, I am planning if possible to reinforce the patrol line which we have repeatedly disposed off the south Taman coast.

Craft employed to escort convoys and search for moored mines on route Red from point 15 to Temriuk swept no mines.

The group with skid gear and the PZ-group swept the route to the winter harbor six times for ground mines. No mines swept. Minesweeping planes swept route Red for ground mines without result.

Temriuk: The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla swept route Red for moored mines between points 220 and 201. No results.

Mariupol: The Mariupol-Taganrog route was swept for mines. No mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: No convoys owing to lack of cargo.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1000 convoy No. 68 put in to Temriuk with 4 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 57 ran with 1 towing vessel, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges. At 1630 convoy No. 58 put out from Genichesk with 4 naval ferry barges.



CONFIDENTIAL

- e. Sea of Azov: The Mariupol-Taganrog convoy ran with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 naval gunnery lighter and anti-mine escort. At 1910 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Taganrog with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 2 naval gunnery lighters and anti-mine escort.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL

25 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 0440 Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted a naval tug with a lighter of about 300 tons, 1 gunboat and 1 minesweeper entering Ghelenjik from the south, at 0500 1 small tug with a small lighter entering Ghelenjik from the north. A gunboat cruising off the bay still on reconnaissance. No reports on the enemy from the Sea of Azov. The ports were not examined.

At 1720 according to a radio intercept report, 2 enemy patrol vessels received the position of a vessel in 42° 25' N, 40° 53' E, at 2225 in 42° 52' N, 40° 07' E.

According to aerial photographic reconnaissance, 7 submarines, 2 freighters, 1 coastal vessel and 7 motor minesweepers were lying in Ochenchiri on 24 August. Thus one fifth of the enemy's submarines is concentrated in Ochenchiri. As this small port probably has weak anti-aircraft defenses, prospects for an attack by a sufficient number of planes seem very favorable. Moreover, the Russian submarine arm might be considerably weakened by this one action.

1st Air Corps has been informed and we have proposed that the operation take place as soon as possible.

Own Situation:

At 0350 3 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put in to Anapa from the patrol line between Cape Chauda and Cape Takil, enemy not sighted.

At 0500 the coastal defense forces put in to Tomriuk. At 0100 and again at 0130 2 parachute flares were observed in a northwesterly direction, otherwise nothing to report.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: northeast to east winds, force 4-5, sea wind during the day, wind northeast at night, force 4-3, fair, visibility 20 miles.

The 1st and 11th E-Boat Flotillas did not operate.

CONFIDENTIAL

Repetition of the bombardment of the Mius front has been ordered for the night of 26/27 August. The employment of 4 naval gunnery lighters as requested by Group von Buelow does not seem necessary, because a bombardment by 2 naval gunnery lighters would have practically the same effect and unnecessary exposure of the precious boats to any danger, especially from enemy mines, cannot be accepted. The bombardment will therefore be carried out in early twilight with navigational support from 2 motor minesweepers (RM). Sufficient visibility must first be ensured. The formation is to put in to Taganrog after the operation.

The following report was sent to Corps Headquarters, 1st Air Corps, Commander, Naval Air, Black Sea:

The operation by the 1st E-Boat Flotilla on 23/24 August showed that cooperation of E-boats and their escorting fighters would benefit both. It is therefore proposed that, in operations in which fighters support the 1st E-Boat Flotilla, a fighter escort officer should be embarked in an E-boat as is done for large convoys, and that 1 E-boat should have a radio set which covers the fighter radio telephony frequency. This will ensure that:

1. On approaching an E-boat formation, our fighters will be able to identify themselves and, if trying to drive off enemy planes, will not be mistaken for and shelled as enemy planes.
2. The E-boats, which in many cases sight the enemy planes first, will be able to direct the fighters to them.

If the embarkation of a fighter escort officer should be impossible, it is proposed to install the radio equipment aboard an E-boat whose commander can operate the set as a result of earlier training in the Air Force.

In view of the anti-submarine operations by the Italian midget submarines in Eupatoria Bay, Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea has been instructed to postpone an Odessa-Sevastopol convoy planned for 26/27 August.

The steamer "Feodosia" which is lying unable to proceed in Mariupol is to be transferred from Mariupol to Nikolaiev via Kerch. The following orders were issued on the transfer:

- A. The transfer from Mariupol to Kerch will be executed by Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus in the following manner:

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

1. The towed convoy will be commanded by Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla as far as Kerch.
  2. The following ships are to be employed: as tugs, towing vessel "Junak" and tug "Kiel"; for protection, 4 naval gunnery lighters of the Temriuk group, motor minesweeper R 30 and 2 motor minesweepers (RA).
  3. On X-day, i.e., 27 August, "Junak" and "Kiel" are to be transferred via the prescribed route from Kerch to Mariupol by motor minesweeper R 30 and 2 motor minesweepers (RA). On passage, the motor minesweepers are to provide anti-mine escort for the tugs from Red 15, at the same time examining the towed convoy's route for moored mines.
  4. Sailing from Kerch and later passage should be arranged so that the escorting vessels and the tugs arrive at Mariupol on X+1 day 3 hours before nightfall.
  5. The towed convoy is to leave Mariupol before nightfall on X+1 day.
  6. From Mariupol to Kerch, the towed convoy is to proceed at the highest possible speed to reach Kerch before nightfall on X+2 day. If this is impossible, the towed convoy is to anchor off the north entrance to Kerch Strait until daybreak on X+3 day.
  7. From 5 miles north of Red 15 an anti-ground mine escort is to be made available for the towed convoy. On X+1 day, all minesweepers, including minesweeping planes, are to sweep the north-south route in Kerch Strait.
- B. A request for fighter escort for the towed convoy from dawn to dusk on X+1 day will be submitted by Admiral, Black Sea.
- C. Naval Harbor Master, Mariupol will ensure and confirm that "Feodosia" will be ready for transfer on X+1 day.
- D. The towed convoy will be controlled directly by Admiral, Black Sea from Kerch to Nikolaiev.

Motor minesweeper R 30 and 2 motor minesweepers (RA) were ordered to fetch S 505 from Anapa, providing anti-mine escort as far as Theodosia.

CONFIDENTIAL

U-boat Situation:

At 0500 Italian midget submarines CB 3 and CB 4 put out from Sevastopol for anti-submarine operations in Eupatoria Bay. At 0920 CB 3 reported damage to steering gear off Cape Lukull. She was towed in to port by a naval ferry barge belonging to the transfer escort for CB 2 which was proceeding from Constantza. At 1330 CB 3 and CB 2 put in to Sevastopol. CB 4 is continuing the operation.

At 1000 U 24 put in to Constantza from operations. At 1344 U 23 reported that at 2325 on 24 August in air grid square 0346, she set a 150-ton patrol vessel on fire with her guns. Later, the vessel sank.

At 2046 U 18 intercepted a convoy in air grid square 15174, course northwest, moderate speed. She reported details to U 23. At 2137 the same boat reported: "Have been driven off by searchlights and artillery fire, am making for Pitsunda Point as I have lost contact."

A Lichtenstein plane which happened to be in the area south of Korch Strait was directed by radio to this area to lead the U-boats on to the convoy again. The plane proceeded to off Pitsunda Point without sighting the enemy, then had to break off the operation because of lack of fuel. Possibly the convoy had put in to Sukhum. U 18 and U 23 were ordered to join in the northwesterly search operation planned from 0300. U 23 reported by radio: "At 1608 fired fan-of-three at Q-ship of 500 tons in air grid square 1354, depth setting 3 meters, ..... firing 1. Salvo missed, probably because the boat had been observed. Depth charges."

U 9 reported readiness for operations on 26 August and was ordered to put out via the southern route, temporarily to the Batum area.

The special task planned for this boat (landing of agents) has had to be postponed again because the necessary documents for the personnel to be embarked were not ready in time.

The boat was also to be equipped with 1 EMS mine to be laid on leaving the operational area as a decoy to mislead and damage enemy submarine chasers.

At 1953 Temriuk reported that, owing to bad weather, patrol duties would be impossible. The boats are lying at readiness. At 2020 4 flashes, probably from 7.5 cm. guns, were observed at a range of 7 or 8 miles to the northeast.

CONFIDENTIAL

As a naval bombardment of our coast was suspected, the patrol forces were ordered to put out and were in position at 2200. According to a later report from Naval Port Commander, Tomriuk, the flashes observed presumably originated from the Russian front. Investigations up to 2250 revealed that there had been no bombardment of the coast and no firing at sea.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

No air raids in the Black Sea area during the day.

Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine reported that, from 2240 to 2310 on 24 August, one of our batteries near Petrushino (southwest of Taganrog) was shelled by an 18 cm. battery with 4 guns. 24 short bursts, no damage. The enemy battery lies between Semi-Balka and Pavlo-Ochakov. At 2320 20 short bursts from 7.5 cm. guns were fired at our battery near Petrushino by 2 gunboats from a range of some 7 miles. No damage.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: Mine exploding vessel No. 195 swept the area between Kilometers 65 and 88 six times without result.

West Coast: A mine was cut in 45° 34' N, 29° 57' E and another in 45° 39' N, 30° 03' E.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group swept route Green eight times from the approach buoy northwards to the 40-meter line and eastwards to the minefield. No mines swept.

Minesweeping was continued off the northwestern minefield gap at Sevastopol. No mines swept.

Kerch: During operations on the Zhelezni Bog-Anapa route, 8 more inertia contact mines were swept. The mines were exploded by gunfire.

Sea of Azov: Minesweeping planes swept route Red three times for ground mines between points 201 and 220. No mines swept. The route from point 213 to the Peresyp estuary was swept eight times without result.

The Tomriuk harbor defense flotilla searched the route to Peresyp estuary for moored mines. No mines swept.

No moored mines were swept on the Berdyansk-Mariupol route.



CONFIDENTIAL

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. No Anapa convoys owing to lack of cargo.
- c. The Kerch-Temriuk convoy No. 68 (second part) ran with 4 naval ferry barges. At 1730 convoy No. 69 put out from Kerch with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 5 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 58 ran with 4 naval ferry barges.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 2 naval gunnery lighters and anti-mine escort.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the northwestern Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

26 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 0545 Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported 1 M.T.B. entering Ghelenjik from the southwest; the boat put out to the southwest at 0720. At 1215 2 M.T.B.s put in to Ghelenjik from the south, at 1600 1 M.T.B. put out again. 1 minesweeper put out from Ghelenjik and cruised off the bay. At 0815 1 M.T.B. put out from Ghelenjik on a westerly course and put in again at 1825.

At 2350 night reconnaissance reported 1 motor minesweeper 3 miles southeast of Ghelenjik and at 0100 a small vessel off Tuapse (during the night of 25/26 August). Daylight reconnaissance over the Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy. Normal freighter traffic was reported off the Turkish coast. No reports were received on the Caucasus coast or on enemy shipping in port as the reconnaissance plane did not return.

No enemy forces were reported in the reconnaissance area of the Sea of Azov. Normal enemy ships in port. At 1555 a destroyer was detected at sea from radio traffic in the southeastern Black Sea. At 2055 2 destroyers were reported in the Tuapse area. Normal activity of small vessels off the east coast. No new reports on submarine activity.

No special actions were reported from the Kuban bridgehead.

Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk later reported that at 2000 (25 August) 1 enemy rubber dinghy with 4 men had been destroyed off the nearest gap in the west mole from a range of 10 to 15 meters.

At 0445 naval ferry barge F 419 and naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 put in to Tomriuk from the patrol line. Nothing to report.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: northeast to east winds, force 5-6, fair, visibility 20 miles, wind abating during the night to force 4.

In view of the changeable weather, the operation by the 1st E-Boat Flotilla planned against the Caucasus coast has been postponed.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus has been instructed to send 2 naval ferry barges to Temriuk for patrol duties, as replacements for the naval gunnery lighters to be employed as protection for the steamer "Feodosia" on transfer passage.

The Lieutenant, who was taken prisoner during the night of 17/18 August when the 2 M.T.B.s were destroyed north of Yeisk, made the following statements concerning the organization and complement of the Azov fleet:

1. 1st Division with base at Yeisk, berths at Yeisk and Akhtari, altering constantly.  
Strength: 6 large armored cutters of 30 tons. The number is to be increased to 12.  
Armament: 2 7.62 mm. guns, 2 machine-guns.  
Armor: amidship 10 mm., bridge 12 mm., gun-turret 45 mm. Maximum speed 25 knots.  
4 small armored cutters of 37 to 40 tons also belong to the 1st Division. The armor is the same as on larger cutters. Armament: 1 7.62 mm. gun, 1 rocket-thrower with 24 rockets, 43 rockets on board.
2. 2nd Division is not yet established, but is shortly to be formed on the lines of 1st Division.
3. 3rd Division with base at Azov, berths at Azov, Akhtari and Yeisk. Some vessels are lying scattered among the reeds near Azov.  
Strength: 10 small armored cutters.  
Armament: 1 7.62 mm. gun, 2 machine-guns, no rocket-thrower, 1 trench mortar of 82 mm. to 107 mm. with 4-6 barrels. For each trench mortar 200 rounds are on board.
4. In Primorsko Akhtari 6 submarine chasers. Two were sunk by planes. Armament: 2 or 3 4.5 cm. guns, 3 machine-guns, 1 automatic 2.2 cm. gun. Potential strength 18, actual number 4.
5. About 20 fishing smacks with various armament also belong to the Azov Flotilla.

All these armored cutters were either built in the dockyard at Selenodolsk or at the Nikolaiev yard, which was evacuated and is now on the River Volga. Range-finders are not yet available but are expected.

U-boat Situation:

At 0200 Italian midget submarine CB 4, on anti-submarine operations, reported: "At 0115 sank



CONFIDENTIAL

enemy submarine in 45° 07' N, 33° 00' E." As she had fired all her torpedoes, she proceeded to Sevastopol, putting in at 1400. The commander reported a hit from a range of 400 meters. The target was lying stopped, a submarine of approximately 800 tons. She received a direct hit under the conning tower and broke in two and sank.

Naval Staff is requested to ascertain that no publication of this success is made in the Armed Forces Official Announcements or in the German or Italian press to allow the enemy to gain information.

At 1400 U 9 put out from Constantza for operations via the southern route.

CB 2 and CB 6 reported ready for action. The boats were ordered to proceed on anti-submarine operations south of Sarich on 27 August. This area was chosen because in the Eupatoria area convoy traffic and anti-submarine operations by surface forces were planned from 27 August onwards.

At 2028, while leaving the first day's position line, U 23 reported on yesterday's miss with the fan-of-three: "Presumably the Q-ship was the same ship as was encountered on the first enemy operation. Wood (?) (sic) stopped, now and then zigzagging to make smoke. Firing range 800 meters, angle of spread 40°, angle on the bow 90°, length of target 60 meters, torpedo ran 20 meters ahead of the bow. Clear location, Diesel engines. Accurate depth charges."

During the night U 18 and U 23 advanced in patrol line to the next day's position line off Sukhum to join in the northwesterly search operation.

From 1645 to 1708, 30 Russian planes raided Temriuk harbor using high explosive bombs, phosphorus and machine-guns. Damage: Of the evacuation transports, RT 05 was sunk, RT 02 damaged and beached, RT 03 slightly damaged. 1 naval gunnery lighter received indirect hits, 1 2 cm. gun out of order. Phosphorus set fire to about 15 petrol and oil barrels, 1 truck and 1 store house.

The fires were extinguished shortly afterwards. 5 planes probably shot down. Casualties: Navy: 1 dead, 3 wounded. Army: 4 dead, 3 wounded. Civilians: 2 dead, 7 wounded.

At 1930 naval ferry barge F 419, naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 and 10 combined operations

CONFIDENTIAL

boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no air raids on convoys or naval forces. For air raid on Taganrog harbor, see above.

Novorossisk reported heavy artillery fire.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: Minesweeping was continued by mine exploding vessel No. 193 and minesweeping planes without result.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group swept route Green eight times off Sevastopol without result.

Crimca group: The group equipped with towed loop gear and skid gear searched the route to the winter harbor; no mines were swept, although the area was covered sixteen times.

Sea of Azov: While providing escort against moored mines for Temriuk transports and searching for mines on route led between points 220 and Z, vessels swept no mines.

Minesweeping planes searched for ground mines from point 213 to the Peresyp estuary. No mines swept.

The Mariupol-Taganrog and Baidyansk-Mariupol routes were swept for moored mines without result.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: At 1510 convoy No. 179 put out from Kerch with 8 naval ferry barges, 1 tug carrying part of a net barrage and anti-mine escort. The convoy anchored near Zhelesni Rog.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 69 put in to Temriuk at 2045 with 3 naval ferry barges, 1 tug and 1 lighter.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 58 ran with 4 naval ferry barges. At 1530 convoy No. 59 put out from Genichesk, 3 naval ferry barges, 1 towing vessel and 1 lighter.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1100 the Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 3 transport barges, 5 naval

CONFIDENTIAL

gunnery lighters and anti-mine escort.

- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the northwestern Black Sea ran according to plan.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 50 -

152



CONFIDENTIAL

27 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 2045 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported 14 vessels off landing area B until 0030. The landing point was bombarded, but bad light prevented shelling of the vessels. Around 2130 after a sudden burst of fire, explosions were heard and a fire blazed for 2 hours. During the evening of 27 August, there were 10 vessels off landing area B.

The landing point was shelled again. During the day slight patrol vessel activity off Chelenjik.

Night reconnaissance during the night of 26/27 August produced no important reports of the enemy. Several freighters on various courses were sighted off the Turkish coast. No reports from the Caucasus coast. No reports on the enemy from the Sea of Azov. According to radio traffic, 2 destroyers were in the area between Adler and Ochenchiri during the night of 26/27 August. At 0335 it was reported that according to radio traffic there was a cruiser at sea as well as the 2 destroyers. During the day radio traffic abated and large surface vessels could no longer be detected at sea. In the afternoon air activity was detected in the central Black Sea. Disposition of submarines in the operational area almost unchanged. On the Army front several assault detachments were driven off.

Own Situation:

At 0050 a patrol encountered 20 Russians who had been landed near Taganrog by a minesweeper. In the engagement two of our men were wounded; the place where the landing occurred was sealed off.

At 0430 the coastal defense forces put in to Temriul, nothing to report.

At 0500 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 1 and 2 put in to Taganrog after bombarding the Mius front.

At 0225 the formation put out from Taganrog and reached the firing position at 0327. The bombardment was started on a westerly course against the Svesda-Kommunisma valley about 2 km. north of Primorsko. This was the target agreed upon with the Army Division. Enemy concentrations

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

had been observed there suitably disposed for the expected attack carried out on 27 August. After the bombardment, heavy smoke clouds with dark red flames extending along the whole valley were observed. According to a communication from the Army Division, the bombardment was accurate and the concentrations were effectively attacked.

The cease fire came at 0352. During the bombardment the enemy fired a few short salvoes. 1 armored train was observed near Morskaya. While our forces were entering Taganrog, the enemy accurately shelled the harbor.

Ammunition used amounted to 440 rounds of 8.8 cm. shells.

At 0715 I proceeded to Eupatoria to inspect the naval vessels there.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: northeast to east winds, force 4-5, sea wind, in the evening wind veered to east and southeast, abating to force 3-2, fair, visibility 20 miles.

1st Air Corps has been informed of the planned transfer of the steamer "Foodosia" from Mariupol to Nikolaiev and warned to expect an enemy attempt to prevent the transfer by the employment of strong bomber formations. Fighter escort has therefore been requested for the towed convoy while proceeding through the Sea of Azov on 29 August from daybreak until it reaches Cape Fonar.

German Naval Command reported that the minelaying operation (first part of the minefield of the southern defenses) was planned for approximately 1 September. On the question of whether the minelaying area could be examined by then as requested, the German Naval Command was informed that this operation was to be carried out on 30/31 August by the Crimea group if weather conditions allowed.

German Naval Command inquired whether the minelaying formation could enter Sevastopol through the northwestern minefield gap which would be cleared by then. In answer to this question, German Naval Command was informed that hitherto only the northern part and one third of the southern area of the northwestern minefield gap had been swept. Completion of minesweeping by 1 September would be impossible in view of the above-mentioned examination of the minelaying

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

area on 30/31 August. It is therefore proposed to have the minelaying formation proceed directly to Constantza after completion of its task. Should there be any reason for entering Sevastopol, the boats would have to enter via the northern part of the northwestern minefield gap preceded by an anti-mine escort.

U-boat Situation:

No reports from boats at sea.

At 0630 Italian midget submarines CB 2 and CB 6 put out for anti-submarine operations in the area south of Cape Sarich.

U 18 and U 25 are cruising in the patrol line off Sukhum. At night they will proceed to the position line southwest of Pitsunda Point.

As Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea had planned to run convoys on 28/29 August when surface submarine chasers would be operating in the operational areas of CB 2 and CB 6, these boats were instructed to leave their operational areas on the afternoon of 28 August and put in to Yalta. To avoid any doubt, the boats were requested to confirm their orders.

At 1200 submarine chasers "Xanton", Nos. 2304 and 2306 passed Cape Tarkhan to begin their anti-submarine operations in the Eupatoria area. In the course of the afternoon, No. 2304's engine broke down and the boat had to be towed in to Sevastopol by No. 2306. "Xanton" remains alone in the operational area and on the morning of 29 August will meet the Constantza-Sevastopol convoy to reinforce the escort.

At 1255 the "Zar Ferdinand" convoy was attacked 5 miles southwest of Bugaz by 7 torpedo planes, each firing 1 torpedo. The raid was carried out in 3 waves.

The first wave of 3 planes attacked from the starboard side, the second wave of 2 planes 2 minutes later from the port side and the last wave 4 minutes later from the starboard side. The first 2 raids were out-manuevered by "Zar Ferdinand" and in the last raid the torpedoes were dropped so far away that they exploded before reaching the target. The planes also machine-gunned the convoy. Our own defense guns had no visible success. No damage or casualties.

According to a report from 1st Air Corps received here at 0948, the convoy was reported leaving



CONFIDENTIAL

Sulina by a Russian reconnaissance plane. The raid showed that Russian air reconnaissance now covers the entire Black Sea and that in future, air raids on convoys in this area must be expected at any time.

At 1300 the tug "Kiel", towing vessel "Junak", 4 naval gunnery lighters, 2 more tugs and 1 lighter led by motor minesweeper R 30 and 2 motor minesweepers (RA) put out from Kerch for Mariupol. They have the task of towing and escorting the steamer "Feodosia".

At 1730 submarine chasers Nos. 2301 and 2305 put out from Constantza on anti-submarine operations in the Bosphorus, because a steamer convoy had been planned for 28 August from Bosphorus to Constantza.

At 1900 3 naval ferry barges and 10 combined operations boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties. 3 more barges are lying in the roads ready for operations.

At 2000 I arrived at Simferopol from Eupatoria.

At 2145 Naval Shore Commander, Crimea reported a wide area on fire near Balaklava. An old Russian minefield had been discovered, mines exploding continuously, wires fouled.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

For air raid on the "Zar Ferdinand" convoy, see above. Novorossisk reported heavy artillery fire.

Taganrog: Artillery bombardment in the morning just as the landing craft formation was putting in from the Mius front. 2 men dead, 1 seriously wounded aboard a transport cutter.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: Minesweeping continued according to plan. No mines swept.

Sevastopol: The FZ-group continued to search for ground mines on route Green off Sevastopol. No mines swept. Minesweeping of the northwestern minefield gap was continued by 4 motor minesweepers of the Crimea group. No mines swept.

Sea of Azov: Motor minesweepers R 30, RA 52 and RA 54 acted as escort against moored mines for the Kerch-Mariupol convoy. No mines swept.

The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla swept route Red. Searches for moored mines were carried out

on the Berdyansk-Mariupol-Taganrog route. No mines swept. Minesweeping planes did not operate owing to lack of fuel.

Kerch: Motor minesweeper RA 51 and 3 motor minesweepers (FR) acted as escort against moored mines for Anapa transports. 2 inertia contact mines were swept, one near point 20, the other 800 meters off Anapa harbor entrance. No ground mines were swept in Kerch Strait.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoy: Convoy No. 176 ran with 8 naval ferry barges, 1 tug and anti-mine escort.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 69 ran with 5 naval ferry barges, 1 tug and 1 lighter. At 1700 convoy No. 70 put out from Kerch with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 motor sailing vessel and 5 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 59 ran with 3 naval ferry barges, 1 towing vessel and 1 lighter.
- e. Sea of Azov: For special Kerch-Mariupol convoy, see under 1300. At 1915 the Taganrog-Mariupol convoy put out from Taganrog with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 2 naval gunnery lighters and anti-mine escort.
- f. Crimea convoys ran according to plan. Convoys in the western Black Sea ran as usual. For air raid on the "Zar Ferdinand" convoy, see above.

28 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

At 1100 (27 August) the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported 1 tug with 1 lighter of about 1,000 tons, 1 motor lighter of about 800 tons, 2 gunboats, 3 minesweepers and 2 patrol vessels entering Ghelenjik from the south-east. From 2115 to 2300 (27 August), 10 vessels were shelled off landing area B. At 0430 4 gunboats, 2 minesweepers, 1 patrol vessel put in to Ghelenjik, at 0455 another minesweeper put in to Ghelenjik from the south.

Daylight reconnaissance of the central and south-eastern Black Sea produced no reports of the enemy other than the destroyer squadron mentioned below.

No enemy forces were sighted in the reconnaissance area in the Sea of Azov. According to aerial photographic reconnaissance, 6 motor minesweepers and possibly 29 M.T.B.s, 5 coastal vessels, 15 landing boats and 23 boats were detected in Ghelenjik.

At 0815 air reconnaissance reported 3 destroyers in grid square 33573, course 225°. According to a later report at 1107, the squadron was in grid square 2372, course east, slight speed. At 1150 another report stated that the destroyers had been bombed by a reconnaissance plane. The destroyers broke their formation and steered north at high speed. Further reconnaissance reports during the afternoon confirmed that the formation was proceeding eastwards at high speed. The reports of the Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria approximately coincided with those of air reconnaissance. At 1800 the destroyer formation received the position of 7 unidentified vessels in 44° 05' N, 36° 14' E, course 110°.

These were the 7 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla which put out from Ivan Baba at 1300.

Another destroyer was detected from radio traffic in the southeastern Black Sea in the course of the afternoon. She was later identified as the large destroyer "Charkow".

Submarines detected by Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria: 3 in the northwestern Black Sea, 3 in the eastern Black Sea and 4 in unidentified positions.



CONFIDENTIAL

Own Situation:

At 0130 submarine chaser No. 2306, with No. 2304 in tow, attacked a surfaced submarine with guns approximately 5 miles north of Sevastopol. The submarine submerged. No hits were observed. Submarine chaser No. 2306 towed No. 2304 to Sevastopol and at 0420 put out again with submarine chaser No. 2303 for anti-submarine operations. The submarine was again located by No. 2303 and pursued with depth charges. Meanwhile "Xanten" had arrived and took part in the operation against the submarine which was again attacked at 1903. After depth charges had been dropped, small pieces of wood and oil traces were observed. No further reports have been received.

At 0445 the vessels employed on coastal defense duties put in to Temriuk. At 2355 engine noises were heard in a northeasterly direction at varying ranges. No contact was made with the enemy.

In view of the report that a destroyer formation is proceeding to the western Black Sea, the following measures have been adopted:

1. The Bosphorus-Constantza convoy (steamer "Thisbe"), due to leave the Bosphorus around noon, has been canceled. The escorting forces on passage have been ordered back to Burgas and Constantza. It can be assumed as fairly certain that the enemy knew about the sailing of the steamer "Thisbe" from the Bosphorus and that the destroyer formation was sent out to meet her.
2. In order to intercept the returning destroyer formation, U 9, which was on passage to the operational area, has been ordered to take up a waiting position 12 or 15 miles north of Inze Burun. U 18 will occupy a waiting position off Poti.
3. No decision on diversion or postponement of the Sevastopol-Constantza convoy planned for 1900 on 28 August has yet been made; it will depend on the results of the present air reconnaissance.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: light winds, mainly east or southeast, sea wind up to force 5 in the afternoon, fair, visibility 20 miles, morning haze off the coast. 7 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla were ordered to operate in groups of two in the Turnse-Cape Uchdere area on the night of 28/29 August, if the flotilla commander thought it advisable. On outward and return passage, the flotilla is to proceed in close formation so that the boats' defenses will be concentrated in the

event of enemy air raids. The boats are to leave Ivan Baba to reach the operational area at 2130. They will commence return passage from the operational area around 0130. 1st Air Corps has been requested to detail a Lichtenstein plane during the night of 28/29 August for cooperation with the flotilla in the area between Adler and Tuapse. A request has also been made for fighter or heavy fighter protection for the return passage from 0400.

1st Air Corps reported that the 3rd and 4th Anti-Aircraft Detachments of the 5th Air Force Field Division were at readiness for the protection of Anapa harbor from low-level air attacks.

Reliable statements by prisoners-of-war confirm that enemy forces are continuously increasing in the Sea of Azov. In addition to Akhtari, Yeisk and Azov are also main flotilla bases, mainly for 2 types of armored motor gunboats. With these boats the enemy is making sorties almost every night to bombard the coast or to lay mines off the north coast of Taganrog Bay. Minelaying countermeasures may prevent these operations and weaken the enemy forces. In view of the shallow water, only ground mines would come into the question for this task. These mines would also be effective against small iron vessels (motor gunboats) in water 5 meters deep. Commander, 3rd Naval Gunnery Lighter Flotilla was therefore given the attached orders for minelaying between Azov and Yeisk.

The enemy is constantly transporting supplies in medium steamers and tankers up to 8,000 tons from the southeast Caucasus ports to Tuapse, where the material is transferred to smaller vessels for further transportation to Gholenjik and the beachhead. The enemy organizes supply traffic to Tuapse so that the steamers pass the dangerous E-boat area by day. Night operations by E-boats can therefore not intercept it. On the other hand, minelaying on the approach route to Tuapse as close as possible to the harbor entrance promises at least one success, as air reconnaissance has hitherto not observed a systematic patrol of the routes. The appended orders for minelaying of the approach route to Tuapse were therefore issued to 1st E-Boat Flotilla.

At 1045 naval gunnery lighter No. 10 put in to Berdyansk because of engine trouble. She had been proceeding to Mariupol with tugs and escort forces for the "Feodosia" convoy.



CONFIDENTIAL

At 1300 7 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out from Ivan-Baba for the Tuapse-Cape Uchdere operational area.

At 1545 motor minesweeper R 30 put in to Mariupol with tugs and escort vessels for the transfer of the steamer "Feodosia", with the exception of naval gunnery lighter No. 10 which had been sent to Berdyansk at 0815 because of engine trouble. At 1700 the steamer "Feodosia" put out from Kerch with tugs and escort forces under the command of Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla who was on board motor minesweeper R 30.

At 1810 a submarine attack was made on the Odessa-Sevastopol convoy off Cape Marco Polo.

The towing vessel "Hainburg" was hit by a torpedo in the bow, which was torn off. The crippled ship was towed by the stern and beached. All the escort vessels pursued the submarine with depth charges, but without success. 4 men of the anti-aircraft gun crew are missing.

At 2100 the tug "Wunschenbach", which is equipped with pumping equipment, was sent out to the place of the accident. "Hainburg" was towed to Sevastopol and beached in the harbor. No further reports.

At 1811 1st Air Corps reported to Simferopol that no fighter escort could be made available for the return of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla. The fighter escort for the towed convoy with the steamer "Feodosia" would still be provided. The flotilla has been informed and instructed to commence return passage at 0030.

At 1815 Commander, Convoys and Escorts, Black Sea was instructed to run the planned Sevastopol-Constantza convoy via the southern route, as it had been definitely established that the enemy destroyer formation was sailing eastwards and was therefore no longer dangerous for the convoy.

At 1925 3 naval ferry barges and 10 combined operations boats put out from Tomriuk for coastal defense duties.

According to reports on the situation on the Mius front received during the last few days, the enemy had prepared a large-scale attack for 27 August and started it on that day. At first the situation appeared to be very critical. The radio station at Taganrog went off the air temporarily and a convoy on passage to Mariupol



CONFIDENTIAL

was recalled. On the morning of 28 August, the attack was intercepted and transports were resumed by agreement with Group Recknagel. The planned evacuation of the town was not carried out. At 1304 a report was received that the front at Taganrog was steady as far as 50 km. to the north. An adjacent enemy penetration was slowly driven back. Advancing enemy tanks stalled owing to lack of fuel. A regiment of cavalry employed as reserves was wiped out. Taganrog is to be held. The civilian population is being evacuated.

The Army and Air Force confirmed that the naval gunnery lighters made a major contribution to the destruction of the enemy concentrations by accurately bombarding them on the morning of 27 August. They were a great help in driving off the attack on the coastal part of the front.

At 1515 a convoy with 1 tug and 1 motor sailing vessel with about 200 tons of petrol escorted by 2 naval gunnery lighters and 1 motor minesweeper (RM) put out from Mariupol for Taganrog. The convoy was to be the main means of evacuating all kinds of commercial goods from Taganrog and was to bring back one 300-ton lighter carrying such goods to Mariupol.

From 1615 to 1645 radio reports were received from the commander of the group of naval gunnery lighters in Taganrog on the tank breakthrough, the advancing Russian attack and concentrated air raids on Taganrog. Further reports from the Rumanian Air Corps confirmed those reports. Under these circumstances, Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine considered it senseless for the convoy to put in to Taganrog. When still further reports were received on the Russian advance, the convoy was ordered at 1830 to turn about. The same orders were given at 2200 by the commander of the group of naval gunnery lighters, obviously by agreement with Group von Buelow. (Army Command in Taganrog.)

Around 1900 the Quartermaster General of the 6th Army telephoned Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine to ask why the convoy had been ordered to turn about. For the first time it was evident that, contrary to previous directions, the Army attached great value to the quick supplying of Taganrog regardless of all difficulties. When this was learned, Admiral, Black Sea gave his consent to the convoy run and sent the following teletype to the 6th Army: "The Mariupol-Taganrog naval transports will proceed if at all possible. Please make requests to Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine." At 2000 this teletype was communicated

CONFIDENTIAL

in advance by telephone to the 6th Army and at the same time they were told that further vessels had been ordered to Mariupol by Admiral, Black Sea.

Discussions between Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine and the Loading Staff of the 6th Army revealed that, despite many phone calls to the Quartermaster General, no loading orders could be obtained. This fact was communicated to Army Command and the Loading Staff quickly received the necessary loading orders.

At 2022 a teletype from Naval Staff, Operations Division was received: Naval forces are urgently required to support the southern sector of the Mius front. The Führer has therefore ordered the immediate transfer of all available naval gunnery lighters, motor minesweepers and E-boats to the Sea of Azov.

Admiral, Black Sea reported the following plans:

1. On the morning of 29 August 7 naval gunnery lighters, 1 motor minesweeper and 2 motor minesweepers (RA) will be available in Mariupol or Taganrog.
2. 6 naval ferry barges will proceed from Kerch to Mariupol.
3. On the morning of 29 August the 1st E-Boat Flotilla will put in to Kerch after carrying out the assignment off the Caucasus coast. The boats will refuel and put out on further operations in the Sea of Azov. In addition to the E-boats, motor minesweepers and naval gunnery lighters are to be employed as ordered, naval ferry barges will be provided for the following purposes:
  - a. To transport necessary material for which lighters are unsuitable.
  - b. To reinforce the fighting forces, as there is a scarcity of forces, especially of motor minesweepers.

(The Crimea group is penetrating the Russian declared area west of Sevastopol and recent enemy submarine attacks make it necessary to sweep this new route as soon as possible. The Crimea group, at present consisting of 4 motor minesweepers, cannot therefore be released.)

In order to carry out these plans, Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla was instructed at 2035 to put in to Kerch instead of Theodosia.



CONFIDENTIAL

The commander of the group of naval gunnery lighters in Taganrog was ordered to despatch naval gunnery lighters Nos. 3 and 4 to give active support to the Army from the sea. Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine will coordinate instructions for this operation with the Army.

At 2145 Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was directed to order the return of the steamer convoy to Mariupol. He was also to transfer to Mariupol 6 naval ferry barges, if possible those equipped with quadruple anti-aircraft guns. At the same time the fighter protection planned for this area was re-allocated to the 1st E-Boat Flotilla with the approval of 1st Air Corps.

At about 2230 Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine reported that at 2200 Field Marshal von Manstein had telephoned to say that he had learned that a naval convoy had turned about after bombardment by Russian gunboats. The mistake was explained by Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine who described what actually happened. The Field Marshal then thankfully acknowledged that the Navy was at full operational readiness.

U-boat Situation:

U 23 is carrying out operations close to the coast. Because her fuel situation will not permit her to operate in a more distant area, she has been allotted air grid square 9440 as operational area from 29 August. U 18 was informed that air reconnaissance reports had led the Command to expect the destroyer squadron to reach its port of destination at 0400 on 29 August. The boats were then allowed to operate at maximum speed. U 9 reported no contact, no attacks: presumably she was in an unfavorable position or had passed the formation.

At 1830 CB 2 and CB 6 put in to Yalta according to plan. They were ordered to operate again in the same area until the morning of 31 August, putting out from Yalta at 1000 on 10 August.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

During the day no air raids on our own convoys or naval forces.

During the afternoon, Taganrog was heavily shelled in the harbor area from the direction of Primorka. In the evening and during the night, harassing measures were taken against the harbor and town area of Taganrog. At 1315 on 27 August, 9 enemy bombers attacked the lighthouse and the harbor area. The office building of the Naval Harbor



CONFIDENTIAL

Master was destroyed and the Naval Harbor Master seriously wounded. The commander of naval gunnery lighter No. 4, 2 boatswain's mates (second class) and 1 man were killed in action. The commander of naval gunnery lighter No. 2 was wounded and there were several slight casualties. During the night several enemy penetrations were again made. A few bombs, phosphorus, and a vast number of incendiary bombs were dropped. In the course of 27 August, several enemy planes flew over Mariupol, no bombing. At 1500 the first degree of alarm was sounded. At 0625 a single enemy plane dropped 5 bombs on the harbor area and the tug "Alenth" was hit and sank. 3 Ukrainian civilians dead.

At 1700 a surprise low-level attack was carried out on the port of Temriuk. Bombs, phosphorus and guns were used. Only slight damage because the anti-aircraft guns of all vessels opened up simultaneously. 4 planes were shot down.

Novorossisk reported the usual gunfire.

Minesweeping Activity:

Sevastopol: The Crimea group with 4 motor minesweepers continued minesweeping off the north-western minfield gap. No mines swept. Motor minesweepers R 203 and R 206 were exchanged for R 164 and R 197, because the former were not equipped with mine rails.

Motor minesweepers R 197 and R 164 are at the disposal of Commanding Officer, German Naval Command for a minelaying operation.

Kerch: While carrying out ground mine check sweeps in Kerch Strait, the groups with skid gear and towed loop gear swept no mines. Minesweeping planes swept route Red for ground mines. No mines swept. The escort to protect the Anapa transports against moored mines also swept the route to Mariupol. No mines swept. The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla carried out minesweeping and mine observation duties.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoy: At 1730 convoy No. 177 put out from Kerch with 7 naval ferry barges and anti-mine escort.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 1030 convoy No. 70 put in to Temriuk with 5 naval ferry barges, 1 tug, 1 lighter and 1 motor sailing vessel.

CONFIDENTIAL

- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 59 ran with 1 towing vessel, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges.
- e. The Sea of Azov: At 1840 motor minesweepers R 30, RA 52, RA 54, 2 naval gunnery lighters and the steamer "Feodosia" towed by "Kiel" and "Junak" put out from Mariupol for Kerch.

The Taganrog-Mariupol convoy ran with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 4 transport barges and anti-mine escort.

- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan. For submarine attack on the Odessa-Sevastopol convoy, see above.

CONFIDENTIAL

29 August, 1943

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

From 2110 to 2300 on 28 August, the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk observed 5 vessels off landing area B. They were shelled. At 2200 a rubber dinghy was sighted off the west mole at a range of some 1,000 meters. It turned out to sea after being machine-gunned. At 1655 1 M.T.B. put out from Gholenjik on a southwesterly course.

At 0510 U 18 sighted the 4 destroyers reported yesterday entering Batum on a course of 115°. They were in air grid square 1214 some 10 miles off.

Reconnaissance during the night of 28/29 August detected the enemy destroyer formation in air grid square 6369, course east, high speed. Only slight patrol activity was observed by night reconnaissance off the Caucasus coast.

Daylight reconnaissance over the entire Black Sea area reported only 1 naval vessel, course north-east, in the southwestern Black Sea.

Thanks to the fact that our own air reconnaissance detected the enemy destroyer formation promptly, the enemy achieved nothing. In future they must expect continuous patrol of the Black Sea area while they are operating. Unfortunately our own submarine operations against the enemy destroyers also failed.

According to radio inference, traffic was generally slight in the entire sea area.

No activity of larger vessels was observed.

Submarines detected: 1 in the Sevastopol area and 1 in an unidentified position.

The Main Naval D/F Station confirmed U 18's sighting report by reporting an enemy destroyer formation of 4 vessels entering the base on the morning of 29 August.

No important engagements were reported from the Kuban bridgehead.

Regarding the situation on the Mius front, it was learned that at noon on 29 August the order to hold out at Taganrog was still in force.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

At 1630 the 6th Army reported that Taganrog was to be abandoned and new positions taken up further west. The forces then surrounded were to fight through across the mainland, but the Army would be glad if the Navy were able to fetch any forces left behind in Taganrog or on the coast.

Own Situation:

A later report was received concerning the torpedoing of the towing vessel "Hainburg": The ship was torpedoed 10 miles north of Sevastopol. The torpedo was probably fired from the seaward side, because the escorting BV 138 shot white stars in that direction and dropped 3 depth charges. The disabled ship was at once towed to the coast by motor minesweeper RM 7; after determining that the ship would remain afloat, course was set for Sevastopol. When the towing rope broke, 2 naval ferry barges took the ship between them and brought her in to Sevastopol. The towing formation put in at 2340. "Hainburg" was beached in the north bay and is now being unloaded there. 80% of the cargo can be salvaged. It is planned to put the ship in dock.

On receipt of the action report from submarine chaser "Xanten" on the submarine engagement which took place at 1930 on 28 August, it was decided that the submarine had been destroyed.

At 1903 a periscope was sighted at a range of 150 meters, while at the same time the submarine chaser made hydrophone contact with the enemy. The periscope remained visible up to a range of 25 meters, when depth charges were dropped. Oil traces were then seen and small pieces of wood and a corpse floated to the surface. The body sank shortly afterwards before it could be recovered. Measurements were very exact because the periscope was visible. Course of attack 265°, approximate course of the submarine 265°. The first depth charge was dropped about 50 meters astern of the submarine. "Xanten"'s speed was 8 knots, speed of the submarine 1 knot. The second charge was dropped about 50 meters from the submarine, the third charge hit the submarine, the fourth charge was dropped about 40 meters astern. Depth setting 35 meters. More wood and oil floated up. A rather large object was visible for a short time on the surface of the water. Locations were very good, observations were exact and confirmed by several of the crew.

CONFIDENTIAL

Generally, the action report of "Xanten" confirmed the report from submarine chaser No. 2303.

At 0047 Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla was requested by radiogram from Simferopol to arrange the return passage from the operation so that the flotilla would be in air grid squares 6560 and 6580 at 0050 heading for the Cape. This would enable the fighter escort which was withdrawn from the towing convoy steamer "Feodosia" to support the 1st E-Boat Flotilla.

At 1357 Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla reported that one of S 26's engines had broken down.

At 0357 the group commander of the naval gunnery lighters reported that by agreement with the Army he was making for the Mius bridge with 2 gunnery lighters to prevent landing operations.

At 0430 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 3 and 4 tied up in Reshok. The vessels had been well camouflaged. The group commander reported that he planned to put out at nightfall to oppose enemy landings in the Mius area as he had agreed with the Army.

At 0500 naval ferry barges F 419, F 445, F 576 and 10 combined operations landing boats put in to Temriuk from patrol duties. Nothing to report.

At 0555 a report, time of origin 0242, was received from Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, in which he said that the return of the "Feodosia" towed convoy to Mariupol was impossible because the naval gunnery lighters could not sail against the rough sea. The convoy was continuing passage to the south. Position air grid square 67485. As communications were held up, Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla did not receive the orders to return until it was too late to carry them out. The 2 escorting naval gunnery lighters and the group of motor minesweepers (RA) will therefore not be available in Mariupol this forenoon. In order to have at least some of the motor minesweepers (RA) available as soon as possible, Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was ordered to add motor minesweeper A 30 and 1 motor minesweeper (RA) to the naval ferry barge formation as it passed from Kerch to Mariupol and to have the "Feodosia" convoy continue with 1 motor minesweeper (RA) and 2 naval gunnery lighters as protection. The fighter escort which was withdrawn for the 1st E-Boat Flotilla was ordered back to the steamer convoy "Feodosia", although the planes were already with the 1st E-Boat

CONFIDENTIAL

Flotilla. They were flying with the convoy again from approximately 0630.

At 0630 I proceeded from Simferopol to Mariupol by air.

At 0728 a radiogram was received from 1st E-Boat Flotilla, reporting an air raid and requesting heavy fighter or fighter escort. Position grid square 6539. The attack had therefore been made immediately after the withdrawal of the fighter escort.

At 0814 another radiogram was received from Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla, stating that the Flotilla would put in to Ivan Baba at 1000 and would require ambulances. Position air grid square 6534.

At 0918 Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla reported on request that all the boats were damaged. As there were wounded men on board, the formation was compelled to put in to Ivan Baba. This meant that the quick transfer of the Flotilla to Mariupol could be carried out as I had planned.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and the Sea of Azov: variable winds, force 1-2, in the afternoon sea wind up to force 5, fair, local thunder showers in the afternoon, visibility 20 miles, morning haze off the coast.

On 24 August the following communication was sent to Corps H.Q., 1st Air Corps, copy to 6th Army H.Q.: "During the night of 20/21 August the coast near Anapa was bombarded by enemy surface forces (destroyers or torpedoboats). The enemy squadron was able to make a surprise attack because it was not intercepted either by daylight or night reconnaissance. If the enemy had attempted a large-scale operation employing strong forces on this night, such as a landing operation on the south Taman coast or the Crimean coast, they would probably have succeeded in reaching the coast without being intercepted.

This fact urged me to apply again for extensive air reconnaissance of the Caucasus coast and examination of enemy ports. Recently too few planes have been operating and then not even every day.

As far as is known here, the poor reconnaissance is due to the lack of suitable planes. We know that a Staffel of Ju 188 has been formed in the area of the 4th Air Corps. As this type of plane is especially suited for reconnaissance of the Caucasus coast, we herewith submit an application to have the Staffel allocated to us."



CONFIDENTIAL

Army Group A referred to the above communication in a report to Army High Command, General Staff of the Army, Operations Division and once again urgently requested the allocation of suitable reconnaissance planes to 1st Air Corps.

1st Air Corps reported that 4th Air Force Command had again been requested to allocate a long-range reconnaissance Staffel of Ju 188 or other reliable planes.

A teletype application made on 15 August had already been rejected.

The Crimea group of the 3rd Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was ordered to carry out the following task by 30 August in preparation for a minelaying operation:

- a. A channel was to be swept in loose formation with Oropesa gear, 30-meter pendant, from point Green 40 on course  $213^{\circ}$  to  $44^{\circ} 40.9' N$ ,  $32^{\circ} 52.5' E$ .
- b. In addition, a channel 600 meters wide was to be swept from  $44^{\circ} 40.9' N$ ,  $32^{\circ} 52.5' E$  to  $44^{\circ} 38.5' N$ ,  $33^{\circ} 05.5' E$ .
- c. From there the minesweepers were to sweep a channel in loose formation on course  $215^{\circ}$  as far as the 300-meter line.
- d. The western part of the enemy declared area off Sevastopol was to be examined west of  $33^{\circ} 10' E$  and north of  $44^{\circ} 35' N$ .
- e. Soundings were to be taken at the same time in the channel between the points in b) and the results reported immediately on entering port.

If any mines should be found, a "Most Immediate" report should be transmitted and the extent of the minefield determined. Thereafter the minesweepers should await further orders. The rate of work should be such that, if there is no mine alarm, the task is completed by the evening of 31 August. The flotilla is to enter Sevastopol on the evening of 30 August and will continue operations on the morning of 31 August, reporting the results on entering port.

At 0945 the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put in to Ivan Baba from operations. According to the action report, they approached in close formation via air grid squares 5544, 6415, 7427, 8463. At 2040 (27 August) the flotilla divided into groups of two and occupied lurking positions off Shakh Valley, Vardana and Uchdere. Up to 0050 no

CONFIDENTIAL

shipping was identified close to the coast. The boats then commenced return passage at 31 knots. From 0151 until 0219 one of S 26's engines was out of order.

At 0420 the flotilla assembled in air grid square 7445 for joint return passage via air grid square 6585 with course set for Cape Takil. From 0610 to 0635 the formation was escorted by 2 or 3 Mo 110. From 0645 to 0735 about 15 enemy fighters continuously attacked the boats in air grid square 3536. Our own defensive fire was accurate, but no planes were seen to crash. From 0700 only 20 knots could be maintained owing to engine trouble aboard several boats.

From 0635 the fighter escort took over the escort of the "Feodosia" towed convoy in the Sea of Azov.

E-boat casualties:

S 51: 1 dead, 3 wounded, 4 cm. gun out of order.  
S 26: 1 2 cm. gun out of order, starboard engine out of order.  
S 52: 1 wounded, 1 2 cm. gun out of order.  
S 72: 4 wounded, cooling water pipe pierced.  
S 49: 1 dead, 2 wounded, 4 cm. gun out of order, 1 engine out of order.  
S 28: 2 seriously wounded, 1 2 cm. gun out of order, 1 engine out of order.  
S 46: splinter damage and fire damage on deck.

The flotilla commander was ordered to try at all costs to make some of the boats operational, if necessary by exchanging spare parts and guns so that some of the boats could leave for Mariupol on the morning of 30 August at the latest.

At 1100 naval gunnery lighter No. 1 and motor minesweeper EM 2 put out from Mariupol to reinforce the 2 gunnery lighters anchored off Roshok.

At 1235 Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was instructed to send the 2 naval gunnery lighters and the 1 motor minesweeper (RA), which were arriving with the towed convoy "Feodosia", back to Mariupol again after quick refuelling. The plan to hold Taganrog at all costs and to supply the town liberally by sea makes it necessary to bring up more shipping and escort forces.

Moreover, if Taganrog cannot be held, the troops can be evacuated by these ships. 12 more naval ferry barges, among them 1 ambulance barge, tugs and lighters, are to be transferred to Mariupol to be at the disposal of Admiral, Black Sea on arrival. If possible, the barges are to be sent

CONFIDENTIAL

out together from Kerch on 29 August so that they will pass the enemy declared area between Berdyansk and Mariupol before nightfall on 30 August. Naval ferry barges which are not ready to put out in time are to be sent out so that they will pass the enemy declared area at daybreak on 31 August. The second ambulance barge, now undergoing dockyard repairs, is to be completed as soon as possible and equipped with medical stores. The orders for transfer will come later.

At 1420 after quick loading, a Taganrog convoy with 1 tug, 1 lighter and 1 motor sailing vessel was sent out from Mariupol.

Despite the abundant shipping available, no large convoy could run owing to lack of cargo.

At 1710, after reporting 4 E-boats ready to leave at 0300 on 30 August, Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla was ordered to transfer all operational boats from Ivan Baba to Mariupol at 0300 on 30 August. Under command of the flotilla commander, the boats are to proceed via route Brown to point 17, then on the prescribed route through Kerch Strait and the Sea of Azov to Mariupol. The enemy declared area was indicated to the flotilla commander. Reserve torpedoes are to be taken on board in Ivan Baba and as much ammunition as possible is to be carried. Work on boats not yet at readiness should be completed as soon as possible.

At 1820 Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus reported that 7 more naval ferry barges (among them 1 ambulance barge) and the towing vessel "Junak", tug "Stralsund" with 2 lighters and motor minesweeper RA 54 were despatched at 1900. The rest of the barges will put out on 30 August as ordered. Naval landing craft Nos. 9 and 11 will be attached to this group.

At 1850 motor minesweepers R 30, RA 52 and the first 6 naval ferry barges put in to Mariupol.

At 1900 Group South was informed by teletype of the measures adopted.

At 1900 3 naval ferry barges and 10 combined operations boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties.

At 1630 while I was visiting 6th Army Headquarters in Stalino, I was told that Taganrog is now to be evacuated immediately and the main line of defense to be withdrawn to the west behind the Mius estuary. Any troops which are already surrounded will fight their way through on the mainland. The Army would be grateful if the Navy could

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION



CONFIDENTIAL

evacuate the troops left behind in Taganrog or on the coast. Our first action was to recall the towed convoy which left at 1420 for Taganrog. The escorting vessels consisting of 2 naval gunnery lighters were instructed to proceed onwards to the east. This group is later to strengthen the 3 naval gunnery lighters already farther east.

Henceforth all supplies to Taganrog will be canceled and if possible Army troops will be evacuated on a very small scale.

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was therefore instructed to leave his last 5 ferry barges in Kerch but to send out the 2 naval gunnery lighters and the motor minesweeper (RA) on 30 August as ordered.

The sailing orders for the 1st E-Boat Flotilla remain in force, but it is no longer intended to send out any further boats when their repairs are completed. This does not alter the order to have the other boats at readiness as quickly as possible.

The towing vessel "Junak", tug "Stralsund" and the lighter which are on passage with the second naval ferry barge group were instructed to put in to Berdyansk.

At 2056 the group of naval gunnery lighters off Roshok reported that, as their radio sets were out of order and the Roshok Radio Station had been evacuated, the group had not received any operational orders. As they were uncertain as to developments, they did not bombard the Mius front independently, since around 1400 they had seen one of the German tank spearheads advancing there. At 1730 naval gunnery lighter No. 1 and motor minesweeper RM 2 joined the group. The group then requested to be brought up to date with events and was informed that Group Recknagel had urgently requested support near the Mackenson bridge across the Mius River where there had been an attack. As this request had been received by radio only, it had been assumed that the naval gunnery lighters had also heard it.

The group was then ordered to advance as far as Taganrog to attempt to penetrate the harbor to take off any Army troops there. Under the leadership of Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla, motor minesweepers R 30, RA 54 and 5 naval ferry barges put out from Mariupol for Taganrog. This would ensure adequate shipping space there and the group would also increase the fighting force of the formation as a whole.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

There were thus 5 independent groups (2 groups of naval gunnery lighters and 1 naval ferry barge group) proceeding to Taganrog. All the groups were informed of the situation and as all three were proceeding eastwards and had left at different times, they were not expected to meet during the night.

Army Group South and 6th Army Headquarters were informed by teletype. At the same time fighter escort was requested for the formation from dawn-break as far as Taganrog. The request was sent to the 6th Army Headquarters because this command informed Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine some days ago that requests for fighter escorts for convoys could be sent to them; they would then add these requests to their own for the Army front and arrange the allocation with the Air Force.

(Confirmation of the allocation of fighter escort was given during the night after an inquiry from Deputy Chief of Staff, 6th Army Headquarters.)

After a telephone inquiry from Army Group South and personal discussions at 6th Army Headquarters concerning the employment of E-boats, the following note was added to confirm previous information:

E-boats are not at all suitable for employment in Taganrog Bay. In view of the shallow water, their superior speed cannot be utilized, torpedo operations are impossible and their armament is inferior to the enemy's.

#### U-boat Situation:

At 1015 Italian midcet submarines CB 2 and CB 3 put out from Valta for further anti-submarine operations south of Sarich. The boats were instructed to leave for anti-submarine operations in the area between Cape Tarkan and Cape Lukull on the morning of 30 August.

A chance gap in the convoy traffic until the morning of 1 September will be used for this purpose.

As the CB-Flotilla has only enough operators to man one radio station at a time, either at Valta or Sevastopol, the operation of CB 2 and CB 6 south of Sarich is to be broken off one day earlier; at any rate anti-submarine operations in the northern area seem more important. Manning of the Italian radio station by German personnel is being investigated.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

At 2226 U 18 reported by radio the sinking of a Q-ship of 800 tons. She was sunk at 2151 in air grid square 03634 after 12 hours of pursuit. Only 1 single torpedo was fired. U 18 was given the area off Sukhum and Ochemchiri as her new attack area. U 23 was operating freely between Tuapse and Sochi. At 2225 the 4 minesweepers of the 3rd Motor Minesweeping Flotilla, which were operating in the Sevastopol area, were informed of the operational plans of the Italian submarines and forbidden to attack submarines.

Minesweeping Activity:

Submarine chasers Nos. 2301 and 2305 sank 2 drifting mines by rifle fire 45 miles north of the Bosphorus. At Kerch 5 motor minesweepers (2 RA and 3 FR) acted as anti-mine escort for the Anapa convoy. No mines swept. Groups with skid gear and towed loop gear and minesweeping planes searched for ground mines in Kerch Strait and off the northern and southern entrances. No mines swept.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: Nothing to report.
- b. Anapa convoy: Convoy No. 177 ran with 7 naval ferry barges and anti-mine escort. Owing to lack of cargo, no further convoys were planned.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk transports: Convoy No. 70 ran with 5 naval ferry barges. At 1700 convoy No. 71 put out from Kerch with 3 naval ferry barges and anchored off Vasovka Bay.
- d. Gonichesk-Temriuk: Convoy No. 59 ran with 1 towing vessel, 1 lighter and 3 naval ferry barges. At 1620 3 naval ferry barges put out from Gonichesk for Kerch. They will be at the disposal of Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus.
- e. Sea of Azov: The Mariupol-Taganrog convoy put out from Mariupol at 1420 with 1 tug, 1 lighter, 1 motor sailing vessel, 2 naval gunnery lighters and motor minesweeper RM 3. It was recalled in view of the enemy situation and put in to Mariupol again at 2305. For special convoys ordered by Admiral, Black Sea, see above.
- f. Crimea convoys and convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.



CONFIDENTIAL

30 August, 1945

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

From 2130 (29 August) to 0400, the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk sighted 5 vessels off landing area B. The landing points were shelled although invisible under an artificial smoke screen. At 1100 1 minesweeper put out from Ghelenjik. A rubber dinghy which had penetrated into the inner harbor around 2100 (29 August) was shelled from both pierheads. At 2300 1 rubber dinghy and a Russian Lieutenant were brought in. In that action 2 men were slightly wounded. The body of a Russian soldier in a German uniform was recovered from the rubber dinghy sunk on 25 August.

Daylight reconnaissance of the Black Sea sighted nothing except neutral shipping off the Turkish coast. Slight patrol activity off Ghelenjik. No important changes in the number of ships in port were observed. The ports on the Caucasus coast were not examined.

Lively activity of motor gunboats and small vessels was observed in the Sea of Azov off Yeisk.

Main Naval D/F Station, Eupatoria reported radio traffic generally slight. No large surface vessels were identified at sea. Slight activity of patrol vessels and other small vessels. Submarines detected: 1 in the Sevastopol area and 1 in an unidentified position.

No important actions were reported from the Kuban bridgehead. According to statements of the Russian Lieutenant who was taken prisoner yesterday evening in Novorossisk harbor, the enemy is planning a landing operation in the harbor of Novorossisk and at the Oscreika estuary. Airborne troops from the Gaiduk area will take part.

During the night of 29/30 August, Taganrog was evacuated and the frontline withdrawn westwards. There is no exact information on the extent of the front and its actual position. 6th Army Headquarters believe they can form and hold a new frontline behind the Mius River, but point out that Mariupol is now closer to the front and therefore surprise attacks are not out of the question.

As far as can be seen, Navy personnel and material could be brought back from Taganrog without great losses.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

Own Situation:

The following measures were taken on receipt of a report of an imminent enemy landing in Novorossisk: Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk was reinforced from Anapa. The Army strengthened their defense forces in the harbor by 1 battalion and assumed operational command for this operation.

The Army Group has requested further minelaying in the inner harbor.

Since only TMB mines can be considered for this operation and they are not released for this purpose, the Air Force is to provide LMB mines which are to be laid by the Navy with the help of engineers. Some time ago the Army Headquarters had applied via Group South for the release of TMB mines for minelaying in Novorossisk harbor. Personnel of the Mines Section of Admiral, Black Sea will be sent from Kerch to Novorossisk on 31 August.

At 0130 the enemy landed small forces by motor gunboats 30 km. east of Mariupol. The squadron of naval ferry barges under the command of Commander, 50th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was in position nearby, but, as the situation on the mainland was not at all clear and it was very dark, the squadron was not detailed for operations because a bombardment of the coast would have a 50% chance of harming our own troops. Moreover, it was much more urgent for the formation to reach Taganrog and in any case according to our information on the Russian shipping it could only be a small-scale operation. With the sole aim of informing the formations at sea, the landing operation was announced by radio. After a counter-attack on land, the enemy withdrew by sea at 0500, taking some prisoners.

At 0150 the commander of the group of naval gunnery lighters in the patrol line, who had been ordered to put in to Taganrog although we had evacuated it, reported that he expected the enemy's artillery and planes to destroy the entire formation.

The situation at Taganrog is still uncertain. It is not out of the question that some remnants of our own troops are still there and every effort must be made to evacuate them. As we have not planned any minelaying after the evacuation, but merely intend to block the harbor with an old steamer, there is no danger of this kind threatening the squadron. The vessels only have to withdraw before the harbor is blocked. They were all therefore again ordered

CONFIDENTIAL

at 0230 to attempt to reach Taganrog. Fighter escort has been promised from daybreak onwards.

At 0300 4 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put out from Mariupol.

At 0310 a radiogram was transmitted to the naval gunnery lighters in the Gulf of Taganrog to look out for Army detachments along the coast and to pick them up. (Before sailing, Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was informed verbally.)

At 0445 motor minesweeper R 30 reported enemy vessels coming at high speed from the direction of Yeisk: they were in air grid square 88856.

At 0515 motor minesweeper RA 56, naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 put out from Kerch for Mariupol.

At 0532 motor minesweeper R 30 reported an attack by 7 enemy planes in air grid square 88850; fighter protection was requested.

At 0552 naval gunnery lighter No. 1 urgently requested more fighters.

At 0655 she reported that she had sunk 2 out of 6 attacking enemy gunboats. Position 5 miles southwest of Taganrog.

At 0640 another attack was made on the squadron by ground-attack planes in air grid square 88863.

At 0734 Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla on board R 30 was ordered to assume complete command on meeting the other formations.

At 0750 the group commander of the naval gunnery lighters reported by radio that Taganrog had been evacuated and that the landing craft group was leaving the harbor to attempt to make contact with the Army along the northern shore.

At 0820 Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla reported that he was off Taganrog and had assumed command. The fighter escort had not yet appeared.

At 0833 Commander, 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla was again ordered to report on the situation in Taganrog. (At this time the radio message of 0750 from the commander of the naval gunnery lighters had not yet been deciphered.)

At 0854 (after discussion with 6th Army Headquarters) another order followed saying that, if no particular danger were involved, volunteer civilians from Taganrog were to be taken on board.



CONFIDENTIAL

At 0900 a report from the group of naval gunnery lighters was received. It stated that there were no more German soldiers in the port of Taganrog and that no enemy forces had been sighted.

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: variable winds, force 2-3, sea wind in the afternoon, clouds increasing, local thunder squalls, visibility 15 miles, morning mist.

It was reported to Group South that plans had been made to lay a new meteorological buoy in the near future. The operation will be carried out by 1st E-Boat Flotilla. For meteorological reasons, the buoy is to be laid in almost the same position as the first one. After our experience with the first buoy, this second one will be tactically exploited as a decoy. As meteorological conditions make it necessary to place the buoy far from the coast, it cannot prejudice operations by Italian midget submarines. The buoy will be laid about one day before U 23 returns to Theodosia from the operational area, so that, after refuelling, she can take up a lurking position by the buoy from about the second to sixth day after it is laid. The duration of the first buoy's transmission amounted to 4 days.

At 0947, from the Gulf of Taganrog, motor mine-sweeper R 30 reported one man seriously wounded in an air raid and requested a doctor. Application was made for a sea rescue plane which 1st Air Corps promised to send. The application was made although there is a doctor with the naval gunnery lighters, so that the seriously wounded man could be transported more quickly.

At 1058 1 engine broke down aboard naval gunnery lighter No. 2. Reinforced fighter escort was urgently needed as ammunition stocks were dwindling.

The fighters had not arrived by daybreak and it was not until 0730 after repeated urgent requests that 2 planes were allocated. It then became evident that the fighter escort of two planes which did not arrive until 0800 was inadequate. The application for fighter escort had been communicated through and confirmed by 6th Army Headquarters, but had not been received by the relevant Air Force divisions. Then, when the fighters were already being used for other purposes, it was very difficult for the Air Force to re-direct them. Nevertheless every effort

CONFIDENTIAL

was made and in the end led to success.  
(Compare with 1307.)

At 1011 the commander of the group of naval gunnery lighters reported that 7 prisoners had been taken aboard from the 2 gunboats sunk.

At 1120 motor minesweeper R 30 reported that at 0931 the formation was already in air grid square 8855. Once more it would be dangerous to enter port in view of enemy gunfire and bombing. According to a report from the group of naval gunnery lighters, the people at the harbor were nearly all women and no soldiers had been seen on the coast. (This report was made in answer to the order which was transmitted here at 0833. Passing of the messages had been slow.)

At 1134 motor minesweeper R 30 reported another attack by numerous planes. One of her engines had broken down. 2 fighters are insufficient as escorts.

The raid was made about 1000. After receiving another report from R 30, according to which the sea rescue plane was no longer needed, the plane which had already taken off was recalled to Mariupol.

At 1300 4 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla put in to Mariupol.

At 1307 motor minesweeper R 30 was informed that 3 Me 110 were en route for the formation.

At 1422 another attack was made by 8 planes flying low and using machine-guns. It took place 5 miles south of Budenovka while the formation was on return passage. Our increased fighter escort was in position.

At 1830 the naval gunnery lighters Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, motor minesweeper R 30 and RA 52 and 5 naval ferry barges put in to Mariupol from an easterly direction. The air raids damaged several boats. Some repairs would be made at Mariupol, but all the boats were ready to proceed. Casualties: 3 dead, several men wounded.

At 1515, after previous instructions on the situation to the commanders of both the naval ferry barge groups which have arrived in the meantime, the following orders were issued: The first group of 4 naval ferry barges is to put out at 1530 to occupy a patrol line off the northern part of the Azov coast between 38° 10' E and 38° 30' E. The second group of 4 naval ferry barges is to put out at 1900 to occupy a patrol

CONFIDENTIAL

line off the northern part of the Azov coast between 37° 50' E and 38° 05' E. Both groups will remain some 500 meters from the coast depending on the depth of water.

At 0330 Group 1 is to commence return passage to Mariupol, Group 2 at 0400. The boats are to stand on and off in pairs in the patrol line according to the directions of the group commander. 4th Air Corps has been requested to provide fighter escort for the returning Group 1 from 0330. Commander, 1st E-Boat Flotilla has been instructed to occupy a lurking position in the Gulf of Taganrog west of 28° 20' E and south of 46° 55' N during the night of 30/31 August. Assignment: To attack and destroy enemy motor gunboats and any other targets e.g. landing boats. The boats will sail at 1830, and leave the operational area at 0330 on 31 August for return passage to Mariupol. 4th Air Corps has been informed, also 6th Army Headquarters.

At 1835 the steamer "Thisbe" was torpedoed and sunk by a submarine in air grid square 9257 2.5 miles north of the entrance to the Bosphorus. She was hit by 2 torpedoes. The escorting motor minesweepers rescued 27 survivors and 7 seriously wounded men and set course for Burgas to deliver the wounded. The 2 Rumanian destroyers and 2 submarine chasers which were employed as escorts pursued the submarine unsuccessfully with depth charges. A few minutes after the depth charges were dropped, the Rumanian destroyer "Maria" was attacked by a torpedo which passed astern. At 1850 the destroyers commenced return passage. The submarine chasers remained at the place of sinking with orders to carry out anti-submarine patrol until daybreak.

The exact position of the place of sinking is 41° 22.2' N, 29° 08.3' E.

No further details have been received up to now.

3 naval ferry barges and combined operations boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties. 3 naval ferry barges are lying in the roads at operational readiness.

At 1730 4 naval ferry barges put out from Mariupol for patrol duties.

At 1830 4 E-boats put out from Mariupol.

At 1910 4 naval ferry barges put out from Mariupol for patrol duties.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 3 -

182



CONFIDENTIAL

At 2000 naval ferry barge F 492 (first naval ferry barge group) reported an engagement with 5 gunboats. At 2040 she reported 5 enemy boats. No further reports so far. The sound of guns could no longer be heard and the flashes which could be seen from my Battle H.Q. were no longer visible.

U-boat Situation:

At 0645 Italian submarines CB 1 and 4 put out from Sevastopol for anti-submarine operations between Cape Lukull and Cape Tarkan. At 1315 CB 2 and 6 put in to Sevastopol from anti-submarine operations south of Cape Sarich. No sightings. CB 3 is to be ready to operate on the morning of 31 August. At 0500 U 19 put out for Constantza for transfer to Galatz for routine dockyard repairs. She was escorted by 1 motor minesweeper.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

No attacks on convoys or naval forces in the Black Sea. Novorossisk was shelled by artillery. At 1135 a direct hit was scored on a pill-box in the southern sector; 1 man dead, 1 missing, 7 men wounded. At 1430 shells hit No. 17 quarters. No casualties.

Minesweeping Activity:

Sevastopol: The Crimea group continued mine-sweeping duties according to plan. No mines swept. Minesweeping planes swept route Red for ground mines from point 15 to point Z. No mines swept. The Temriuk harbor defense flotilla swept the area from point 213 to the Peresyp estuary for moored mines.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. No Anapa convoys ran owing to lack of fuel.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: At 0900 convoy No. 71 put in to Temriuk with 3 naval ferry barges.
- d. Genichesk-Temriuk: At 0820 3 naval ferry barges put in to Kerch to be at the disposal of Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus.
- e. Sea of Azov: At 1100 towing vessel "Junak", tug "Stralsund", 2 lighters and motor mine-sweeper RA 54 put in to Berdyansk. The special convoys were reported above.

CONFIDENTIAL

- f. Crimea convoys ran according to plan. For torpedoing of the steamer "Thisbe", see above. Nothing to report on the other convoys in the western Black Sea.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 92 -

184

31 August, 1945

Simferopol

Enemy Situation:

From 2150 (30 August) to 0045 the observation post of Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk reported 6 vessels off landing area A and 10 vessels off landing area B. The vessels put up an artificial smoke screen, but nevertheless were shelled.

Daylight reconnaissance produced no reports of the enemy. In the afternoon 3 motor minesweepers were observed in the area south of Ghelenjik, course southeast. 1 freighter of 2,000 tons was observed off the Turkish coast 10 miles northeast of Inebonu, course east. In view of the prisoner's statements yesterday, the area between Ghelenjik and Novorossisk and the harbor of Ghelenjik were closely examined. No important changes in the numbers of ships lying in port, no striking traffic.

Reconnaissance in the Sea of Azov as far as Yeisk produced no new information.

It is a pity that reconnaissance reports from the southern part of the coast of the Gulf of Taganrog either do not come in or are very sparse. 1st Air Corps only reconnoitered as far as Yeisk, while the area and the coast east of Yeisk were the responsibility of the 4th Air Corps. A request was made for additional reconnaissance covering the south coast of the Gulf of Taganrog to provide a basis for naval operations in this area.

Reconnaissance during the night of 31 August/1 September in the area southeast of the Crimea and in the triangle Cape Sarich - Cape Idokopas - Cape Tahir obtained no locations although the set was in good working order.

According to radio traffic, 1 torpedoboat was detected in the northeastern Black Sea as far as the Kerch Peninsula area, 1 small vessel, probably a submarine chaser, in the southeastern Black Sea; in the evening 1 destroyer, another torpedoboat and 2 M.T.B.s at sea in unidentified positions, presumably off the east coast of the central to southern Black Sea. Slight activity of small vessels off the east coast. Submarines detected: 2 in the northwestern Black Sea, 2 in the eastern Black Sea and 4 in unidentified positions. All the submarines in the southwestern Black Sea were detected receiving dummy



CONFIDENTIAL

procedure from the submarine command; no hearings could be taken. No important actions were reported from the Kuban bridgehead.

Regarding the situation on the southern front, it was rumored that the enemy had penetrated west of the old frontline near Kuibyshevo with tank formations and advanced as far as Ilovaisk. From there, the enemy had turned south as far as Pokorovo Kireyevka, where they were stopped. This enemy advance to the south led to the evacuation of Taganrog and withdrawal of the front behind the Mius River. No distinct frontline has yet developed. On the Azov coast the enemy advanced up to Wesselo, about 8 km. west of the Mius estuary. East of Ilovaisk our tanks are attacking in a southerly direction and south of there towards the east.

Own Situation:

From 2100 (30 August) Novorossisk ordered 2nd degree of alarm.

At 0000 naval gunnery lighters Nos. 8 and 11 and motor minesweeper RA 56 put in to Mariupol from Kerch.

At 0320 naval ferry barge F 304 reported from the western Black Sea that she was proceeding with motor minesweeper R 163 to Varna instead of Burgas because the seriously wounded man had died. Both vessels are returning from the Bosphorus with survivors and wounded men from the torpedoed steamer "Thisbe".

At 0500 the patrol forces put in to Temriuk. Nothing to report.

At 0545 4 E-boats and 3 naval ferry barges put in to Mariupol from the patrol line east of Mariupol.

From 2120 the 1st E-Boat Flotilla was in patrol line and at 0135 sighted a small silhouette to the west. It was identified as hostile. The flotilla assembled in line ahead and hauled via cast to north, shelling the enemy vessel in several runs-in at ranges of 500 to 900 meters from 0203 until 0240. The vessel was recognized as a gunboat with 4.5 cm. guns. At 0545 she sank in air grid square 87175 after being damaged by the first burst of fire, so that her defenses were restricted. No survivors were found at the place of sinking. At 0330 the flotilla commenced return passage.

No German casualties, two 2 cm. guns out of order after a barrel premature, one 4 cm. gun out of order.

CONFIDENTIAL

Nothing important was reported from the group of naval ferry barges except one short engagement. (See War Diary 30 August.)

At 0605 suspected minelaying planes were reported from 0300 until 0400 between Kys Aul and Cape Takil over the fixed route.

Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was instructed to have the route investigated by 1 motor mine-sweeper (RA) and motor minesweepers (FR).

Weather forecast (Simferopol 0930): Eupatoria - Novorossisk and Sea of Azov: Slight, variable winds, sea wind in the afternoon, overcast, local thunder squalls, visibility 20 miles, morning mist.

It was reported to Group South that 1st Air Corps had made 32 LMB mines available for the urgent minelaying in Novorossisk harbor. They will be laid by naval specialists during the next few nights. (See also War Diary of 30 August.)

Commander, 11th Naval Communications Unit reported by telephone that the naval exchange had been instructed to dismantle the telephone and teletype exchange. The orders were given by the Naval Port Commander who was withdrawing from Novorossisk as the Army had assumed command.

He was instructed that the dismantling of the exchange was not to take place. Naval Shore Commander, Caucasus was immediately directed to have Naval Port Commander, Novorossisk remain in Novorossisk at all costs. He had already been instructed by teletype on 30 August to remain there as Naval Port Commander. At the same time it was pointed out that the subordination to the Army referred only to the troops and to participation in the defense of the port, not to his duties as Naval Port Commander.

1st Air Corps reported that today they were planning to attack shipping targets in the Sea of Azov in air grid squares 7750, 7760, 7770, 7780 and 7610, 7620, 7630 and 7640. The Air Force simultaneously requested us to ensure that our own vessels bore markings for recognition. For information on the air situation in the Black Sea, Army Group A forwarded an excerpt from the action report of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla on 29 August, 1943 to Army High Command, General Staff of the Army, Operations Division and emphasized that this was not an isolated case.

As already mentioned in the War Diary of 30 August, according to prisoners' statements, enemy landing operations on the coast west of the

CONFIDENTIAL

Myshako beachhead are to be expected at any time.

The 11th E-Boat Flotilla was therefore ordered to occupy a patrol line between Cape Utrich Nok and the Osereika valley during the night of 31 August/1 September. All available boats were to operate. Distance from the coast about 3 miles, boats to stand on and off at slight speed. The approach is to be made via route Brown as far as off Anapa, then at a distance of 3 miles from the coast into the patrol line as ordered. They should reach Anapa at about 2000, returning to Theodosia 1 hour before daybreak via the approach route. If any enemy forces are encountered, the boats should attack and transmit a "Most Immediate" report. The Naval Shore Commanders and the Naval Liaison Officer to 17th Army H.Q. will ensure that coastal authorities are informed. From 1800 Naval Communications Officer, Anapa will tune to the E-boat frequency. He will repeat the E-boat "Most Immediate" reports and transmit enemy sighting reports and radar reports immediately on the E-boat frequency.

In addition to the 1st E-Boat Flotilla and the 3rd Naval Gunnery Lighter Flotilla, naval forces in the Gulf of Taganrog will be formed up in operational groups: 3 operational groups, each comprising 4 naval ferry barges and 1 motor mine-sweeper operational group of 1 motor minesweeper and 4 motor minesweepers (RA). They have received the following orders for the night of 31 August/1 September:

1. The 1st E-Boat Flotilla will repeat last night's operation in the same operational area. Leaving Mariupol at 1830, entering at 0530 on 1 September at the latest. The 1st E-Boat Flotilla will put out at 0600 for Ivan Baba.
2. The first naval ferry barge operational group of 4 barges will again occupy the patrol line east of Krivaya Kossa as ordered last night. Leaving Mariupol at 1445, commencing return passage at 0330.
3. The second naval ferry barge operational group of 4 barges will again occupy the patrol line west of Krivaya Kossa as ordered for last night. Leaving at 1815, commencing return passage at 0400.
4. The 3rd Naval Gunnery Lighter Flotilla will occupy the patrol line off the coast between Mariupol and Kossa Byelosaraika between the meridians 37° 15' E and 37° 25' E, distance from the coast 1-2 miles. Leaving Mariupol



at 1900, entering port at 0400 on 1 September. The squadron will sail in patrol line in close formation. Fighter escort has been requested from 4th Air Corps, who have also been asked to forgo air attacks on any armed vessels in the Gulf of Taganrog west of 38° 20' E between 1830 on 31 August and 0530 on 1 September.

The third naval ferry barge operational group of 4 barges will have a night's rest.

The motor minesweeper operational group (of the 30th Motor Minesweeper Flotilla), comprising R 50 and 4 motor minesweepers (RA) has been ordered to investigate a Russian mined area which, according to prisoners' statements on 1 September, is to be found south of Kossa Byelosaraika. Leaving Mariupol at 0600 on 1 September, entering port again at 1900 on 1 September. No fighter escort. In the event of air raids, it is left to the group commanders to decide to break off the operation.

At 1545 the first naval ferry barge operational group put out from Mariupol in an easterly direction to the patrol line as ordered.

At 1740 3 boats of the 11th E-Boat Flotilla put out from Theodosia for operations.

At 1830 4 E-boats and the second naval ferry barge operational group put out from Mariupol for the patrol line as ordered.

At 1855 Temriuk was raided by 6 enemy planes. Bombs were dropped around and in the harbor, no damage, 2 planes thought to be shot down. During the raid, naval ferry barge F 419 ran aground off the harbor entrance and is reported to be unserviceable.

At 1945 the Naval Liaison Officer to Army High Command inquired whether supply transports could be run from Berdyansk to Mariupol. It was confirmed that this was possible with the ships now available. The difficulty would be the low capacity for loading at the small port of Berdyansk. The Naval Liaison Officer asked for information in case the demands of 17th Army H.Q. and those of Army Group South were too extensive for the total amount of shipping. In that case he would ask for the decision of the Quartermaster General on General Staff. At our request, Army Group South reported that the group was asking for the allocation of tugs and lighters, hitherto employed as transports to Taganrog, for supply and evacuation duties between Mariupol and Berdyansk. Daily turnover

CONFIDENTIAL

from ship to railroad 600-800 tons. Increase in loading facilities would be necessary as only one 3-ton crane is available in Berdyansk. 6th Army H.Q. has a loading staff in Berdyansk.

At 1920 the group of 3 naval gunnery lighters put out as ordered from Mariupol in a westerly direction for the patrol line.

At 1930 2 naval ferry barges and 6 combined operations boats put out from Temriuk for patrol duties.

At 2206 a Crimea convoy from Sevastopol to Theodosia was diverted to Yalta because of a report from the Main Naval D/F Station to the effect that a torpedoboat was proceeding in the northwestern Black Sea as far as the Kerch Peninsula area.

U-boat Situation:

In view of the known enemy plans for landing in Novorossisk and because patrols had observed that the enemy convoys were running close to the coast, new attack areas were ordered:

U 23 between Gholenjik and Tuapse, U 18 between Tuapse and Sochi and U 9 between Gagri and Sukhum. U 9 was ordered to lay an EMS mine with time setting for 2 days in air grid square 12732. Italian midget submarine CB 3 reported readiness on 31 August and was instructed to leave at 0700 on 1 September for anti-submarine operations in the Tarkan area. At 2020 U 23 reported her plan to return on 1 September to refuel at Theodosia. At 2149 U 18 reported that she was engaged by a submarine chaser in air grid square 13331 at 1932 on 30 August. The enemy vessel turned off making smoke. Sinking not observed owing to searchlight activity. At the same time the tonnage of the Q-ship which was sunk on 29 August was announced as 800 tons.

At 2200 CB 4 reported that she was returning early because an engineer was seriously ill.

Enemy Air and Shore Battery Activity:

Novorossisk reported the usual artillery and mortar fire. At 2355 (30 August) 1 enemy plane raided Mariupol with 4 bombs, at 0610 1 enemy plane dropped 2 bombs on the port area. For air raid on Temriuk, see above. No attacks on convoys or naval forces during the day.

Minesweeping Activity:

Danube: Minesweeping planes swept the area between Kilometers 477 and 497 for ground mines. No mines swept.

Sevastopol: 6 mines were swept by the Crimea group while continuing minesweeping west of Sevastopol.

Kerch: Groups with skid gear and towed loop gear and minesweeping planes searched for ground mines in Kerch Strait and on route Red from point Z to point 220. No mines swept. Searches for moored mines from Kys Aul up to Cape Takil on route Brown yielded no results.

Supply Traffic:

- a. Kerch Strait: According to plan.
- b. Anapa convoys: No convoys ran owing to lack of cargo.
- c. Kerch-Temriuk: Convoy No. 71 ran with 1 tug, 2 lighters, 1 motor sailing vessel and 3 naval ferry barges.
- d. The Genichesk-Temriuk convoys did not run owing to lack of cargo. Next sailing date is not yet certain.
- e. Sea of Azov: No convoys ran.
- f. The Sevastopol-Theodosia convoy put in to Yalta because of the enemy situation. Convoys in the western Black Sea ran according to plan.



CONFIDENTIAL

Monthly Review August 1943

A. Tonnage sunk:

1. By U-boats: -
2. By E-boats: 2,000 tons (3 coastal vessels).

B. Enemy forces sunk:

1. 6 motor gunboats (4 by naval gunnery lighters,  
2 by E-boats).
2. 1 M.T.B. (by E-boats).
3. 1 Q-ship of 800 tons (by U-boats).
4. 1 patrol vessel of 150 tons (by U-boat).
5. 1 tug of 10 tons with two-man landing boats  
(by U-boat).
6. 1 submarine of 800 tons (by an Italian midget  
submarine).

C. Planes shot down by naval forces: 3.

D. Enemy air raids:

1. On naval vessels and convoys: 34.
2. On ports in the Crimea: 3.
3. On ports and loading places  
at the Kuban bridgehead and  
on the Sea of Azov: 19.

E. Enemy submarine attacks: 8.

F. Convoys escorted: Naval forces protected the  
following vessels in August: Western Black Sea  
convoys and Crimea convoys:

157 vessels: 107,070 tons.

G. Supplies to the Kuban bridgehead:

1. Kerch Strait (Navy's tonnage in brackets): ... (31,582 tons)	64,079 tons
2. Ropeway service: .....	9,645 tons
3. Kerch-Temriuk: .....	12,748 tons
4. Genichesk-Temriuk: .....	9,279 tons
5. Kerch-Anapa: .....	9,781 tons
6. Theodosia-Paman: .....	5,397 tons
7. Sevastopol-Kerch: .....	2,282 tons
8. Wood supplies: .....	1,399 tons
Total	114,610 tons

Tonnage carried by the Navy ..... 72,468 tons

Thus 40,390 tons of the total amount of supplies,  
requested as 155,000 tons, were not shipped. (For  
reasons, see review on the situation concerning

CONFIDENTIAL

transportation in August.) The following material was also transported in Kerch Strait from west to east (Navy's tonnage in brackets):

Soldiers, voluntary assistants and civilians: .....	75,817	(1,498)
Motor vehicles: .....	4,466	(6)
Horse-drawn vehicles: .....	1,926	(175)
Guns: .....	146	(7)
Tanks: .....	6	(3)
Horses: .....	6,591	(472)
Cattle: .....	2,869	(2,869)

Supplies for the Mius front: 11,497 tons.

Transportation Situation in August 1943:

1. With the loss of the steamers "Boy Feddersen" and "Varna", there was a further drop in the tonnage carried to the Crimea and the Ukraine.
2. Transportation requirements for the Kuban bridgehead were not fulfilled because the amount of incoming goods to the ports of transshipment was too low during the second half of the month. Moreover, in the first half of the month, there were not enough trucks available in the ports of discharge for the temporarily high amount of incoming goods. There was enough shipping for the requested transportation of 5,000 tons daily.
3. The efficiency of the Mariupol-Taganrog transportation was essentially increased in the course of the month until the evacuation of Taganrog: 11,500 tons. As the evacuation of Taganrog was ordered at very short notice, 2 lighters and 6 transport cutters remained there. According to a report from the Sea Transport Officer at Mariupol they have been destroyed in enemy counter-actions. In the evacuation the lack of a Sea Transport Office was very disadvantageous. The Naval Port Commander had been seriously wounded. The Naval Harbor Master was busy with other assignments.
4. The Main Sea Transport Office at Nikolaiev reported that the rate of discharge is very slow in the ports of Nikolaiev and Kherson because of lack of manpower. For instance, the lighter "Braila" has not even unloaded 350 tons within 12 days. For most of the time the lighter was lying idle in port.

Enemy assignments, operations etc. of the 3rd Naval Gunnery Lighter Flotilla from the beginning of May up to the end of August 1943:

In addition to continuous patrol duties for coastal defense, the following operations have been carried out:

CONFIDENTIAL

15 bombardments of the coast  
1 minelaying operation.

Approximately 40 escort assignments from Mariupol to Taganrog and back for 30,000 tons of supplies. In these operations the flotilla scored the following successes:

3 planes shot down  
6 gunboats sunk  
5 gunboats damaged  
11 prisoners taken.

German casualties:

10 soldiers killed in action  
35 soldiers wounded.

Damage to the naval gunnery lighters by enemy counter-actions was not important. All repairs carried out on board.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 102 -

194



APPENDIX I

Admiral, Black Sea.

28 August, 1943.

Serial No. Gkdos. Chefs. 184/43 A I

Most Secret

To:

1st E-Boat Flotilla, Ivan Baba.

Copy to Naval Group South, Sofia.

A. Situation:

The enemy is continuously transporting supplies in medium steamers and tankers up to 3,000 tons from the southeastern Caucasus ports to Tuapse, where the goods are transshipped to smaller vessels for further transportation to Ghelenjik and the beachhead. The enemy has organized supply transportation to Tuapse so that the steamers will pass the zone endangered by E-boats during the day. The traffic cannot therefore be stopped by E-boat operations at night. Minelaying in the approach fairway to Tuapse as near as possible to the harbor entrance would ensure at least one success, because up to now air reconnaissance has not observed any systematic minesweeping of the routes.

B. Orders:

1. Mines are to be laid in the area between the connecting lines of the following points:  

From	44°	4.0'	N,	39°	3.4'	E
to	44°	4.0'	N,	39°	4.5'	E
to	44°	3.7'	N,	39°	4.5'	E
to	44°	3.7'	N,	39°	3.4'	E.
2. Mines required: From 29 August 42 FMC mines will be available for embarkation.
3. Mine-carriers: 7 boats of the 1st E-Boat Flotilla.
4. Depth setting minus 2 meters.
5. Minelaying should be carried out unobserved by the enemy.
6. As far as possible minelaying should be carried out in the area in B) 1. Deviations of up to 1 mile may be allowed to the south only, so that the approach course (with the navigational light in line) crosses the center of the mined area.

CONFIDENTIAL

7. Enemy patrol forces are to be evaded while approaching the area.

C. Execution:

1. On X-day the mines should be taken on board in Theodosia on receipt of the dated codeword "Tannenberg".
2. On X-day the boats will leave Theodosia so that they will be in approximately 44° 3' N at 2300 in line abreast, ready to lay the mines.  
(See enclosed drawing).
3. After carrying out the operation, the flotilla will withdraw from the coast at slight speed and will then return to Ivan Baba at some distance from the coast.
4. Enemy forces met on return passage are to be attacked.

- D. After entering port, execution of the minelaying operation should be reported by teletype and then a report in writing made as per S.A. II, Volume g) fig. II.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX II

Admiral, Black Sea.

28 August, 1943.

Serial No. Gkdos. Chiefs. 185/43 A I

Most Secret

To:

Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine, Mariupol.

Commander, 3rd Naval Gunnery Lighter Flotilla, Mariupol.

Copy to Naval Group South, Sofia.

Subject: Minelaying between Azov and Yeisk.

A. Situation:

Reliable statements by prisoners confirmed that enemy forces are continuously increasing in the Sea of Azov. In addition to Akhtari, Yeisk and Azov are also main bases for their flotillas which consist mainly of 2 types of armored motor gunboats. With these boats, the enemy is making thrusts along the north coast of Taganrog Bay nearly every night to shell the coast and lay mines. These operations could be prevented and the enemy weakened by the laying of mines in the approach routes. In view of the shallow water, only ground mines could be used. With water 5 meters deep, they would also be effective against small iron vessels (motor gunboats).

B. Orders:

1. On receipt of the dated codeword "Aussen-Jade", mines should be laid in the area between the lines connecting the following points:

From 47° 3.2' N, 38° 49.5' E  
to 47° 3.2' N, 38° 51.0' E  
to 47° 2.2' N, 38° 51.0' E  
to 47° 2.2' N, 38° 49.5' E.

2. Mine-carrier: 1 naval gunnery lighter.
3. Escorting vessels: 1 naval gunnery lighter and 2 motor minesweepers (RM).
4. Mines required:  
12 LMB (S) mines, 6 with firing unit M-1,  
6 with firing unit MA-1.  
Clockwork setting switch II a = 3 hours  
LMB-type mines with MA-1 firing unit should be set for first contact, so that the mine explodes as the first ship passes over it.

CONFIDENTIAL  
SECURITY INFORMATION

- 105 -

197



CONFIDENTIAL

5. LMB (S) type mines with M-1 or MA-1 should be laid irregularly.
6. Distance between individual mines must be at least 200 meters.
7. Minelaying should be carried out unobserved by the enemy.
8. Minelaying should be carried out in the area ordered. Deviations up to 1 mile to south and east are allowed, but mines must not be laid in water less than 5 meters deep.
9. The mines are ready in Mariupol and should be taken on board there.
10. While approaching the area, the boats should attack any enemy forces encountered. The operation should be carried out after the enemy has been destroyed or driven off. If the enemy maintains contact, the squadron is to put in to Taganrog. If attacked while laying mines, the escorting vessels are to take action, while the mine-carrier completes the operation.
11. On entering port, execution of the operation should be reported by "Most Immediate" radiogram and a written report on the minelaying should be transmitted as per S.A. II Volume g) fig.II.

C. Execution:

1. The mines should be embarked in Mariupol on X-day (X-day = date after the codeword).
2. The minelaying squadron should put out on X-day to reach the minelaying area at 0100 on X+1 day.
3. After carrying out the operation, the squadron is to put in to Taganrog or return direct to Mariupol if Naval Shore Commander, Ukraine considers it necessary.
4. For approach course and return route, see enclosed diagram.







**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**